nerdgirl

I'm looking for data that supports that statement - do you have any? Of the top of my head, no, I don't. Would be curious to see some. Most of the arguments that I have heard are based on scenarios and judgements of capabilities. Others may have more empirical data. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

The B of A ATMs around here function similarly. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

I read what I suspect is a very different The Forever War. Agree Dexter Filkins’ book was very good … have not heard of Haldeman’s synonymous book before. As a variant of Drew’s post, there is the idea of Democratic Peace, i.e., that democracies tend to go to war less than non-democracies. Or as Jason [kelpdiver] noted no nuclear states have ever gone to war with each other directly. That’s a small N set tho’. I’ll go back to my favorite dead Prussian General (actually the *only* Prussian General I can name ), “St Carl” von Clausewitz: “War is merely a continuation of politics by other means.” Until we eliminate politics, as a species we are unlikely to eliminate warfare, imo. Interstate wars have decreased over the last 100 years. Insurgencies and small internal wars have increased. (I’ll dig up some empirics if anyone really wants them.) Cool questions! Interesting to read others’ thinking … to see both where mine intersects and diverges and to where the discussion goes. Thanks! /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Unfortunately, you seem to be confusing the word 'norm' and the word 'ideal'. Eh, you might be right ... this was kind of in the back of my mind. It is an interesting paradox (to me, as far as my own introspection) that while I rarely argue norms, I do try to behave based on my own normative principles. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

On what do you base that -- both the assertion of the policy position and the assertion of fact? Marg, sorry for the long answer, but it is a major pair of questions. Thanks for the reply. Chapters and books have been written on the subject. I was more curious as to how you got to your thinking as posted above that CW are useful in modern warfare. I’m a bit an iconoclast (or ‘heretic’ depending on how feisty I’m feeling at the moment ) w/r/t the relative threat (i.e., motivation x capability x vulnerability) and risk (i.e., probability x consequence) of CW within the WMD community. Always curious how others get to their assessments. Interesting argument. That’s the chemical weapons “taboo” argument or a normative argument. I don’t tend to argue normatives w/r/t policy. My observation is that the current thinking is driven by a perception that CW are neither a tactical nor strategic threat, e.g., the latest WMD Commission that I cited asserted that along with considerations that there were much better developed countermeasures to CW, the latter which is true to some extent. (And mostly a credit to the US Army Chemical Corps and Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center.) The potential consequence of CW is often minimized, imo. What’s driving – i.e., the underlying ‘how’ and why’ folks come to those conclusions – that perception is the curious part to me. “Calculated Ambiguity” w/r/t responding to a CBW attack was the US policy through the signing off on the February 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. With those policy changes, the ambiguity was clarified. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-14 remains tightly classified, which is thought to deal with nuclear weapons targeting including in retaliation. A new NPR is currently being undertaken, as required by Congress. Oversight of the NPR (& QDR) is by General James “Hoss” Cartwright, USMC & (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). GEN Cartwright was an iconoclast at STRATCOM … have heard different comments on how the move from Nebraska to DC affected that. He’s got a good understanding of nukes. I would argue that more strongly: it’s pretty clear that the US would not have given up its offensive CW program were it not for its nuclear deterrent. The Aum Shinrikyo executed at least ten separate chemical terrorism attacks. The most well known was the March 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway with sarin. They also improvised weaponization for generating hydrogen cyanide (including condoms as improvised delivery systems) and synthesized VX, which they used to kill a cult member who left the group (delivered to the back of the neck via syringe drop; only through the GC-Mass Spectrometry w/the detection of sulfur-containing degradation products in the corpse was that recognized.) Empirically, across the WMD spectrum chemicals looking at data of real incidents the overwhelming -- 76% -- of actual terrorism *use* (excluding hoaxes, pranks, and threats) incidents have involved chemical agents … of one type or another. See attached graphs. The empirics are recognized, e.g., from the National Academy of Sciences’, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (2002): “Chemicals continue to be weapons of choice for terrorist attacks. They are readily available and have the potential to inflict significant casualties (from a few to perhaps many thousands in technically possible, if improbable, high-end attacks). And they have characteristics that make them attractive for deployment against an open society: easily concealed, undetectable at a distance, and visually indistinguishable from materials in everyday use.” But the rhetoric and perceptions disconnect from those empirics. I speculate it is based on perceived vulnerability and mis-perceptions of technical capability by terrorists (or alternatively mis-perceptions of the ease of some weaponization.) For example, the Aum Shinrikyo with trained scientists, millions in available resources, infrastructure, and a set of laws that minimized (or outright prohibited) police ‘interference’ were unable to successfully obtain, grow, weaponize, or disseminate a biological warfare agent. They failed completely w/Botulinum and made a mess with the vaccine strain (i.e., non-pathogenic) of anthrax (i.e., the Sterne 34F strain). I think that there is an unintended vulnerability that has been created w/r/t the perception of threat and relegation of CW largely to annals of history. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Here in Atlanta, the requirements for police use of deadly force are: (1) Perpetrator must have the Ability to cause death or serious bodily harm; (2) Perpetrator must have Opportunity to inflict harm; (3) Perpetrator must put officer or bystanders in real Jeopardy. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

