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Everything posted by snowmman
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"I'd like to have two armies: one for display with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals, and dear little regimental officers who would be deeply concerned over their general's bowel movements or their colonel's piles, an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country. The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage uniforms, who would not be put on display, but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight." -Jean Larte' Guy, Soldier and Writer
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This is bound to stir up controversy. A 2005 master's thesis at a US war college, stating that SOG was "neither strategically nor operationally useful in Vietnam". But no one here reads long papers so I have nothing to worry about. (I'm always reading N things at once) http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437021&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf The author graduated from USMA West Point. This was for his master's after that.. Interestingly, relatively recent: 2005. By Major Danny M. Kelley II U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Presented for a Master's Thesis, 6/17/05 Title "The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam" I'll just repost some of the first paragraphs from the conclusion on page 73. He goes on to blame the civilian government, basically the presidency, for misuse. Which is accurate! Hey! This is how military coups start to get rationalized...yahoo. ----------------- CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Despite the tactical successes, SOG was neither strategically nor operationally useful in Vietnam. The ability to maneuver and conduct battles by the North Vietnamese was not impacted to any great degree by SOG's activities other than what was already mentioned in the research. The unconventional war effort was more or less a nuisance to the North Vietnamese. History shows that they continued to maintain control of their rear area and move supplies and personnel to fight the war in South Vietnam. They were still strong enough to mount a major offensive in 1972 and again successfully in 1975. Thus, SOG did not contribute significantly to the Vietnam War effort. Had SOG operations been linked to the conventional fight and restrictions lessened or dropped, the unconventional war effort might have been more effective. The significance of the conclusion to the field of study and related problems is that future presidents should ensure they know their enemy before committing military forces against it. Knowing the enemy will help ensure the correct forces are used and in the right manner. Furthermore, they must know the true capabilities and limitations of their military and paramilitary forces. There are advantages to using SOG type forces in limited wars. They have a low visibility signature, can be disavowed, and are by their nature extremely flexible. Furthermore, if applied to the correct targets, they can be extremely successful. Deciding what the force can actually accomplish is critical, although quite possible if planners conduct competent mission analysis. Restrictions should be carefully weighed during mission analysis to ensure the courses of action proposed will still meet the commander's intent. Whether or not the military or CIA is the paramilitary force of choice seems irrelevant. The advisors to the President need to ensure he or she has the correct information in order to make command decisions regarding the use of force. This applies today in the GWOT as well. The difference in presidential approaches to conducting limited war proved critical to an organization like SOG. Conducting large scale paramilitary operations that the US government would potentially have to acknowledge, explain, deny or disavow caused the President great risk at home as well as on the global stage. The presidential advisors should have known just how much could have been done covertly without causing a war that expanded beyond the scope of what was acceptable. Both Kennedy and Johnson shared many of the same key advisors, such as Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk. These individuals made numerous miscalculations and failed to provide their Presidents with the information they needed to properly execute covert operations in the context of a limited war strategy. Ineffectual advisors and Johnson as a cautious, almost timid Commander in Chief proved devastating to SOG's paramilitary efforts.
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okay I don't have Plaster's big photo book, but here are some pics from the center of "SOG, The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam", published 1997. (this was paperback edition. Not sure the year of the first published) SOG_1.jpg is cool for you jumpers. There's a photo from Jim Storter, the guy who exaggerated his HALO experience, but led the successful fourth HALO. The shot is two guys freefalling as a pair. Remember the account said they jumped as pairs. So you jumpers can chime in on their style! The shot is daytime, they are training at Camp Long Thanh. Altitude looks high to me. maybe 14k'? (edit) Looks to be a helicopter jump? The second I included for 377, since it shows use of a hand held radio direction finder on the ground. (edit) apparently NVA? not sure how Plaster would get such a pic though? I also like the picture of a toe-popper, because I couldn't visualize them from the description. (I even read I think where they improvised toe-poppers from soap dishes? Jerry: ever hear about anything like that?) And the pic of all the typical arms carried is good. Every account I've read emphasized the exact count of magazines, and the count of bullets in each magazine. I could imagine that became real important to these guys.
