snowmman

Yes, Cooper could have had no skills and knowledge and done the hijacking. That's always a possibility. However, that also means there's nothing for us to theorize about. So I'm comfortable with saying, the only reasonable discussion, assumes Cooper had some skills, and he lived. It might not be true, but any other discussion ends quick.

http://books.google.com/books?client=firefox-a&id=jDluAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22Ted+B.+Braden%22+special+forces&q=%22Ted+B.+Braden%22#search_anchor "The men parachuted, using smoke jumper techniques to land in the tree-studded terrain of the Annamites. Another Project Delta Green Beret, an Army sergeant named Ted B. Braden, who had been a pioneer in high-altitude, low-opening(HALO) parachute methods..." Book is "The Blood Road" by John Prados, published 1998. The Annamite Range is a mountain range of eastern Indochina, which extends approximately 1100 km (700 miles) through Laos, Vietnam

I disagree I think a large number of non-jumpers "could" have been familiar with front/back parachutes. For example a person who was interested in aviation or paratroopers may have seen pictures, someone with a relative who had jumped and seen photo's or been told stories at Christmas, someone who knew a jumper and had been told "no shit there I was stories..." Yes, Cooper could have been just a random guy with no jump experience. That theory is always possible. But you're throwing in motivation theories. Who knows what Cooper's motivation was. Could be anything. But yeah, if you don't think there was any firsthand skill knowledge displayed by Cooper...i.e. he could have had no training..then sure...anyone could be Cooper. I guess I don't follow the reasoning that just because he knew jumpers, he would be motivated to hijack a plane and get away by jumping. Seems a stretch? Can you expand? He wanted money and he hatched the plan based on what he had heard others talk about? Or he was a wannabe jumper and figured he could jump out at night in the rain, for first jump? And didn't hesitate?

Dick Meadows is a classic example of how no one knew about these SOG guys even up to the early '80s. Meadows was described by Plaster, I mentioned him a little. A very good in-depth history of Meadows is here http://www.specialforces.org/sfalx/docs/meadows.pdf Even after retiring, he was involved in stuff, training...the Delta Force attempted rescue of the Iranian hostages, etc. "Virtually no one outside the black ops and Special Forces community knew of Dick Meadows until he made the cover of Newsweek in the early 1980s" Any investigation the FBI did in the '70s may have been pretty poor, just because all the info was still kept pretty close by these guys.

To increase the odds of getting a working chute nobody had screwed with - You know the wild conclusion the FAA Psyst jumped to- Those crazy theories the shrinks came up with don't make sense. He could have said "two parachutes" to address the thing you're saying. two back plus two front (chest), makes no sense, unless you're a jumper.

Bath did one of the halo jumps. Campbell and Bath were with Waugh on his HALO jump, along with Madison Strohlein who went MIA/KIA. Get this though: from Plaster's book: "RT Colorado, with Sergeants Ted Braden, Jim Hetrick and JD Bath went in first, just north of the Ben Hai River on the western end of the DMZ..." (from page 56 of "SOG" by Plaster) here: http://books.google.com/books?id=1UZuAAAAMAAJ&q=%22Ted+Braden%22&dq=%22Ted+Braden%22&lr=&client=firefox-a That's really interesting. It also confirms Braden was MACV-SOG. He was on RT Colorado, minimally. (RT = Recon Team. I believe most of the CCN RT's were named after states and snakes..further south, tools I think (e.g. RT Hammer)

Google books shows a number of foreign language books in the 70's referencing the Braden story here: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&hs=Exa&q=%22Ramparts%22%20%22Ted%20B.%20Braden%22&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wp

Ramparts? Thats (was) a deep political rag. Not the kind of place many SOG people would publish. Flags go up^ He was no longer SOG, remember. He was nabbed for desertion, but let go.

Georger said "Just out of curiosity, what do you think chances are the FBi already looked at Waugh/Braden, ages ago?" No idea. Ckret gave no clues. (edit) You can throw Sheridan in that pot of "did they interview".. (apparently Sheridan did get interviewed, but it may have been recent for all I know...don't know) Ckret said "loadmaster" but why would a loadmaster ask for front and back chutes? I would think loadmaster would just say "parachute" since he's using to emergency rigs. Ckret said "engineer" but that was BS. Ckret is now on comic books only. There is nothing to suggest the FBI did a good investigation. We know they talked to Rex Jaco, who was totally the wrong age. If they talked to Waugh, why didn't Plaster report that in his book? Waugh's a big talker? Why mention Jaco, but not Waugh if they both shared a story of being interviewed. There is no reason to believe, based on Ckret's actions, that the FBI did a reasonable investigation, at any time.

I've got one reference saying it's the Oct 1967 issue. here's background on that issue RAMPARTS magazine for October 1967 Cover attached 1967, Softcover Quarto, paper covers. Front cover has a photo of John Lennon wounded in army uniform, with the legend "John Lennon, Please Don't Die While There is Still Hope", Previewing a Beatle's Savage Anti-War Movie. Stephen Schneck's article and interview with Richard Lester about his film "How I Won the War", which featured Lennon. Of much more actual cultural significance is Judy Stone's "Conversations with B. Traven, a Literary Supplement on pp 56-71. Some minor rubbing to spine and front cover, else a fine, uncreased copy.

Okay, the "RAM parts" in "der Spiegel" is "Ramparts" the magazine that was referenced in the book listing I just posted. "Ramparts" October 1967 is apparently the issue where Braden's article first appeared, before "Der Speigel" republished. It's here, but no preview http://books.google.com/books?id=QxHZAAAAMAAJ (edit) Wikipedia entry for "Ramparts" magazine gives it's history http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramparts_(magazine)

80 now, would mean 42 in 1971. don't know if same one. let's see the article says 14 year vet in say 1966 when he was in Africa? (not 1968 when the article was written) So if he was 80-43=37 in 1966, then 14 years earlier he would have been 23? But that would only have been 1952, not WWII Maybe his service wasn't consecutive years. This book printed in 1979 says Braden was hired in Brussels, to serve in Zaire. Says CIA agents were involved in the hire Dirty work 2: the CIA in Africa‎ - Page 22 by Ellen Ray - Political Science - 1979 - 523 pages See the comments by Ted B. Braden, himself hired in Brussels through CIA agents to serve in Zaire in the mid-sixties, in Ramparts, October 1967; ..