A transcript would allow investigative analysis. Concur. A transcript would be useful, interesting, & ... perhaps even edifying in the subsequent discussion. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

What was your intent in posting this? Maybe I'm missing something. I was responding to the mnealtx post on dirtbag tactics only when those tactics are aimed at TK. Similar tactics used elsewhere by different co-respondents are generally considered SC norm. It was just a comment. Some people would call that making conversation. Thanks for the reply. As I read your comment – & perhaps I read it incorrectly, hence why I asked – your comment did not read like “making conversation.” Norms of behavior are often fluid. For me, ‘playing the player rather than playing the ball,’ i.e., addressing the topic and writing about ideas rather than focusing on the person is the SC norm. I try to practice that norm. Would you be willing to practice that norm too? Set an example for others? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Bumping this as President Obama is going to make an announcement regarding strategy and force structure (i.e., troop authorizations) tomorrow. As I type the votes here were 20 (54%) in favor of deploying more troops to Afghanistan and 17 votes (46%) opposed. A Gallup poll from last week, found that “47% of Americans would advise President Obama to increase the number of U.S. troops -- either by the roughly 40,000 recommended by the commanding general in Afghanistan or by a smaller amount -- while 39% would advise Obama to reduce the number of troops. Another 9% would opt to leave troop levels as they are, while 5% have no opinion.” Have you changed your opinion? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Thanks for posting that. Looking forward to reading the full report, which was linked at the bottom of the yahoo story you linked. My speculation is that it will discuss aspects of the decision-making process that have not been previously reviewed as part of internal reports ("lessons learned") or other external assessments, which have largely focused on military operations. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

What was your intent in posting this? Maybe I'm missing something. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

On what do you base that -- both the assertion of the policy position and the assertion of fact? I have observed the inverse, i.e., the CW are largely considered relics of history in the US and much of the NATO allies. For example, the most recent WMD Commission (bi-partisan) did not even consider CW; they focused solely on nukes and BW. NB: Please don't confuse questions with challenging statements ... curious *how* and *why* you got to those conclusions. I had an interesting, as I get to define interesting, conversation a few weeks ago with the South African representative to the OPCW regarding perceptions of relative risk. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

You do have a valid point to be considered w/r/t the US decision to abandon new chemical weapons and eliminate its arsenal. Both landmines and CW are indiscriminate weapons. The major difference is that CW are more unpredictable in behavior. There are *other* differences – latency, countermeasures, history, stronger norms, etc – but that is the major one from a strategic operational perspective (not necessarily foreign policy or other considerations that sometimes get lesser weight in this forum). The US has chosen to retain the option of using landmines because landmines are judged to be of strategic and tactical value. Ron and Tom have tried to explain. There also considered to have greater value (versus CW) when weighed against the threat of other states possessing them or transferring them to non-state actors (terrorists). It’s a judgement call that weighs a lot of different factors including but not limited to the long term consequences. Does that mean that whether that judgement is correct or incorrect cannot or should not be re-evaluated or discussed? Others may disagree, but I don’t think so. My opinion, owned entirely as that, is that a number of factors are combining to make the utility and effectiveness of landmines versus other options less strategically and tactically desirable. There are technological solutions ("material solutions," in DoD-speak) and the predominant form of warfare is shifting toward asymmetric and increasingly urban. Situations in which landmines offer little advantage. We’re not there yet, however. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Clever. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