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Two new books in my mail today. (well, used, but very good condition) I've referenced what's available on Google Books before, but now I have the whole books. SOG, The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam, John L. Plaster and Secret Commandos, Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG. also by John L. Plaster. I'm actually looking forward to reading them. More than 700 pp. total. The bits I had read before of Plaster, I much more enjoyed his writing style, thoughts, commentary, than say the Waugh book. I've not read Hooper's book so can't comment on his writing style. I don't know if there will be anything interesting to post about..since I think I've covered most of it already. But will see. There is always more literature! it is never ending.
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Saw Indonesia was in the news today. I happened to be reading an article the other day from 1990 where the claim was that the US/CIA helped provide lists of names of PKI/Communist, that were used to track killings by the Indonesian army during the massacres in 1965. http://www.namebase.org/kadane.html I guess it's still fuzzy what the facts are. from wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Indonesia "Between 300,000 and one million Indonesians were killed in the mass killings that followed. The victims included non-Communists who were slain because of mistaken identity or "guilt by association." However, the lack of information makes it impossible to pinpoint an exact figure of casualties. Many scholars today suggest that the figure is between 200,000 and 500,000. Lists of suspected communists were supplied to the Indonesian military by the CIA. A CIA study of the events in Indonesia assessed that "In terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century..." " There is a separate entry for CIA involvement in Indonesia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Indonesia
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georger's use of "tyranny" was interesting. We make fun of forums and posts and writing, yet it can inspire someone to use the word "tyranny" ....must be good stuff then! Let's talk about something new. Jerrry's talk about a dispersion of bill fragments upward of the money find is interesting. (edit) Jerry: what direction is "above" ..towards the house, or N or S on the river bank? Jerry, we have pictures of the excavation. It was a series of trenches. Your post made it sound like the full bar was excavated (my read). It wasn't. I guess I don't understand why people would "see" fragments, but not pick them up. Are you saying they saw fragments, but no one recovered them? Need some clarification. Also: even if everything you say is true, why does it point to the Washougal? Is there some knowledge of how debris flows into the Columbia that the Fazios have?
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Jerry said "This in its self produced panic" Jerry, I sometimes wonder if Cooper was good enough that he knew how to induce panic in lots of ways...not just with a visual (the bomb). It's easy to induce panic with a stare, a tone of voice. Sometimes you don't have to say anything. You just have to act ...different. People get scared. Especially when they know they're exposed. The real problem with hijackings is not hijackers, but that planes are basically unsafe technology. Any unsafe technology is exploited. The lie the airlines promoted was that they were reasonable methods of transportation. It does not make sense, with where we are in terms of technologies and the world, to be flying people around in the air. (edit) I had a thought about technology and skill issues in a modern flavor. Jerry: if someone read the files off your computer right now and gave them to me, would that person be skilled or a whuffo? The correct answer is: could be either.
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You know what I really like about this thread (pause. you know it's going to involve a Orange1 reference) I imagine Orange1 contemplating this thread with one part of her brain, and the world economy at the same time, binning it..US. China. Japan. Brazil. Argentina. Slovenia. etc..All brimming with energy. Some negative, some positive... seeing the generational divide (actually just a taste of it...I by no means represent the youngest generation)..the cultural divide, the etc. divide, in the United States. Seeing Hooper, who still apparently can drum up a shoot-em-up loving crowd. War is good, although I would think it would rankle Orange1 seeing Hooper carpet-bag into Africa to get his stories to make a living off of. Back to the US representatives: And we just have white people posting here! Probably upper middle class, although if anyone wants to plead poverty, go for it. Imagine if we really had a cross section of America! I know I don't know anything about you guys. But sometimes I can feel the dogma coming thru. I called it "bombastic" once. Now it's interesting to me that I may be perceived as bombastic too...It makes the whole societal problem just that more intractable, if we can all perceive each other negatively. Doomed to failure? I don't get this proposition that if we just turned back the clock and acted like we all did around WWII or whenever some magic time was, life would be great. I mean, what are we supposed to do? Send men to moon? why? Listen to georger who cares apparently about young married couples with kids and no jobs? I'm surprised if that's true. But if so: kudoes to you georger, and I support you.
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Georger: Yes. Everything you think about me is exactly correct. And more. And more. And less. And less. Is that good?
