snowmman

Sorry, I keep thinking Cheney is still running things! Got to take his picture off the wall.

Good catch... you're "on to me!" Sluggo_Monster Poser. It's called Atlanta.

some stuff from the perspective of a tank guy 1) Ammo Box Altar. Chaplain Jack Day Conducts Dak To Service 2) Long exposure of AC-47 Spooky gunship firing at night (68-69?) 3) C Co unloads VC corpses after fight near Cu Chi - Apr 66 4) Blackhawk Sign on eastbound QL-19 between Pleiku and Mang Yang Pass 5) C-123s Spraying Agent Orange right on troops on Strongpoint 10, Hwy 19E, Jan 1969 6) Montangard Craftsmen - making crossbows, and arrows that would be tipped with Curare. 7) Herding cattle - Herd of cattle being driven home at curfew time on Hwy 19 near An Khe. 8) Charlie 16 - Tanks accompany artillery on raid to CP102 9) 8-inch Howitzer Camera catches "projo" leaving M-110 8-inch howitzer tube 1967 source: http://www.rjsmith.com/scrapbook.html

http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html NVA casualty data was provided by North Vietnam in a press release to Agence France Presse (AFP) on April 3, 1995, on the 20th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. The entire press release, along with more detailed breakdowns (say by year) is at the url above. US casualty information was derived from the Combat Area Casualty File of 11/93, and The Adjutant General's Center (TAGCEN) file of 1981, available from the National Archives. Additional information was derived from the sources listed at the end of this document. Entire.War Force.......KIA...........WIA...............MIA........CIA US.Forces......47,378 (1)...304,704 (2).....2,338 (3)..766 (4) ARVN..........223,748.....1,169,763.........NA.........NA South.Korea.....4,407........17,060.........NA.........NA Australia.........469.........2,940.............6......NA Thailand..........351.........1,358.........NA.........NA New.Zealand........55...........212.........NA.........NA NVA/VC......1,100,000.......600,000.........NA.........26,000 (5) Note 1: there were an additional 10,824 non-hostile deaths for a total of 58,202 Note 2: of the 304,704 WIA, 153,329 required hospitalization Note 3: this number decreases as remains are recovered and identified Note 4: 114 died in captivity Note 5: Does not include 101,511 Hoi Chanh The Agence France Presse (French Press Agency) news release of 4 April 1995 concerning the Vietnamese Government's release of official figures of dead and wounded during the Vietnam War. HANOI (AP) - April 4. Cinq millions de morts: 20 ans apregraves la fin de la guerre du Vietnam, le gouvernement de Hanoi a reacute veacute leacute, lundi, le bilan d'un conflit dent le nombre de victimes avait eacute teacute minore a l'eacutepoque pour ne pas affecter le moral de la population. Selon Hanoi, il y a eu pres de deux millions de morts dans la population civile du Nord et deux autres millions dans celle du Sud. Quant aux combats proprement dits, les chiffres sent d'un million cent mille militaires tueacutes et de 600.000 blesseacutes en 21 ans de guerre. Ce dernier bilan comprend a la fois les victimes de la guerilla vietcong et les soldats nord-vietamiens qui les eacute paulaient. Les preacute ceacute dentes estimations de source occidentale faisaient eacute tat d'un bilan de 666.000 morts parmi Ies combattants Vietnamiens. Translation The Hanoi government revealed on April 4 that the true civilian casualties of the Vietnam War were 2,000,000 in the north, and 2,000,000 in the south. Military casualties were 1.1 million killed and 600,000 wounded in 21 years of war. These figures were deliberately falsified during the war by the North Vietnamese Communists to avoid demoralizing the population. End Translation Note: Given a Vietnamese population of approximately 38 million during the period 1954-1975, Vietnamese casualties represent a good 12-13% of the entire population. To put this in perspective, consider that the population of the US was 220 million during the Vietnam War. Had The US sustained casualties of 13% of its population, there would have been 28 million US dead. ------------------------ Additional Casualty Statistics Source: Combat Area Casualty File of 11/93, National Archives All US Forces KIA in Vietnam = 58,169 US Army Soldiers KIA in Vietnam = 38,190 US Army Infantrymen (MOS 11B, 11C, etc.) KIA in Vietnam = 20,460 US Army Helicopter Crewmen KIA in Vietnam = 3,007 US Army Scouts KIA in Vietnam = 1,127 US Army Tankers KIA in Vietnam = 725 (equals 27% of all tankers ever assigned to Vietnam) US Marines Killed In Action in Vietnam = 14,836 The highest loss-rate for any MOS was 11E (Armor Crewman) 27% KIA