You are correct. The goal is insuring that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for al Qa'eda. The method to achieve that goal is population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN), (see the last bullet on page 2; the ‘how to’ accomplish the ‘objectives’ on page 1). Neither occupation nor traditional military operations, i.e., what the British and Soviets pursued. Concur. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

I’m willing to answer the questions I ask. The deployment of 30k additional troops was not the single most important factor for decreasing the violence in Iraq. Recognizing that is an important lessons learned for Afghanistan, imo. The single biggest factor for decreasing violence in Iraq was the rise of The Awakening Councils. After the bombing of Sunni mosques (in retaliation for the bombing of the Al Askari Mosque (Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra), the Sunni tribes and insurgent groups (many of whom were members of the former Sunni government & the disbanded Iraqi Army) realized (awakened to the fact) that the Sunnis were not going to return to Hussayn-era minority rule of Iraq. The Awakening Councils manage payment for the … … Sons of Iraq paramilitary groups. These were Sunni paramilitary groups paid for by our tax dollars. At ~$300 a month, it was a lot cheaper than the costs associated with US soldiers and the non-specific costs of US soldiers lives. Many of the same insurgents who previously had been fighting against the multi-national forces were paid to secure the areas that previously were major ‘hot spots’ like al Anbar province . GEN Petraeus' comments on Sunni Awakening, Sons of Iraq, and increases in capabilities of Iraq security forces from Defenselink.mil here:“‘Since the first Sunni ‘awakening’ in late 2006 [i.e., before the authorization of ~20k soldiers to Baghdad and extended the deployments of ~4000 Marines in al Anbar province – nerdgirl], Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate in the political arena.’[... also realized they would be unlikely to participate in expected economic bounty - nerdgirl] “More than 91,000 Sons of Iraq local security volunteers are under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads, Petraeus said. These [paid] volunteers have helped to reduce violence and contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons caches, he said. The Sons of Iraq have been directly responsible for many lives and vehicles saved, and their value far outweighs the cost of the contracts to pay them, he said.” This type of support – direct and cooperative – between the US military and former Iraqi insurgents is part of … … Counterinsurgency Theory, aka “COIN”. OIF started as a first attempt to demonstrate the power of defense transformation. SecDef Rumsfeld attempted to apply Transformation Theory to execute OIF … except the force was still (largely) trained/training, equipping, and preparing to fight under the doctrine of more traditional warfighting theory and, more importantly, Iraq was not a peer-competitor. As part of COIN, the importance of changing the force structure of the insurgents (i.e., pay them to fight someone other than you) and the value of tacit support of the population is paramount, i.e., the population-centric counterinsurgency in GEN McChrystal’s leaked COMISAF Assessment. In order to get the tacit support of the population, one has to have basic security in areas of extreme conflict, like Anbar before … … lastly the “The Surge”. If more members of the best military in the world along with lots of US tax payers dollars are sent to a conflict area, one would quite reasonably expect immediate security to increase. (It may be positive evidence for the aphorism that throwing more money at a problem *does* work, eh?) The introduction of more troops to targeted areas facilitated the immediate securing of those areas to allow stabilization so that transition (e.g.., the handover of previously kinetically-active provinces) could begin. --- -- --- -- --- The first order lesson for Afghanistan that I take from this – and that’s the more important part, imo – is focusing purely on troop deployment numbers is strategically and operationally wrong. I understand that some folks do and even why they do – if one’s training is to see a purely military solution then it makes sense. It is also is simplification that fits with 20-second sound bites. As Gen McCrystal wrote in the leaked COMISAF initial assessment: “Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate. “This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. “This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population.” GEN McChrystal’s job is to think about force structure for Afghanistan, (among other things). He was requested by the President through the SecDef to do that. He did. It sucks that it was leaked. One can speculate on motives and interests behind the leaking but I see little utility in that. It was leaked is the reality of the situation. SecDef Gates has commented already. If one is to make a simplified comparison, there is a need for a ‘Pashtun Awakening’ in Afghanistan. As at least one poster has noted, we are already paying some Afghani’s (possible Taliban) to not fight us. Article from April 2009. Paying off an Afghani is only $10-20 (versus the $300 for Sons of Iraq). And more recently through the Afghan government in Kandahar province. Just paying them off is not sufficient, however. Indigenous anti-Taliban militias have arisen in eastern provinces and are being supported by the US-led Community Defense Initiative (CDI), which is strongly supported by GEN McChrystal. An interesting intersection, imo, is that many of these areas and provinces have had quite effective Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), e.g., Nangarhar, Paktia, and Khost. Unsure if that's correlation or causation. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Something that straddles Bonfire and Speakers Corner … it’s adorable so notionally suppose it could be in Bonfire, but it’s military-related and from Afghanistan (politics) so Speakers corner.