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Jerry: We could go down the track of analyzing the prior hijacks and what the hijackers got or didn't get, but I thought we did that already. (edit) for instance: Cooper wasn't the first to demand money. You've shifted your thesis. I was asking why it would be a suicide mission if he didn't expect to get anything. That would just be a "lock-me-up" mission. To die, you need a way to do it. Do you think Cooper thought he'd get a parachute? Or was he going to just jump out the door if he didn't get anything? I don't follow the suicide mission theory, coupled to not expecting to get anything. I can believe suicide theory, if he expected to get at least a parachute. I can picture the idea of suicide, leaving it up to fate/chance..sort of a passive suicide...quite self-affirming, I would think, if you survive. (edit) Jerry I must be misunderstanding you. Cooper didn't start the skyjacking "era". Not by a long shot. What exactly do you mean? I've posted on historical precedents way back in the thread, and notable hijacks before Coopers. I'm surprised: it sounds like you're talking about some of the common myths?
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Good Air Force doc here from 1983 "Human Strength Capabilities for the Operation of Parachute Ripcords and Riser Releases" 63 pp You can get the pdf here http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA138328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Summary on page 5 is good Military Specification MIL-P-6645H, "Parachutes, Personnel, General Specification for," prescribes a 27 pound force limit to pull a parachute ripcord. They measured what males and females could do, under test conditions, with one and two hands. They said males could exceed 27 lbs with two hands. However based on their testing, they said: "It is recommended that the 27 pound limit should not be increased and that the Air Force continue teaching the two-hand pull for deploying a parachute" The test is pretty controlled, not real. See page 60. (edit) The Bibliography on the last page is interesting..looks like they used FM Telemetry in 1973 a paper "Determination of Parachute Ripcord Pull Forces during Free-Fall: Physiological Studies of Military Parachutists via FM Telemetry - IV." Aerospace Medicine 44(10); 1164-1168, 1973
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hey i'm just a whuffo, georger, but that was the funniest post in this thread in a long time. (edit) Poynter mentions old-time specs (dating to 1949) of 22 lbs "to cause the positive and quick functioning of the pack opening device" http://books.google.com/books?id=BKTuTXrXQu0C&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=poynter+22+lbs&source=bl&ots=n_qpxo8K-s&sig=ld_RSN3tsrqoqx-Xm1nKeYykzXM&hl=en&ei=4ZlmSt7AKJGOtAO-isT0Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1 (edit) Georger: it's only old folks in tight pants who go to Walmart. The digital age you're so antsy about: they don't go there. Try again!
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Cossey may be right! Be interesting to ask Cossey "Could anyone have survived using that rig? Who?"
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(edit) Corrected my first post: it was Hooper's brother Bill. I didn't know Hooper's brother had flown FAC in Vietnam. Cessna Bird Dogs. I guess maybe Hooper could tell us a lot. But fat chance! Gotta buy his latest book instead. http://www.jimhooper.co.uk/ youtube promo here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pg7ceDs39-A I guess the following is a review of the book "Jim Hooper's latest book, A HUNDRED FEET OVER HELL, puts you in the cockpit of what could be called one of the most dangerous flying jobs in history: forward air controllers in Vietnam. What makes the book extraordinary is that the pilot Jim profiles is his brother, and you get a story only a brother could weave, one that gets to the soul of an individual, and has the hairs on the back of your neck standing up. Bill Hooper flew Cessna Bird Dogs, slow, unarmored, virtually unarmed, and always within range of a determined enemy that eventually won that war. His mission was directing artillery and air support for Marines and Army personnel in contact with Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army regulars. A lot of missions and a lot of being shot at. His unit, the Catkillers, flew below the mountain tops, low over the jungle, at night, in monsoon downpours, into the DMZ and even North Vietnam, getting far less notice than their jet brethren or the helicopter pilots who became synonymous with Vietnam. Jim allows the men who were there to tell their own stories, taking us from his brother circling just above a fierce battle, to the company commander directing his troops in the firefight, to the grunt in a bomb crater not sure if he is going to live to see tomorrow. For anyone who wants a great story, who wants to learn about another aspect of the Vietnam War, or wants to read about a hair-raising aviation arena, A HUNDRED FEET OVER HELL has it all."
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This map (attached) is taken from the mia compilation on Strohlein, but it shows the marked area of roughly where Waugh's team jumped. (remember, at night, in the rain) from http://taskforceomegainc.org/S176.htm they have the team assignments as: Sgt. Major Billy Waugh, team leader SSgt. James "J. D." Bath, assistant team leader and baseman Sgt. Jesse Campbell, rifleman SSgt. Madison A. Strohlein, rifleman Summarising the training: "put through refresher training on Okinawa; they practiced for an additional month at Long Thanh, South Vietnam. This in-country training included 10 jumps from Huey helicopters and C-130s, 4 night HALO jumps and a final exercise in War Zone D, north east of Saigon." Another bit of trivia, I read an account of static lining from helicopters in Vietnam (Montagnards). Evidently they would use the triangular mount they used for the STABO rigs, on the heli. Just attach, and sort of jump out while sitting on the floor of the heli. I guess there were a lot of parachute operations, a lot of indigeneous.
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Has anyone dug up anything interesting on Gossett?
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I'm not sure I posted this before. I think the most detailed account I posted before was from the point of view of what happened with Strohlein...i.e. the MIA, presumed KIA accounting. It's interesting that Billy didn't write up his account of the jump in his book. I suppose he left out a lot of interesting stuff in his book. I don't know why. The Carlos the Jackal stuff was pretty boring, in comparison to stuff he did earlier. I can't imagine the Carlos/Libya stuff was all that important to Waugh? Apparently posted by someone who was in the helis afterward..part of the bright light team. Interesting more detail. I'm not sure if I have this book from Plaster on order....but apparently it describes that Bath's chute had blown out in the center and he had almost no control (actually I think I read that before elsewhere). It reiterates the heavy rain. Not as detailed as another accounts, but it's good because it's first person. http://www.macvsog.org/halo_extract.htm I’m recently read SOG by John L. Plaster. I love the book and read it with interest and looking for that “story” that might have something to do with A/101, Comancheros .... Anyway on page 317 of “SOG”, I read where Sergeant Major Billy Waugh, Staff Sergeant James “JD” Bath and Sergeants Jesse Campbell and Madison Strohlein were the member of SOG HALO team. They were put in a target DZ 60 miles southwest of Danang on 22 June 1971 on a intensely dangerous night jump at 14,000' from a Blackbird [ed. C130]. The book goes on to tell that Bath’s chute had blown out the canopy center and he had almost no control in his descent. He got separated from Strohlein, Campbell and Waugh in the heavy rain and his chute collapsed on a tree branch and he plunged to the ground wrenching his knee and knocking himself out. Strohlein crashed through the trees and was caught up in the tree with his chute. He broke his right arm and could not operate his descender. In his harness with a broken arm he was stuck in the tree. He could only talk with Bath by radio. Waugh and Campbell landed safely. They all say NVA during the night but were not discovered by them. The A/101 Avn., Comancheros, were the extraction birds the next morning. We had Bright Light teams on board a couple of our birds, but not on mine, when we went out at O dark 30. We first were going to go after Bath, but he said that Strohlein needed to get out first. We were redirected to the adjoining embankment to look for Strohlein. We had a hell of a time trying to find him. He was on the radio talking to us and trying to vector us toward him by the sound of our rotors. This was triple canopy jungle and we could not see him anywhere. We once thought that we were very close and he said he could hear us overhead. The rotor blades moved the jungle away and I saw him (I thought). I leaned out and threw a string to him and it landed at his feet. He just looked up at me and would not take the string. We were hovering about 25'-30' above “him” and I was motioning for him to grab the string but he would not. He just looked up at me and smiled. The pilots ask me what the problem was and I told him he would not grab the string. Then for some reason I asked the pilot if the team was all round eyes or if yards were among them? While I was still motioning to try to get this “yard” to grab the string, the pilot came back with “All round eye team”. About that time I got very frightened and reached back to grab my M16 as it was within reach while I was laying on the floor. Just as I locked and loaded it and stuck my head back out to shoot and this guy as he starts to take his gun from a position of slung over his shoulder. Now it seems like it took forever for all this to transpire, but could not of been more than a couple of seconds. I pulled the trigger before he got his AK up to aim. Why he did not shoot us before this I can’t explain. He had enough time to fire his whole clip in the bottom of my Huey and me as I lay on the deck. This