The following was taken from USARV GTA 21-1 (September 1967). Each soldier arriving in the Republic of Vietnam was issued this GTA (General Training Aid), which measured 2 1/2 x 3 1/2 inches, and required to keep it on his person at all times. The Enemy In Your Hands As a member of the U.S. Military Forces, you will comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions of 1949 to which your country adheres. Under these conventions: You Can And You Will Disarm your prisoner Immediately search him thoroughly Require him to be silent Segregate him from other prisoners Guard him carefully Take him to the place designated by your commander You Cannot And Must Not Mistreat your prisoner Humiliate or degrade him Take any of his personal effects which do not have significant military value Refuse him medical treatment if required and available 1. Handle Him Firmly, Promptly, but Humanely The captive in your hands must be disarmed, searched, secured, and watched. But he must also be treated at all times as a human being. He must not be tortured, killed, mutilated, or degraded, even if he refuses to talk. If the captive is a woman, treat her with all respect due her sex. 2. Take The Captive Quickly To Security As soon as possible evacuate the captive to a place of safety and interrogation designated by your commander. Military documents taken from the captive are also sent to the interrogators, but the captive will keep his personal equipment except weapons. 3. Mistreatment Of Any Captive Is A Criminal Offense. Every Soldier Is Personally Responsible For The Enemy In His Hands It is both dishonorable and foolish to mistreat a captive. It is also a punishable offense. Not even a beaten enemy will surrender if he knows his captors will torture or kill him. He will resist and make his capture more costly. Fair treatment of captives encourages the enemy to surrender. 4. Treat The Sick And Wounded Captive As Best You Can The captive saved may be an intelligence source. In any case he is a human being and must be treated like one. The soldier who ignores the sick and wounded degrades his uniform. 5. All Persons In Your Hands, Whether Suspects, Civilians, Or Combat Captives, Must Be Protected Against Violence, Insults, Curiousity, and Reprisals Of Any Kind Leave punishment to the courts and judges. The soldier shows his strength by his fairness, firmness, and humanity to the persons in his hands. Key Phrases English Vietnamese Halt -- Dung Lai Lay Down Your Gun -- Buong Sung Xuong Put Up Your Hands -- Dura tay len Keep Your Hands On Your Head -- Dura tay len dau I Will Search You -- Toi kham ong Do Not Talk -- Dung Noi Chuyen Walk There -- Lai Dang Kia Turn Right -- Xay Ben Phai Turn Left -- Xay Ben Trai Have A Nice Day -- Chou Ang

funny! In Plaster's books, it's actually quite interesting to see how they put together the team of top level guys at the start. Some had backgrounds going back to WII. The top position was called Chief SOG, and was held by a couple of people over the years. I had one line of thinking about Vietnam histories, and war and how populations and societies absorb the ideas over time. We get used to the idea that the "truth" is told by the guys on the ground..the guys on the front lines, in the trenches, with the heartbreaking buddy stories. But in reality, they're just reacting, yes in a superhuman way, given the box that was defined for them. The goals, the gear, the restrictions on their conduct. Even though they might think they have infinite freedom to act noblely, the outcomes are pretty much constrained by higher level things...for instance all the troops and supplies coming thru Cambodia and Laos, on trails you couldn't see from the air. And that the NVA were comfortable living in the jungle, and were actually an impressive fighting force, and had the home field advantage. But we don't see as many stories from the top to middle level guys. Because those stories would be pretty ugly. They're less romantic. But the way those decisions were made and who made them, probably were primary contributors. In the few snippets I've read about the very early years, it's amazing how basically all the shit in Southeast Asia was nonstop from WWII on. I'm also less impressed with Kennedy. Lack of knowledge was a big thing. Lots of actions based on little knowledge. (edit) Chief SOGs 1965-1966 Brigadier General Donald Blackburn 1966-1968 Major General Jack Singlaub 1968-1970 Colonel Steve Cavanaugh 1970-1972 Colonel John Sadler

The Nat Geo team, Katie Greenfield specifically, has released info that the DZ has finally been identified by a team of scientists. I'm not sure about the use of the "may have very well been directly" modifier, but I think it's a phrase used by scientists: http://ngccommunity.nationalgeographic.com/ngcblogs/inside-ngc/ "Currently the FBI has the help of a team of scientists who are going through the evidence in detail- recalculating the drop zone, analyzing the money. They are finding that the drop zone may have very well been directly over the Columbia River, D. B. Cooper disappeared, yes, he may have been washed out to sea." I also note they have some stills from the documentary. Apparently Cooper landed with sunglasses intact. See photos attached. (was the tie also on for the landing??) or click thru the photos at: http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/the-skyjacker-that-got-away-4375/Overview#tab-Photos/4 The budget for the documentary was estimated to be $280,000 from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1466352/business

Poser. It's called Hotlanta.

page 105-107, "SOG" by John L. Plaster Daniel Boone operation into Cambodia At Stevens' urging, the major finally had four American Huey gunships strafe the woodline around the slash-and-burn, and when they didn't draw ground fire the cocksure officer was convinced Stevens was running scared. With disgust in his voice, the major radioed, "OK, send in a helicopter and we'll call it a day." Because the slope was so steep, the Kingbee that went in carried an American to help lift the recon men aboard, a tall, lanky, master sergeant, Ben Snowden. Friendly, quiet and a good soldier, Snowden was an old Vietnam hand and well respected, and it was his welcome hand that reached from the hovering Kingbee above Stevens. Just as Stevens lifted up his Nung point man to Snowden, "there let loose such a volume of fire as I've never heard since," the One-Zero said. While the men on the LZ jumped for cover, the chopper rocked groggily back and forth but somehow lifted away. The Kingbee made it back to SOG's Dak To launch site where, riddled with sixty-eight bullet holes, its engine out, it slammed into a ditch. From his cover, Stevens raised his head, looked uphill and for the first time could discern a gully and a cave. Protruding from the cave was the NVA machine gun that had hit Snowden's Kingbee. It had ceased firing as soon as the helicopter left. Now Stevens realized they were after the helicopters. "They didn't want us. They could have got us on square one.. They could've shot me sitting in the door coming in." Fortunately, Stevens and his men were not actually in Cambodia but 100 yards into Laos. Covey brought in a pair of A-1s that dropped bombs and strafed danger-close, forcing the enemy back. A Kingbee made a few low passes and didn't take fire, so it swung around and touched down, and the whole recon team rushed it and jumped aboard. It was about 30 feet in the air when that NVA machine gun reappeared at the cave mouth and its concentrated fire shot the tail rotor off, spinning the bird wildly around until it flipped and slammed on its side, its shattered rotors flailing the earth, kicking up a momentary dust storm. Inside the crashed Kingbee, Stevens lay among a mass of rucksacks and squirming bodies; despite his daze he saw high-octane gas streaming everywhere and he knew any second it would torch up. He jumped up, grabbed the edge of the open doorway and pulled himself out, sitting above the H-34's side; he could make out three NVA and the machine gun that had brought the Kingbee down. Whether awestruck or compassionate, the Communist gunners stopped firing for a few seconds. That was all that Stevens needed. With adrenaline inspiration, he snatched up his Nungs and the Vietnamese door gunner and heaved then like rag dolls to safety. Meanwhile his One-One, Roland Nuqui, ran around, kicked in the cockpit Plexiglas and dragged the pilots out. Amazingly, not one of the nine men was dead, and only the Vietnamese door gunner's wounds were serious. As they low-crawled into the jungle the machine gun resumed firing, but by then Stevens had arrayed everyone securely in a small perimeter. But they had to be extracted soon or they were doomed. Only one flyable Kingbee remained and it had to leave to refuel. To make matters worse Covey, too, went to refuel. The only air support left was an unarmed Bird Dog carrying recon man Joe Woods. The Bird Dog made simulated gun runs to keep the enemy occupied. But it was a propeller-driven A-1 Skyraider from the Pleiku-based "Spads" that saved the day. While the Kingbee and Covey refueled, Stevens carefully describe to the A-1 pilot the exact heading to the cave containing the deadly machine gun. Then the A-1 rolled in, banked almost vertically to release a shiny canister that spun end over end just above the team, smashed through limbs and leaves, bounced once then spewed 50 yards of jellied gasoline into the small cave mouth, and PHOOOMPFFFFF!--' the napalm flashed brackish orange. Scratch one machine gun. Looking up at that sharpshooting Skyraider, Stevens saw what looked like dust flicking off its skin and realized other enemy machine guns were stitching it with slugs. A second later the plane belched smoke. Stevens watched the A-1 nose up, saw the canopy fall away and the pilot deject. Stevens clenched his Swedish K so hard it shook in his hands. But wishing and hoping were no help; the parachute drifted into the NVA positions. The A-1 pilot was lost. Whether he died in captivity or was killed immediately, Stevens never learned. Momentarily helicopters appeared gunships, and the remaining Kingbee. flown by the Vietnamese pilot who'd taken sixty-eight hits and crash-landed the other bird at Dak To. He had insisted on flying because he knew the LZ. With the deep shadows of sunset falling across the hillside and this one final H-34 available, everyone understood there'd be just one chance; the gunships let loose almost their entire loads in a couple of withering low-level passes. Then came the Kingbee. It seemed anticlimatic after six hours of shooting and bombing and strafing, but they got out with only minimum ground fire. At Dak To, Stevens and Nuqui and the Nungs climbed from the Kingbee, exhausted and sweating but euphoric because their team had come through without losing a single man. Stevens lifted a silent toast to the unknown A-1 pilot. Then Lowell Stevens saw a body bag and learned Ben Snowden was dead, riddled by nine of those sixty-eight bullets that hit the first Kingbee. He'd probably died even while he hovered 6 feet over Stevens on the LZ. In honor of the lanky master sergeant, about a hundred SOG men gathered that night and sang "Hey, Blue." In memory of this first man lost in Daniel Boone, they named the new recon company office at Kontum, Snowden Hall.

Yeah. Remember I'm just grooming you for access to my nuke. If there are side benefits, well, all the better. Friends with benefits. When people sit in the pews and listen to someone and nod their heads, it's a sermon. When someone rants in the parking lot in front of Starbucks, it's just a lunatic. But pretty much the same thing.

oh the Rex Jaco reference is online in Google Books, in case you didn't believe my reference here: http://books.google.com/books?id=JYT5UO_VHHcC&pg=PA346&lpg=PA346&dq=%22db+cooper%22+sog&source=bl&ots=3UyIbKtnWK&sig=WSvtOtDkcHiUfWIcy32VQoR2iSE&hl=en&ei=wpJrSufiM4L0sgPxjo2WBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3

What "main interviewing"? They who? Or are you just making this up? Okay, how would you paraphrase what sluggo said? You're aware of when the FBI first started saying they changed their opinion of whether Cooper was an expert, right? I figured those two years bounded the SOG investigation, if there was more than one interview. What do you think? (edit) They who? it would be FBI right? who else would it be?

Billy Waugh retired in 1972 He started working for the Post Office in 1975 He started working for Wilson/Libya in 1977 Where was he from 1972-1975? I hate gaps in people's lives. from his book, saying he started at the P.O. in 1975 "found myself back in Texas in 1975, needing to make some money, so I went to work for the US Postal Service. It seemed like worthy employment, " This page also details that the Libya thing started with a phone call on July 20, 1977. In other places he mentiones 1976, but that seems incorrect. Also in other places he says he "left Vietnam" in 1972, but that seems incorrect, because of the orders to report to Fort Bragg earlier? quote above from http://books.google.com/books?id=GdCKyGhie_QC&pg=PA92&lpg=PA92&dq=%22billy+waugh%22+1975&source=bl&ots=u6Am5v9ZNw&sig=yYoPIKIRIc_MEhcXH5VrUZGGuGM&hl=en&ei=yn9rStz5CZG-sgP_taCWBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4 (edit) I'm wondering if the main interviewing of SOG was done in 1972. If Billy had "disappeared" or was not findable, would that mean he wasn't interviewed? Did anyone know where he was? I wonder if they might have guessed it was Billy and he was dead? Strange.

Northern Service long-term agents (So Phong Ve Duyen Hai) in Da Nang. Team BULL Leader - Northern Service, Mr. Nguyen Duc Nhon is far left in the front row. Commanded by Colonel Linh, agents were inserted North by PT Boats or by C-46 transport. Special Branch and SOG inserted more than 500 agents in North Vietnam from 1958 to 1970. 2nd pic is a good pic of Camp Long Thanh, were a lot of training took place (mentioned before in the thread)

full article and photos at http://ngothelinh.tripod.com/the_lost_commandos.html ON THE TRAIN RIDE FROM PRISON, NHI HUNG DINH SAW HIS COUNTRY for the first time in 18 years. He would never forget the view. Rubble, bombed-out buildings and craters scarred the landscape. Conditions were so squalid in Vinh, a major port in the panhandle of northern Vietnam, that he did not want to get off the train to stretch his legs. The people seemed listless, and Dinh spotted pickpockets among the waiting passengers. It was 1982, seven years after the end of the Vietnam War, but much of the city was still in ruin-the target of some of the conflict's heaviest naval and aerial bombardment. His train headed south across the Demilitarized Zone, which once split Vietnam into two countries, and pulled into Hue. In 1968, the Viet Cong had ushered in Tet, the Asian lunar New Year, by turning this lovely old town of palaces and temples into a bloody battleground. Shell-pocked buildings still lined the streets, and Dinh saw Amerasian youths selling fruits, cookies and black market cigarettes. He wondered who would raise them. Their fathers, American GIs, had left long ago. It was the same all the way to Ho Chi Minh City, which Dinh had known as Saigon. At the end of the 700-mile journey, he stood in disbelief outside his family's home in the peaceful seaside town of Vung Tau. It was 10 in the evening. More than 20 years before, he had left the house a cocky, hotheaded young man bolstered, he says, by an American military adviser's promise that he would be a hero. Now, Dinh was returning, middle-aged and in ill health. There would be no hero's welcome-no one was expecting him. The two police officers who had escorted him from prison pounded on the door and announced Dinh's arrival. There was some commotion inside, and Dinh heard members of his family cursing. They refused to open the door. A brother-in-law flatly accused him of being an impostor. His 75-year-old mother was convinced he must be a ghost. "You're dead, son, go on your way, and I will pray for your soul," she said through the door. There was no reason for her to think otherwise. Almost two decades before, South Vietnamese military officials had told her that Dinh had been killed during a mission. Where, they would not say. It was a secret. After that, the family received death benefits courtesy of the U.S. government. The lump sum amounted to a year of Dinh's pay-about $300. Not knowing what else to do, Dinh continued to knock on the door and insist that he was who he said he was. "Soul nothing! He's home!" yelled one of the officers. Finally, the bolt slid back, and his mother realized that the man outside was indeed her son. She wept and collapsed in his arms. Dinh sank into a chair, too numb to speak. It had been so long. Dinh had been a member of Team Romeo, a commando unit of 10 young Vietnamese, trained, paid and commanded by the U.S. government. For almost a decade, beginning in 1961, he and at least 700 men like him, by one estimate, were sent to wage guerrilla warfare in North Vietnam, first by the Central Intelligence Agency and later by the U.S. Army. Those who were not killed were captured and left to languish for decades in Communist prison camps. Now, the survivors are slowly emerging, bringing with them haunting questions about a top-secret operation that U.S. military leaders admit was a debacle and that might have helped trigger the United States' fateful decision in 1964 to dramatically escalate the Vietnam War. According to the military, former intelligence officials, historians and the commandos themselves, these men were part of a highly classified operation-which came to be called Operation 34A by the military-that continued from 1961 to 1970 despite repeated failures and the doubts of U.S. leaders. Sedgwick Tourison, an investigator for the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs, says that since 1979, hundreds of the former agents and commandos have been released from prison. Many have made their way to the homes of astonished relatives in Vietnam who had been told years before that their loved ones had perished. Between 50 and 60 former commandos are thought to have fled Vietnam for the United States. The rest remain in Southeast Asian refugee camps or in Vietnam, where they are treated as second-class citizens. Their actual numbers are hard to determine. Much of the documentation about the operations remains secret in military record centers, and what has been declassified provides only a glimpse of what happened to them. In an attempt to locate American MIAs in Vietnam, Tourison says that during the mid- to late 1980s he interviewed nearly all the former commandos living in the United States. From those and other interviews he estimates that 400 to 450 CIA and military operatives, out of a total of about 700, are still living. Dale Andrade, a historian for the government's Center for Military History in Washington, says his best estimate is that 200 to 300 men participated in the 34A part of the operation. But if the numbers are open to question, the disastrous outcome is not. "It was not worth the effort at all, in my appraisal," retired U.S. Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. ground forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, says of the program. "It was just not productive. We grew skeptical of the teams and skeptical of the intelligence they produced. Not much was contributed to the war effort." The cost of that failure has been borne by the commandos for years. Imprisoned for war crimes, they endured psychological torture, malnutrition, isolation and living conditions designed to break their spirits or kill them. In refugee camps, they watched as other South Vietnamese who had only spent a couple of years in re-education camps were allowed to emigrate long before they were. Those who came to the United States have had difficulty adapting to the culture. Some still eat only one small meal a day-their prison regimen is hard to shake-and many suffer from medical problems. A few have found meaningful work, but many now live on welfare or the generosity of friends, family or their former comrades. All have sacrificed their youth, and betrayal is a common word among them. The United States did little, if anything, to seek the commandos' release from prison during the Paris peace talks in 1973 and has not given them veterans benefits for their service. "There is no question who we are," says Ngung Van Le, a former commando who spent almost 17 years in prison and immigrated to Baltimore in 1985. "We fought for our country, but from my standpoint, the United States must do more than just turn its back on us." .... By 1968, the last 34A team had been sent into North Vietnam; according to Tourison it was dropped by mistake on top of an enemy anti-aircraft installation. Two years later, the teams had all been killed or captured, or were working for the enemy. "The Vietnamese were helpful and brave, but it just did not work," Colby says. "I tried to turn it off after a year or two. Yet, the military wanted to make a fresh start. I don't think they were very effective. But in war, you try everything you can." ... John Madison, now a retired U.S. Army colonel, who headed a U.S. delegation sent to Vietnam to assure the return of American prisoners of war, says he does not recall that the commandos were ever mentioned to him nor was his delegation instructed to inquire about them. ... SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE Paris peace talks, Guong Duc Vu, now 54, was among the first commandos to escape from prison and make it to the United States. For 10 years, he has lived with his wife, mother and three children in a roach-infested, two-room flat in Chicago that is bare except for a bed salvaged from the garbage and a shelf of religious icons. Vu was a member of a commando team sent on raids along the North Vietnamese coast. His first three missions had to be aborted. On his fourth and final raid in March, 1964, Vu was captured after his team could not find the patrol craft it was supposed to sink. "We were trying to find another target when some other boats came into view," Vu recalls. "Their guns opened fire. One of our men was killed and another was hit." After a month on the run, he and another team member were captured while they were trying to walk back to South Vietnam. For 16 years, Vu lived in a filthy thatched prison hut and supplemented his daily ration of barley with snakes, cockroaches and mice. When that wasn't enough, he cinched banana leaves around his midsection to relieve the hunger pangs. Vu says that in 1980 he was transferred to another camp, where prisoners occasionally received temporary passes to visit relatives. After one furlough, Vu did not return, becoming a fugitive and risking a longer prison term. He joined the exodus of more than a million Vietnamese who left the impoverished nation by boat or dangerous overland routes to reach U.N. refugee camps. Some drowned as overcrowded vessels capsized in heavy seas. Others simply vanished on jungle trails. (edit) 2nd pic Mr. William Colby (Saigon Station Chief ) talking to So Bac 'long-term' agents before their mission to the North. He was Chief of 45B Bureau - Special Branch (Truong Phong 45B, So Lien Lac, Phu Tong Thong).