Interesting. Fits with other data. Have nevr seen a photo of Bradon. Do you have any. Georger, read my post ...the english translation of the 1968 article by Ted B. Braden. spells it out. (edit) And matches the Plaster version of Braden's history.... But Braden was only in the military for 14 years. So what, 32, in 1968? So only 35 in 1971? roughly. Don't have exact age. I'm assuming he joined up when he was 18. hm..he says he was World War II. 695 freefall jumps. 377: what do you think???? Maybe he's older than I think. (WWII) "Qualification: 101. Airborne division, world war II; The master parachutist, 911 registered jumps, under it 695 in the free case;" Can't be Cooper. Or could he??? (EDIT) GEORGER: SEE WHAT BRUCE POSTED. WAUGH MISSPELLED> PLASTER GOT THE SPELLING RIGHT.

Note the article was written by Ted B. Braden for the American magazine "RAM parts" (maybe typo) Der Spiegel reprinted the article in 1968. (edit) this link translates german to english using yahoo babelfish. I've posted the english below. http://babelfish.yahoo.com/translate_url?doit=done&tt=url&intl=1&fr=bf-home&trurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwissen.spiegel.de%2Fwissen%2Fdokument%2Fdokument.html%3Fid%3D46094106%26top%3DSPIEGEL&lp=de_en&btnTrUrl=Translate er Spiegel 15/1968 of 08.04.1968, page 146 “WHICH BLACK IS, IS AN ENEMY” Soldier in Viet Nam - mercenaries in the Congo The American magazine “RAM parts” published the report of the former career soldier Braden, which looks for a job as a mercenary, after he defects from Viet Nam and had failed in the Congo. Der Spiegel prints those story of the mercenary, that from “RAM parts " editor Don Duncan -- War comrade Bradens in Viet Nam -- one introduces. Job searched: Mercenary, 14 years military service, immediately freely. Qualification: 101. Airborne division, world war II; The master parachutist, 911 registered jumps, under it 695 in the free case; Ex second lieutenant and ex-Sergeant of the US army; in four countries of Southeast Asia and two countries of Africa served; Experience in the use of US weapons, explosive, sabotage, infiltration; special ability: Training and line of “Hunter killer” - teams; 23 months jungle experience into and around Viet Nam. “Ready to organize and/or lead rebel teams or other side, depending upon desire not of the CIA of supported client. References: US army, US-Special-Forces, CIA and 5th command (the Congo). Data concerning other abilities only on confidential request. Absolute loyalty is assured to highest bidder. Use yourselves: Ted B. Braden, Postfach 711, 301 Broadway, San Francisco.” A joke? No. There are Ted B. Braden, and he looks for a job. Braden belongs to that career soldiers, whose secret death longing seems to be coupled with a well trained instinct of self-preservation. It continual suspends unnecessary dangers, however always creates themselves it to get off. The similarities between Braden and the type of ark of the modern mercenary, of Germany notorious Congo Mueller, are various. Both can laugh at the grausigsten things; both have the habit to divert with their manikürten hands to gestikulieren and thus the attention from their eyes. I had not to no more seen and accepted Braden for two years, he was still in the Speciai Forces. When it set me into the picture, how and why he dismisses was, the following story resulted: For the first time I had heard in Saigon in the Caravelle bar that one hires white mercenaries in Africa. That was four days before Christmas 1966. I was for 23 months in Viet Nam, a few good men had also co-operated, an appropriate portion of woman stories had had and a quite interesting job. Nevertheless I had it fullly. Because of the job was not it -- small groups into the jungle to lead to touch in the search for other men that knows I best, and makes for me at most fun. Partially it was because of the quarrels, which one has with the room stool agencies in Saigon, with the Empire founders, the bureaucratic Stümpern and incapable vietnamesischen officers and officials. But mainly it was because of the money. I became older, but do not enrich. My business was to hunt humans and if necessary -- sometimes also, if unnecessary -- to kill. That is good and beautiful, but riskily and often a very dirty, weld-rubbing work. As I said, that is a business, but the CIA Boys, which sits in Saigon in its offices with air conditioning in the Tran Yang Dau road, makes the thick money. Because I was only one loan to the CIA, I belonged not to the “Boys” and got only the pay of a technical sergeant. I like first-class things -- but with 800 dollar monthly is not that anything. And was called, I had on the black market and in the illegal exchange offices rather often to be seen to be able, in order to provide for pay on improvement. The mercenaries anyhow, then one told me, earned at least twice as much (officers still more) and would have even better opportunities, beside two, to coat three dollar. And I was already more bad pay mercenaries, only. Exactly as the Bur into the Special Forces, which do voluntarily for the fourth or fifth time in Viet Nam service, did not extend I mean service also because of fame, honour, native country -- me ging's around the money. I did not know, for whom and why the mercenaries fought, but that is not very important for a professional one. From Viet Nam to America to come, was unbelievably simple. Then, after I had amused myself Christmas and New Year white God, I flew off from the Miami internationally airport and arrived on 7 January at London. With the nine-clock ship course I slipped from the Victoria station to Belgium “more rüber. One had said, the recruitment to me took place in the administration building of the union Minière you skin Katanga into Brussels. As it turned out was wrong information, but one referred me to an office, where a man telephoned a little and said to me then, the best chances would have I in Salisbury in Rhodesien. On 13 January I arrived at Salisbury. I descended in the piekfeinen hotel “Meikles” and visited then one of the three bar at the place, in order to provide for me information. I wanted to get a line to major Mike Hoare, a citizen of the Republic of South Africa, the original commander of the “Force de Tshombé”, the white mercenary troop, which admits now under the designation “5. and 6th command” is. The 5th command consisted of South Africans, Rhodesiern, Englishmen, a few Canadians and isolated Americans. The 6th command in Kinshasa (Léopoldville) consisted mainly of Belgians -- about 300 men altogether, all air landing troops, which served Mobutu as militia and a palace guard. In the bar I ran Sis over the way, the owner originating from Scotland. I had andeutungsweise asked for the major, there hardly said her completely unverblümt: “Oh so, you want to contact the 5th command.” Sis was only first, which did not only have no scruples to talk with mercenaries but also so uninhibited over it spoke, as if the speech was from the weather. She said to me then, major Hoare had stepped into the retirement and lives now in Durban in South Africa; the 5th command is subordinate now to one of his old officers, a lieutenant colonel named John Peter. Bad messages -- the Anwerber of the command had driven fourteen days before from Salisbury to Johannesburg, and one did not know whether he would come back. Sis recommended to me to turn me to a certain Ralph Hyder which was to be found Windsor in the bar of the hotel. It was not heavy to find it. One needed to follow only from the road from a loud voice to its origin in the bar. Two drinks I later addressed it carefully on the topic 5th command. The caution was redundant. Hyder did not only know of it, it had participated and was delighted to have a pretext in order to spread over its adventures in the Congo. It terminated its remarks thereby that it said to me, I is my time not with the 5th command to waste, but rather directly a good organization enter -- a new “Force de Tshombé”. It let the days of the 5th command see through, is counted. It was not completely easy, but three hours later I could attach, which knowledge and experiences I had. There it hooked immediately and made themselves an open recruitment offer. The money was correct -- I should not get less than 1600 dollar monthly. After repetitive Aufkreuze " in the Windsor bar I discovered then that Ralph Hyder was only one three Bur, which enlisted in Salisbury openly for “the Force de Tshombé, Leute. Obviously Hyder more luck than the others had, and in the days after I became acquainted with five or six men, whom he had enlisted, and who already possessed all mercenary experience. According to the data of Hyder and its “Confréres” an air landing troop from mercenaries should be set up and trained -- the training should allegedly in Spain, probably in close proximity to Barcelona, before itself goes -, and the purpose of the whole one should be to conquer Katanga Joseph Mobutu ejecting and Moise Tshombé reinserting. At present, then it meant, is a man from Salisbury straight in Paris, in order to procure the money for the teams and for transport to Spain. Hyder wanted that I and the others, whom he had already enlisted on the spot for the return of this man wait should. The others were to be waited in agreement, because it unimportant rather to them, for which side they fought, as long as they got only their money. That was valid also for me, but I trusted Ralph Hyder not completely. I reserved myself my decision and used the time and many drinks, in order to draw to it the address of the main recruitment place for the 5th command in Johannesburg from the nose. From Salisbury to Johannesburg I traveled as Ted B. Braden and registered also with this name. After my arrival and after the examination of my passport at internationally the airport January Smuts in Johannesburg from me Joseph Edward Homer, Canadian citizens, and grown up in Windsor, was born Ontario. (It really gave a Joseph Horner -- it was Sergeant with the Special Forces and 1965 in a suction camp with Long Thang died, as a mortar salvo exploded prematurely.) I delivered my traveling bag at the main station in the city center and drove with the taxi directly to the Zygmersh Building, Kruis Street 37 in the city centre. Room number 616 proved as the Congolese office. The door, which I opened, led working office in carelessly, poorly and untidily. Everywhere documents, which was ground scattered with cigarette and cigar stubs, stacked themselves and in the middle in it räkelte themselves a half dozen of tea-drinking men at the desks. I placed myself reduction Bur forwards, which cast in the tea, and he for his part informed me that he was a second lieutenant Denny Scherriff -- evenly the man, whom I looked for: the Hauptanwerber for the 5th command. Although it looked, as if he would have been times in good form, worked he by no means impressively. Later I experienced that he was received slowly at cancer. I asked it immediately whether it was true that the 5th command enlists at present people. Yes, which is correct. Then lap it questions on me off. I kept its interest awake thereby that I referred to my experiences with special units and with air landing operations, and on the next day the Ausfragerei was continued. Most questions were technical nature - he wanted to probably make sure that at least one part of my history none bluff was. Next Scherriff cleared me up somewhat over the operations of the 5th command -- one prepares to fight a rebel troop which stands north of the Tanganjika lake. If I had interest -- I had interest -, I could be filled out a request and be set on the next day in march. Photo, forms, physical examination -- my initial impression of organization lacking passed rapidly. The office of the 5th command did not like to the standard of the US army -- line' em UP, shine' em UP (about: to begin leave -- on momentum) near-rich bring, but one was efficient and thorough. In the late afternoon everything was settled, and Denny Scherriff said should to me, I shortly before midnight on the January Smuts airport to it for the evacuation to the Congo announce itself. The airport looked at that night like a reproduction true to scale the air Force base Travis. Around midnight over one hundred mercenaries had appeared themselves, and in the middle in the airport area officers and NCOs of the 5th command accomplished an appeal. The standing business travelers watched curiously. At our number on 87 had decreased 3.30 o'clock, and we began to go, through the tariff. A word of second lieutenant Scherriff was sufficient -- one let me happen without passport. The grey-blue C-118 (a four-engined machine), into which we entered, had no characteristics and by English-speaking Belgians one flew. We landed against 8.30 o'clock in Albertville. Everywhere it smelled after CIA. Here she was called WIGMA -- Western internationally Ground maintenance operation. We were transferred by officers of the 5th command to most beautiful tropical uniforms of American design with shoulder pieces and brown toque, on which the Goldemböem of the 5th command prangte. While military police of the 5th command controlled traffic, one let us begin in the rain and mount then American trucks. One drove us to Albertville inside -- the city consists mainly of a long road, which at the port and at the railway rails along-led -, and we referred accomodation in an old colonial mansion, which grasps Albertville. In the same afternoon we were brought into the city, where us the Belgian FN-rifle (7.62 mm), NATO ammunition and our 5. - Were missed command uniform. Two days long one interviewte me for the purpose of the classification, then I was registered as a cadet, a decision, which was dependent still on the auxiliary training and trial period in the location Nakalisa. During this time we were not allowed to leave the mansion with the mattresses outside of the office-hours on the floors and the moderate food supply. The city was off of limit -- it had given tensions occasionally between WIGMO and 5th command. As it meant, had a major named Jacques Cassidy and an agent of the WIGMO in the hotel blue moon in a amourösen affair noise get with one another, which had ended with that Jacques set and forced its nine-millimeter pistol for the agent away between the eyes, with which he made, rectified the impression of the WIGMO agent, he only for fun. The two groups became -- except with the work -- from each other kept away, in order to avoid blood act of revenge ions. The command training took place in the location Nakalisa. The training was not even intensive after yardsticks of the US-Special-Forces and the air landing troop pleasure and. Force and quick marches in this height caused some losses under the Drückebergern and Pungees (marijuana smokers). The Pungees was too schlapp and sensitive, that they would have delivered good soldiers. The master troop came from the rhodesischen light infantry and was subordinate to sergeant Cholly Berger, a chap, who really understood no fun. Apart from drilling, which took place to British model, the combat training in each regard corresponded to the text books of the US air landing troops. The smallest deviation would have been noticeable to me immediately, but everything agreed -- up to the rifle attitude, the firing and movement tactics -- everything as directly from away the Benning imports. I never inquired about the procurement methods, but except the Belgian 7,62-Gewehr all were our weapons American makes -- 60-mm and 81-mm-Mörser, 3,5-cm-Granatwerfer, mortar with manual release and so on. Not possibly to characterize my comrades in the training camp -- were all possible people of all education stages, under it even one which came from the McGill university into Montreal. But they had one in common: Many had served at least a appreciative government, and indifferently, on which intelligence stage they stood in an army -- there was not an idealists in the whole group. They had only for money something remaining and were ready to submit to the discipline of an organization in order to take money. One said us, the training would have the purpose to make us fit for an attack on the Rienzi valley which should loose-go, if further commands were trained. Secret information was present, after which in this area 1800 rebels had been pulled together, and which should advance 5th command in three wedges, which devastate valley and everything, man, woman, child and dog, to exterminate. The realistic attitude of the commands to these operations: “Which is black, is an enemy.” 10 000-Dollar-Prämie was for each Russian or Chinesen suspended, who would be alive taken prisoner. To 21. Day were the 45 of us, that had gotten over the training, again in Albertville. I found the instruction to leave my group and to go me with the airplane, which should fly off two days later, after Kinshasa. Cholly Berger could not explain itself the thing; Captain Bozman expressed itself somewhat blurred, whereby it mentioned Colonels Peters, Luftlandetruppen, and let themselves a second dress uniform give. Except the C-118, which had brought me to Albertville, WIGMO and 5th command possessed together a row C-46 and C-47-Transportmaschinen, Skyraider, combat bomber and B-26-Bomber. The combat bombers and the bombers were flown by Kubanern, which had experienced the pig bay adventure. Hardsimmered Bur. It would be to be known interesting, in which country it fly now. Of those, which worked there, I heard that they had times five C-130 that the machines and their crews were used however then to reconciliation by losses in Viet Nam. When we arrived on the airport of Kinshasa, the machine stopped not on the main airfield, but continued to roll the whole runway up to the CIA hangar. Here they did not deliver themselves with rewritings. It was not only a CIA hangar, it called it also in such a way. Me one had abkommandiert, because I should develop a special air landing command of 50 men. Mobutu had approved the thing, and the money for it had been made. I should set up a training programme, an organization and a schedule and a plan of distribution, which had to be approved by Colonel Peters. If I got the thing according to desire, I should be appointed under a British front officer, a captain, the leading officer. The next seven, eight days were hectic, but I had enough time to stroll by the city and to become acquainted with civilians and my people. It was already an amusing situation: The country was black, the government was black, the rebels was black, and both sides used white mercenaries. After the CIA had thought about the tricky question, whom she should support, Mobutu or Tshombé, decided it for Mobutu -- an important decision, since the money of the State department and the CIA decides, who in the Congo to the rudder is. Decisions, which concern the Congo, become from there either directly or indirectly by those * US airplane brings food and medicines. The ammunition piles were left by fled mercenaries. Government passed on. The number of the Americans in the Congo is very small; usually there is message member and employees of the CIA. The CIA did not maintain the mercenary troops directly. Mobutu paid the mercenaries with US means, and that, which controlled these means, controlled Mobutu. Apart from the money the CIA exercised already thereby control that you belonged the transport aircrafts -- a vital thing in an underdeveloped country. My colleagues in the 5th command let see through that them generally Tshombé rather was than Mobutu, not for ideological reasons, but because of its personal characteristics. The inaugurations said, Tshombé was a nice chap, Bur, with whom one builds oneself up and converse one hour can drink long; Mobutu against it is so zappelig, almost paranoid, of diseased megalomania. So that none can approach to it, surround himself he with bodyguards. Unfortunately however at that time, when the last “contract” was signed, Tshombés seemed future and its financial resources somewhat doubtfuly. The mercenary troops were always considered as a necessary evil. They developed from the paramilitary units, which had set up the white ones for the protection of their property; Tshombé gave them then a firm form, because he did not give himself regarding the reliability and the impact force of his own troops any illusions. The troops of the colored ones are badly trained, still more badly paid, stand under the obligation of traditional master enmities, and even the most rudimentary foundation of the discipline is missing to them. Generally three things must accumulate, in order to bring it to the action: They must be complete before liquor and marijuana by senses, it must opportunity for pillaging give, and the direct danger of organized resistance must be past, so that they rape relatively without risk, to pillage and to plunder be able. Then their hate comes certainly on the white ones unrestrainedly to the course. Normally the mercenaries were used as advance guard or shock troop, which each settled, to which you stood in the way. They were only so for a long time, until they had pillaged the bank, then took off it; they left Congolese troops, which should hold the place. Pillaging and the Niedermetzeln completed the Congo reading. If the mercenary troops for Tshombé were active, they pillaged only government banks. If they stood with Mobutu under contract, they eliminated only or such banks, which were controlled by the union Minière for private banks. Whoever wins in Africa -- it is to be doubted that the victory the black one benefits. The color of the government can change, but the white man comes still in the first place. The Kaffir hates and is afraid the white one, makes for it however place, exactly like in former times. The black ones are still the servants of the white ones, and even at that time at least black Bur was entitled to a simple mercenary. With some commands they had four to five servants. But for me was suddenly everything past. The CIA had come me by Colonel Peters on the trace. While the CIA does not have any scruples to hire and use mercenaries, she did not like it in the Congo, if American citizens mercenary troops followed. I went from the jeep to the hotel entrance and through the dämmrige resound to the elevator in the back right. Colonel Peters, the commander of the Congo mercenaries, preceded, its main sergeant was behind me. When we stopped, four men with pistols aimed at me. American agent documents of identification were gezückt. “We looked for reason to the acceptance that you are Ted B. Braden, as a deserter of the government of the USA.” -- They had snatched me. The Colonel, my boss, which had lured me into the trap, apologized and said: “If I to decide would have, could you here-remain and with the order continue, but the decision is not with me.” One brought me in the room to 13 and photographed themselves in my uniform of the 5th command from all sides. Then I had to take off up to the skin, thoroughly scanned myself and to the bed was chained. So that nobody needed to genieren itself, they gave me old Blue jeans. It would have been jokeless to deny who I was -- they had the traveling bag with my official passport and other personal papers, which I had left in Johannesburg. Three and a half days placed it an intensive psychological cross-examine with me on. Why are you from Viet Nam defect? Indicate to the names of each particular, with which you spoke. What did you say to them? Did foreign agents contact you? Finally -- perhaps it was dämlich from me -- I signed a Prototoll something else I however hardly have done could, since the CIA is in the Congo gentleman over life and death. I spent still three days chained in room 13. One morning gave one me a red shirt, my civil shoes and shipped myself by the Hinterausgang of the “Ahladeff of arm” - hotel into a waiting car. We drove to the airport, took however the way in the back to CIA terminal building, where I was included in a barrack. Two hours later one pushed me again hastily into a car. A C-130-Transportflugzeug rolled on the runway. Supported by the agents adeptly, I left the car on fastest way, sharpened the ramp up and 'purely into the Maschi -- which did not receive people soul on the airfield. I was chained to the bracing, and we already were in air. It was the first stage of my return journey into the USA. There I came into the military prison from away DIX, where I spent the next 123 days and 14 hours in solitary confinement. Finally one came at the conclusion that a court-martial was a little meaningful and that the interests would be best served all involved one, if one let me run. I insured by my signature on oath place to pass on nothing from my knowledge of the operations of the CIA and the Special Forces in Southeast Asia then I became honorably from the US army to dismiss. They expect that I am grateful therefore into all eternity. The CIA wants to have American mercenaries directly in its services (like those people, which them trained at that time, thus these again people for the pig bay mess trained and led). Secondly it would be embarrassing for the CIA, if it admits became that an American mercenary was killed or taken prisoner -- while no humans move on, if a British or rhodesischer mercenary dies. The CIA rather works with other nationalities. Now I need a job, and thus I do not mean that I want to become with possibly whom truck drivers. People with my gift are looked for very much, but stupid-prove are concerned the CIA with the attitude, or which others have -- because of the CIA -- not enough money, in order to arrange a contract interesting. It is obvious that I stand with the Agency on the black list -- therefore it is difficult to contact from the USA different employers. The people, which could need my assistance in Latin America, try to let natives and foreign idealists fight -- and that is, professional ones do not have to expect money. I would go gladly again into the Congo, but I had the dark feeling, her leave me not.

I have to translate this. Article from 1968. Mentions Ted. B. Braden http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument.html?id=46094106&top=SPIEGEL DER SPIEGEL 15/1968 vom 08.04.1968, Seite 146 "WAS SCHWARZ IST, IST EIN FEIND" [Artikel zur Merkliste hinzufügen] Soldat in Vietnam - Söldner im Kongo Die amerikanische Zeitschrift "Ramparts" veröffentlichte den Bericht des früheren Berufssoldaten Braden, der einen Job als Söldner sucht, nachdem er aus Vietnam desertiert und im Kongo gescheitert war. Der SPIEGEL druckt die Story des Söldners, der von "Ramparts"Redakteur Don Duncan -- Kriegskamerad Bradens in Vietnam -- vorgestellt wird. Job gesucht: Söldner, 14 Jahre Militärdienst, sofort frei. Qualifikation: 101. Luftlande-Division, Weltkrieg II; Meister-Fallschirmspringer, 911 registrierte Absprünge, darunter 695 im freien Fall; Ex-Leutnant und Ex-Sergeant der US-Armee; in vier Ländern Südostasiens und zwei Ländern Afrikas gedient; Erfahrung im Gebrauch von US-Waffen, Sprengstoff, Sabotage, Infiltration; besondere Fähigkeit: Ausbildung und Leitung von "Hunter-killer"-Teams; 23 Monate Dschungelerfahrung in und um Vietnam. "Bereit, Rebellen-Teams der einen oder anderen Seite zu organisieren und/oder zu führen, je nach Wunsch des nicht von der CIA unterstützten Auftraggebers. Referenzen: US-Armee, US-Special-Forces, CIA und 5. Kommando (Kongo). Angaben über sonstige Fähigkeiten nur auf vertrauliche Anfrage. Absolute Loyalität wird Meistbietendem zugesichert. Wenden Sie sich an: Ted B. Braden, Postfach 711, 301 Broadway, San Francisco." Ein Witz? Nein. Es gibt Ted B. Braden, und er sucht einen Job. Braden gehört zu jenen Berufssoldaten, deren geheime Todessehnsucht mit einem gut ausgebildeten Selbsterhaltungstrieb gekoppelt zu sein scheint. Fortwährend setzt er sich unnötigen Gefahren aus, schafft es aber immer, davonzukommen. Die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Braden und dem Archetyp des modernen Söldners, Deutschlands berüchtigtem Kongo-Müller, sind vielfältig. Beide können über die grausigsten Dinge lachen; beide haben die Angewohnheit, mit ihren manikürten Händen zu gestikulieren und dadurch die Aufmerksamkeit von ihren Augen abzulenken. Ich hatte Braden seit zwei Jahren nicht mehr gesehen und nahm an, er sei noch immer in den Speciai Forces. Als er mich ins Bild setzte, wie und warum er entlassen worden war, ergab sich die folgende Story:

Brucie said "then appeared in Africa as a mercenary." So this was South Africa or ?? Orange1: who was hiring US mercenaries in Africa in the '60s??? Or was he the only one??

Plaster reported that Rex Jaco had been interviewed by FBI. (I think Jaco and Plaster are tight, they were on the truck op/prisoner snatch together?) Did you ask about Jaco??? Je fart dans votre direction générale.

Hey good work Brucie. So "Braden" is the correct spelling? Did you ask about rumors that Waugh was Cooper? How old was Braden in 1971? How Tall? Anyone have any photos of Braden? Is he in Sherman's "Who's Who From MACV-SOG"? what page? http://www.specialforcesbooks.com/MACVSOG.htm

Attached photo of jump boots that belonged to a Special Forces veteran who served two tours in Vietnam and was killed on 16 July, 1970 at camp A-236 (Bu Prang) while patrolling the camp perimeter. This vet is listed in Sherman’s Who Who in SOG on page 132. Jerry M. Weaver. was in a Hatchet Force. I'm not sure why he had jump boots, but they're a good visual of what was used at that time? I've always wondered whether civilians would have noticed jump boots correctly, worn under loose pants (not tucked in) The story of SSG Jerry M. Weaver's death is here: http://books.google.com/books?id=_znbSq4mluUC&pg=PA169&lpg=PA169&dq=%22Jerry+M.+Weaver%22+KIA&source=bl&ots=jqeDLOMG-e&sig=qPs9zcD-m2g9c_7FIRvR41AMLT4&hl=en&ei=oSB5SrLkM4WuswPVjvntBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=%22Jerry%20M.%20Weaver%22%20KIA&f=false

Vietnam Studies U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 CMH Publication 90-23 Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 1989 (First Printed, 1973) you have to click thru the links to read it. This was written in 1973! Has lists of SF camps (A, B and C). What's interesting here, is that MACV-SOG is not mentioned at all. It was still black op stuff in 1973. Just the other SF stuff is mentioned. The 5th Special Forces Group wound down out of Vietnam early in 1971. Includes Project Delta, Sigma and Omega. http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C.htm Colonel Francis John Kelly is eminently qualified to write the story of U.S. Army Special Forces. In 1960 he chaired the committee at the Command and General Staff College which produced the U.S. Army's first definitive approach to counterinsurgency, "The Role of the U.S. Army in the Cold War." He also wrote and conducted the Senior Officer Counterinsurgency Program course of study at the U.S. Army War College and served as a division chief in the Special Warfare Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army. For two years he commanded the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa, which provided multiple operational teams for combat service in Vietnam. From June 1966 to June 1967 he commanded the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Vietnam. Upon his return, he became the Commander of the Combat Development Command Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations at Fort Bragg. In all these positions, he strongly influenced the development of tactics and techniques, equipment, organization, and doctrine. After service in Vietnam, Colonel Kelly undertook the task of complete reorganization of the basic unit, the Special Forces Group, at the same time revising the doctrine. In September 1970 he was assigned as Senior Army Advisor to the State of Colorado in Denver. VERNE L. BOWERS The Adjutant General Major General, USA 15 September, 1972 Washington, D.C.

a really simple way to resize pictures that should be good enough, for windows xp, is described here: http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/window-on-windows/?p=567 Pick "Large" in the "Show More Options" described.

Prior to Waugh's retirement from SF in 1971-72, he worked for the CIA's elite Special Activities Division starting in 1961. Apparently as "Paramilitary Operations Officer" ?? I don't have more detail on this. Maybe just as SF A-Team? (Operational Detachment Alpha or ODA team). He arrived in South Vietnam in 1961..that was pretty early so it was all CIA led at that point?? (per wikipedia entry)

(reminds me of Wilson and C-4 to Libya) LA Times 4/3/1987 http://articles.latimes.com/1987-04-03/news/mn-2414_1?pg=1 Arms Drop for Contras in 1986 by CIA Alleged By DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON — A Central Intelligence Agency helicopter illegally delivered at least one cargo of plastic explosives to rebels inside Nicaragua last year, according to an American crewman aboard the flight and two other sources. Their account is the first confirmed report of a direct violation by CIA employees of the Boland Amendment, which prohibited the agency from providing weaponry to the contras from late 1984 through late 1986. The crewman, who was working for the contras' private airlift at the time, said that an unmarked Bell UH-1H helicopter carried between 200 and 400 pounds of plastic explosives to a landing zone inside Nicaragua from the rebels' air base at Aguacate, Honduras, on May 13, 1986. "We unloaded in the Bocay area (just inside Nicaragua)," the crewman, Iain Crawford of Fayetteville, N.C., said in an interview. "We dumped it on the ground as fast as we could and the contras picked it up and scurried away." Two Confirm Account His account was confirmed by a former U.S. official and by a ranking contra officer who said that CIA personnel made several such supply flights for the rebels. "They made a lot of flights for us," the contra said. "Some carried explosives and others equipment. Maybe it was against the rules, but they were trying to help us out." A spokesman for the Senate Intelligence Committee said that such flights were clearly prohibited at the time. "If they delivered explosives, that would be illegal," spokesman David Holliday said. "The CIA was allowed to do some things for the contras (in May, 1986), but they surely didn't include delivering explosives." Kathy Pherson, a spokesman for the CIA, said she could neither confirm nor deny the reported flights except to say: "The agency has complied with all congressional restrictions." Congress barred the Reagan Administration from providing or transporting military aid to the rebels from Oct. 12, 1984, until last Oct. 17. Congress approved $27 million in non-military aid for the rebels during that period but specifically prohibited the CIA from delivering it. In addition, in an attempt to avoid exposing American officials to combat, Congress barred U.S. government personnel from going into Nicaragua with the contras. Pilot Hit by Fire On a March, 1986, CIA helicopter flight across the border, however, Nicaraguan troops opened fire on the helicopter, damaging the aircraft and hitting the American pilot in the leg, the contra said. "He was a very good pilot, because he got the helicopter down without killing anyone," he said. Crawford, who spent five months working for the contras' private airlift operation, said he learned of that incident several weeks later when the CIA brought a big CH-36 Chinook helicopter down to the Nicaraguan border to lift the damaged chopper out. Crawford, 31, now the owner of a parachute rigging firm, said he knew one of the CIA officers at Aguacate--a man who used the code name "Mick"--from a previous meeting when Crawford was in a U.S. Army special operations unit. No Doubts About CIA "There was no question about his being CIA," said Crawford, who spent 11 years in the Army. "The contras knew it, I knew it, everyone knew it. . . . Mick talked about the congressional restrictions, how their hands were tied a lot." He said Mick organized parachute training for a small group of contras but complained that the CIA's rules prohibited him from helping the guerrillas with weapons training. Mick and another CIA officer who used the code name "Moe" lived apart from the contras in a small shack outfitted with a satellite antenna dish, two racks of radio equipment and a "situation board" showing the disposition of contra troops and the forces of the Nicaraguan government, Crawford said. 'Pilots Were Americans' As for the helicopter, he said: "The pilots were Americans. They wore survival vests and sat in armored chairs. This was new equipment. It wasn't the contras' and it wasn't (the private airlift operation's). It was clearly agency." The helicopters, which included several UH-1H "Hueys" and Hughes 500-Ds, came through Aguacate "roughly every other day," Crawford said. He said they were painted dark green or black and carried no military or national insignia. On May 13, Crawford said, he asked Mick if he could ride on one of the Huey flights, and Mick agreed. Crawford said there were four other men aboard: a pilot and co-pilot, both of whom appeared to be American, an unidentified Latino and Mick. Explosives 'Clearly Marked' "The cargo was about 80% food--bags of rice," he said. "And there was about 200 to 400 pounds of plastic explosive. . . . It was in wooden boxes. It was clearly marked." In fact, Crawford said, the boxes appeared to be from a load of plastic explosives he had helped fly from El Salvador to Aguacate a month earlier. "We flew just the other side of the river," he said, referring to the Rio Coco, which forms the border between Nicaragua and Honduras. "Where we landed I can't testify exactly, but it was just the other (Nicaraguan) side of the river." Crawford said he has already given his account to investigators from the Senate and House committees investigating the Reagan Administration's secret arms sales to Iran and aid to the contras. Congressional sources confirmed that and said the two panels are seeking corroboration for the story. Refers to Date Book Crawford, who referred frequently during the interview to his 1986 date book, said he was hired for the private airlift on Jan. 6, 1986, by Richard Gadd, a former Air Force officer and business associate of retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard V. Secord, an active participant in the effort to supply the contras. He displayed several documents confirming that account, including an identification card issued by the Salvadoran air force providing entry to El Salvador's main air base at Ilopango, where the airlift was based. Crawford said he had worked as a load master and "kicker" on 40 to 50 airlift flights, most of them dropping cargo by parachute to contra units near Bocay and Rus Rus to the east. Although the State Department sought to separate the delivery of its own non-military aid from the contras' weaponry, Crawford said: "There was no segregation whatsoever. It wasn't even dreamed of. . . . There was maybe one load of completely humanitarian aid out of 40 or 50." Invited to Briefing At one point, he said, Gadd asked Crawford to join him on an executive jet flight back to the United States so that he could brief three other men on the airlift operation's problems. One of the three, he said, was Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, then a White House aide. Another was Secord, who was helping North organize the airlift, as well as the Administration's secret arms shipments to Iran. Crawford said he still does not know who the third man was but noticed that, like North and Secord, he carried a purple U.S. diplomatic passport. Crawford said he agreed to work for the secret airlift because he agrees with the contras' cause but also because "I love covert operations. . . . And the money wasn't bad." Pay for Crossing Border He said he was paid $150 per day plus expenses. "We were promised $500 (extra) every time we went across the border, but nobody I know ever got paid that," he said. But he soon found that the operation was mismanaged, starved for funds and saddled with faulty equipment. "The cheapness of the operation was amazing," he said. "The Caribou (cargo plane) we were using had holes in the dashboard. We weren't using navigational equipment to get to the drop zones, just maps. And there weren't any parachutes or safety straps; you just hung on. "We also learned that we were supposed to be getting $300 a day, but were only getting $150." Repeated Complaints Crawford said he was fired from the project last May after complaining repeatedly about the airlift's equipment and management problems. He said he decided to "go public" after Nicaraguan troops shot down one of the planes last Oct. 5, killing three crewmen and capturing Eugene Hasenfus of Marinette, Wis. The plane had reportedly suffered from chronic engine trouble and was off course when it was hit. "I decided," Crawford said, "that people should know how this thing was mismanaged."