is the only time I ever shot any NVA/VC that I could see their eyes. I can still see it just as though it was yesterday. After he threw a smoke we found out that Strohlein was actually hearing another Comanchero over him but was talking to and directing us. Then he popped smoke we found the smoke but could not find his location exactly through the canopy jungle. He warned us off because he heard NVA around him and we did not want to give his position away. The weather got real bad and we were almost out of fuel so we moved over to were Campbell and Waugh were and extracted them instead. After going back and fueling up, we went back out again. We could not reach Strohlein on the radio, so one of the Comanchero birds rappelled in a couple of guys to go after Bath. They found him and all were lifted out on strings. After circling for a while and trying to reach Strohlein on the radio without any luck, his ridge was engulfed in fog so we could not get in to low level search for him. We finally started taking same light ground fire and again running low on fuel we had to leave. The next day a Hatchet force platoon was inserted to go after Strohlein. They found his map and CAR-15. No blood was found, however AK and CAR-15 brass were around the location. Sergeant Strohlein was never found and is still listed as MIA. I didn’t know about his fate until I read it in “SOG”. I was able to tell this story from the information I found in SOG by John L. Plaster and what little memory I have of the incident. It is heart breaking to now know the fate of Sergeant Madison Strohlein. I still have the feeling that if we had just tried a little harder we could have found him. I will look him up on the Wall the next time I get the chance. At Fort Bragg there is a vertical wind tower where Special Forces HALO parachutists perfect their skills, Strohlein Hall, named for SOG HALO jumper Madison Strohlein, MIA and believed captured.
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Jerry, for it to be a suicide mission, Cooper would have to get the parachute, right? Unless he planned on jumping with no chute? But if he thought he'd get the parachute, why would he not think he'd get the money? i.e. be surprised at getting the money. I don't follow the thinking. Are you thinking that getting arrested or shot was the suicide mission?
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Thanks for that detail Jerry. See, you should remind yourself of what you've done to raise some kids more often! It's not just about moms. You deserve an attaboy, if no one has given it. I will. Attaboy. And I'm being sincere. Although I can't know, I suspect "job well done". (edit) And for 377, who based on our recent conversation might say "hmm. snow is sucking up." Nope. The reality is that Jerry has his own life. Me sucking up to Jerry would mean nothing. I'm willing to take the chance of thinking he might really need a pat on the back. A lot of people do.
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I'd also be curious to hear more about any of Jerry's training, jumps and other stuff, if he feels like sharing it. To be honest, I have no gathered info on Jerry's background or experiences.
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nice datapoint nigel99. thanks for posting the pic.
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Yup. To reiterate my point about how Ckret tries to be as dogmatic as any of us, with little data...(I hate saying the same thing twice, but people sometimes don't seem to grok it the first time) Ckret said no experienced jumper would jump in those conditions. Waugh's halo jump was in rain (edit) of some kind. Details are fuzzy. The bad weather prevented extraction for two days I believe it was. There's no way to know, but surely the bad weather was a contributor to the MIA. In my mind, Waugh learned the value of jumping in bad weather, if you didn't want to be found by search planes/helicopters, on that jump. Maybe also got motivated to try again to "do it right this time". Just random thoughts. Obviously.
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Right. So why do jumpers get all dogmatic about this or that detail in probable (possible?) behavior, pointing strongly to a decision about experience? Even Cousin Brucie, in his question about chutes, falls in that trap. I think of it more like "what aligns with what..what doesn't align with what"...I guess it's like the Venn diagram approach georger mentioned.
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Such disarming candor. Honesty as Judo. Clever. 377 "offer bone to break bone" :) Oh, I forgot to re-mention. (hasn't everything been mentioned before at some time? :) The right hand outboard pull, needs to be evaluated in the context of saying the 28' C-9 would be a hard pull in the NB-8. The text I posted from Poynter addresses the benefits of the mod, in improving the pull. Jumpers with experience could address this.
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good point, chutebuilder. But what if Coop had night jump experience/training? (edit) Oh I forgot that Ckret pointed out the evidence of lack of experience. See, I told you we need Ckret. I constantly forget!