When I posted about the new single rule, and Orange1 responded with an appropriate quote, I got to thinking...there can't be just one rule. There must be more. Luckily for everyone, I found the rules. Had to go to S-21 in Cambodia. As a public service, pic attached. Straighten up and fly right, everyone!

Jo: I know you've focused on the comic thing with the FBI. I have a serious question. Aren't black and white comics much better than color comics? I mean isn't my avatar way better than the Dan Cooper comic book on the FBI web page? I'm just saying.

If SOG was good to investigate in 1972, what new data or analysis changed SOG into not good to investigate at some later date? For instance: 2008 When Larry Carr quotes "experts" as the basis for the that change in direction, are the experts correct? and based on what? From what Larry Carr has said, it seems like it's just speculation. That's okay. Did the switch in focus happen purely randomly based on wild speculation?

Sluggo said "I have reason to believe the FBI knew about the SF-SOG activities in Viet Nam by as early as 1972. " Sluggo. You should never assume you're ahead of the pack. Always assume you're playing catchup. It's a better way to control the risk of being wrong. So the next questions to ask: 1) Was Waugh investigated? 2) If so, did someone actively decide to stop looking in that direction? 3) SOG info was destroyed. Were the HALO jumps first described in public in 1995? 4) When were the first photos of Waugh from 1971 made available? 5) Has Waugh's fingerprints and DNA ever been compared to what the FBI has? 6) If Waugh is not worth investigating today, what kind of suspect would the FBI investigate? 7) If the answer is "The FBI won't investigate anyone", then why spend the time on making FBI movies ..e.g. the one with Tom Kaye which is up on the FBI channel on youtube, etc..and all the press releases on the FBI page? Are they expecting Cooper to just show up and say "It's me, here's the proof?" Is that even a remote possibility? And the most important question 8) What can we do to make sure Cousin Brucie can write some good articles, maybe a book, minimally stay employed and keep the electricity on?

377 asked "Did he continue to say Nam vets are not viable candidates after being shown that they were?" He was never here when we showed they were. He hangs out with Sluggo at the bar and talks about the case. I guess I should discount that. So, I apologize. Carr is not full of shit, I have no proof of that. (edit) Can we review why it makes sense that loadmaster is the current FBI profile? I wonder why loadmasters aren't offended. Do loadmaster vet organizations shrug and say "Yeah, it was probably a loadmaster".

a sick obscure play on current events. "Son, we live in a world that has (iPhones) and those (iPhones) need to be guarded by (corporate thugs). Who's gonna do it? You? You, (Mr. I want my iPhone)? I have a greater responsibility than you can possibly fathom. You weep for (Sun Danyong) and curse (Foxconn); you have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what I know: that (Sun Danyong's) death, while tragic, probably saved (Apple) and that my existence, while grotesque and incomprehensible to you, saves (western capitalism). You don't want the truth because deep down in places you don't talk about (on) parties (lines) you want me (in Foxconn), you need me (in Foxconn). We use words like (patents), (trade secrets), (copyrights). We use them as the backbone of a life trying to defend (our monopoly). You use them as a punchline. I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who (surfs the internet) and (make calls using) the very (iPhone) I provide and then questions the manner in which I provide it. I would rather you just (pay up and) said "thank you," and went on your way. Otherwise, I suggest that you pick up a (baseball bat) and (report to Foxconn corporate security). Either way, I don't give a damn what you think you are entitled to."

I thought it was interesting in Waugh's reply to Jo, that he phrased it like he didn't remember where he was in Nov 1971, saying he "surely" must have been busy in CCN. Every SF account I read, the guys seem to know exactly every month where they were and what was going on. Maybe Waugh just had too many things going on. I thought it was interesting, especially if he was quitting then. I would think he'd know exactly, rather than saying something fuzzy to Jo. And why say anything like that to Jo anyhow? It's a weird, light denial, but non-denial since it's fuzzy. Maybe it's just an SF guy playing with whuffos.

hmm. Okay, you're right, 377. my mistake.

377 said "They had to know who Waugh was if they knew who Jaco was. Don't you think?" Depends. Young guys probably wouldn't be able to picture the old guy doing it. Waugh had returned to the US. We need the exact dates. (edit) also, leave to stateside seemed to happen for the SOG guys. Be interested in detail about that...when/how did they take leaves? No idea where the FBI interviewed. Nam? US? What year? All the SOG files were burned. The new composite sketch didn't appear until 1980 (or whatever year?) So who the hell knows what, or where, or when, they did any SOG investigation.

377 mused about the differences between "mistaken rather than "full of shit"?" Someone comes onto the DZ and says something about how a jump should be done. If someone corrects him, pointing out some problems with that perspective, and he adjusts what he says, then he's just mistaken. If he continues to wax eloquent about how a jump should be done, then he's just full of shit. Right?