Think "light". But, you are right is only a theory - just from something that was said over the yrs. and something that was always in our emergency kit in the trunk of the car - and that large battery he hauled around - just "in case" we got stuck in a white out or snow storm on those lonely roads in Wyoming. The post that Snowmman made about this light - made a light go off in my head. It made sense to me, but if the car battery goes dead and we are stranded what do you connect that light to. I said something about a light? Like "when they overrun us, I'm going to have this last strobe light tied to my chest, and be calling in tac air right on top of me?" No that was Robert Howard, incredible Medal of Honor SOG guy, getting everyone stoked, when everything said death was right there. I just finished a chapter in SOG on him, and it's mind-boggling to read, and I spent quite a bit of time trying to imagine the guy, his motivations, the times. It's otherworldly. No way to summarize. Plaster's book is unparalleled, but here's an overview of Howard (plus other SOG MOH recipients) http://rlhtribute.com/

Been trying to figure that out Snow. Looks a lot like a commercial RC transmitter for controlling planes based on shape size and two joystick configuration. Wish I had a higher res photo. 377 Yeah, I'd say hobby RC. Snowmman: That Barry Seal stuff is amazing. Imagine living that life. Hmm. I guess it's a life. The only downside was that "six .45-caliber bullets from a Mac 10 machine gun in the side of the head" thing. Actually that's not so bad, because if you're dead in a millisecond, who cares? But wouldn't it be nice to know that when you're gone, the web isn't going to be full of pictures of your blood-spattered head, a-la Al Capone, etc? I guess Seal knew it was coming. He complained that the parole restrictions made his pattern predictable, and he was a "clay duck". I guess he was. Weird, they found the 3 guys who did it, and they're in prison now? Here's a blog with a lot of stuff, quoting the lawyer who represented Miguel Velez for the Barry Seal killing: "20. Seal’s killers were under the distinct impression that the US military officer who directed their actions was Oliver North. “ ‘I represented Miguel Velez for the Barry Seal homicide, which was one of the most incredible experiences I have ever been through,’ Richard Sharpstein began. ‘It was an amazing experience. Nobody wanted to think about what any of this meant back in 1986. The implications were just too big. And I’m only speaking with you now because some of this has leaked out. All three of the Colombians who went on trial always told us—their lawyers—that they were being directed, after they got into this country, on what to do and where to go by an ‘anonymous gringo,’ a United States Military officer, who they quickly figured out was Oliver North,’ Sharpstein says.” (Ibid.; p. 438.)" http://ftrsummary.blogspot.com/2005/04/ftr-503-death-of-barry-seal.html also NYT of the murder trial http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/14/us/murder-verdicts-in-drug-ring-case.html MURDER VERDICTS IN DRUG RING CASE Special to the New York Times Published: Thursday, May 14, 1987 The state court jury will now consider whether to sentence the defendants, Miguel Velez, Luis Carlos Quintero-Cruz and Bernardo Antonio Vasquez, to death in Louisiana's electric chair or to life in prison. The drug witness, Adler (Barry) Seal, was killed by six .45-caliber bullets from a Mac 10 machine gun as he parked his car Feb. 19, 1986, in Baton Rouge, La. The prosecutor, Prem Burns, contended that an assassination squad dispatched by the Columbia-based Medellin cartel murdered Mr. Seal to protect an imprisoned leader of the drug ring. 'Good Versus Evil' Ms. Burns termed the slaying of Mr. Seal ''an assault on the entire system of justice.'' After the verdict, she said, ''I've looked at this whole case like good versus evil, and I feel there really is some justice.'' Defense attorneys complained after the verdict that their clients were convicted by irrelevant and prejudicial testimony about cocaine smuggling by the Medellin cartel. ''They tried the Medellin cartel,'' Mr. Velez's attorney, Richard Sharpstein, said. Mr. Seal was a pilot who said he earned more than $50 million smuggling cocaine and other drugs from South America to the United States. He became a witness against his former smuggling associates following his arrest on Federal drug charges in 1983. Work of Informer Cited The law-enforcement authorities credit Mr. Seal with providing testimony that led to the conviction of major cocaine smugglers and the first indictments against the reputed leaders of the Medellin cartel. That drug ring is believed to control more than 70 percent of the cocaine traffic in the United States. Ms. Burns contended that ring members offered a $500,000 bounty on the life of Mr. Seal to keep him from testifying against a reputed leader of the ring, Jorge Ochoa, who was fighting a Spanish court order to extradite him to the United States for trial on drug charges. Ms. Burns told the jury in her closing argument Tuesday that when Mr. Seal signed the affidavit in support of Mr. Ochoa's extradition, he ''signed his own death warrant.'' A prosecution witness, Max Mermelstein, a Miami drug smuggler, testifiied recently that leaders of the drug ring approached him in December 1985, offering him $1 million to kidnap Mr. Seal and bring him alive to Colombia or $500,000 to kill him. Pressure Off for a Year Mr. Mermelstein never made an attempt on Mr. Seal's life, Ms. Burns told the jury, and the plot to kill the witness was dormant for almost a year until a Spanish court ordered Mr. Ochoa extradited in January 1986 to the United States. ''At that point, it became extremely important for the Medellin cartel,'' Ms. Burns said, ''to renew the contract on Barry Seal.'' After Mr. Seal's death, Mr. Ochoa was eventually released. Ms. Burns argued that the three defendants and Jose Renteria-Campo, who will be tried later, traveled to Baton Rouge in mid-February 1986 to plot the assassination. Mr. Quintero-Cruz pulled the trigger, Mr. Velez drove the car used to escape, and Mr. Vasquez made other arrangements for the assassination team, Ms. Burns said. Mr. Sharpstein said in his closing argument Tuesday that ''there may be many people out there who hated Barry Seal with a passion, who may be responsible for his murder.'' Mr. Sharpstein complained that Ms. Burns built her case ''on a slew of witnesses who are the barnacles off the pirogues of life.'' Witnesses like Mr. Mermelstein, who is now in the Federal witness protection program, should not be trusted and might be even be suspects in the murder of Mr. Seal, Mr. Sharpstein said.