Me too ... except heading to Colorado Springs from ATL, therefore Delta. About halfway there, so somewhere over southern Missouri or SW Kansas. Ain't technology fabulous, eh? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Mike - Because it makes it very difficult to communicate with you. If you want to communicate only with those who share your exact views and who don't challenge your arguments, then no, you shouldn't care. Have a happy Thanksgiving all!

Serious, non-flippant question: who do you think is the enemy? While it may be completely obvious to you, what/who you consider "the enemy" is not clear to me ... and hence, why I'm asking (rather than assuming potentially incorrectly). And how do you think what GEN McChrystal recommended says w/r/t dealing with those enemies? What do you think about the idea of negotiating with the Taliban, and which Taliban? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Thanks Dan. Appreciate the detailed response. As I wrote to Tom above, my response is short due to waiting on a plane. Much to think about tho’. I don’t think that GEN McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry are that far afield in their overall analysis of the situation and the need to pursue population-centric COIN (rather than “offensive attack” mode), e.g., the comments I cited from the leaked COMISAF report that I cited last night. It’s the timing and ability/stability of the Afghan govt and how much the US/NATO can/should do w/r/t the Karzai govt and all those other internal Afghan governance problems on which they differ, imo. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Concur. President Obama has authorized the deployment of a larger number of troops to Afghanistan than have been deployed at any time since October 2001. President Obama has already authorized 34K additinal deployments in the first 8 months of his presidency. Those authorization bring the total number to more than 68k authorized deployments already and more than doubling the number a year ago. Is he not doing more to support the ground level effort in Afghanistan than done previously? Given that, why are you not championing him and his support of the effort in Afghanistan? He is doing what you've suugested. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Thanks for the serious response. I’m on my way out of town for Thanksgiving, so my response is concise (for me ). There’s a great deal of what you wrote with which I don’t disagree, and you’d find a lot of concurrence in analysis, particularly w/r/t the differences btw Iraq and Afghanistan, I’ve posted here. Still curious what you see as the role of the Awakening Councils and Sons of Iraq (& US policy decisions toward those entities) w/r/t the decrease in violence in Iraq since 2006? And what, if anything, do you see that as suggesting, e.g., i.e., lessons learned, w/r/t operational needs for Afghanistan? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

---- --- ---- Does anyone who’s following this more closely than I, (Jim [1969912] ?) know if the reported change w/r/t processing data, the “trick,” coincides with the start of the Mauna Loa direct data? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

I find it interesting that there has been so little discussion or mention of LTG Karl Eikenberry, USA (retired), who served two tours in Afghanistan and is the current Ambassador to Afghanistan. He reportedly opposes a significant increase in troops. While GEN McChrystal is more likely to have more focused military perspective today, it seems that Ambassador Eikenberry has a more comprehensive perspective. Arguments to the counter? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying