nerdgirl

You can't use current definitions to alter the Constitution. Huh? *I'm* not doing that. You asserted that based on an excerpt from 10 USC that Andy posted that "the National Guard is [emphasis mine, present tense verb] considered part of the "armed forces"." That is not factual under US Law. The National Guard aren't Title 10 forces under US law. (Unless you're arguing Title 32 of the US Code is somehow unconstitutional?) /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Except the National Guard is considered part of the "armed forces" and they specifically state that members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty are exempt. Not by current US law - the US Code. National Guard are Title 32 forces. The “Armed Forces” are Title 10 forces. 32 USC 1.101.2: “Armed forces” means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Title 32 forces can do a lot more domestically than Title 10 forces can (by statute). Previous discussion of the scope of situations under which Title 10 forces can be deployed domestically, e.g., bugs, gas, nukes, War on Drugs. I find the 1992 LA riots case more interesting (than Katrina personally). Federalized California National Guard and active duty US military (Marines and Soldiers) were deployed to the LA streets. It largely was the intervention of the Title 10 and federalized Title 32 forces that brought the end to the riots/rebellion/urban insurgency there. Not sure if/how it effects the 2nd Amendment argument. Or how the history of the National Guard does either. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Altho' suggested as a fact, that seems to be less than completely factual. Sea levels at Tuvalu have been found to be rising at a rate of 0.8 and 1.2 mm/year relative to the land. That data (0.8 - 1.2 mm/yr) doesn't say anything specific w/r/t the cause (& one can hypothesize on it), but it does suggest some skepticism, at least in my mind, w/r/t the veracity of "myths and facts" posted. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

No, I hadn't heard of it. Thanks for the heads' up. It looks/sounds very interesting to me. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

The “problem” isn’t just conventional forces, imo. Conventional forces aren’t a problem. Figuring out when & where the conventional operations skill set is applicable and how to enable application of those skills sets in a counterinsurgency environment is a challenge at times. And frankly and I don’t mean to dismiss it in any way as a challenge, of all the challenges associated with Af-Pak situation specifically and radical global Salafism in general, that’s not the one which worries me the most. Maybe you can convince me otherwise? I’d turn it around and say what are you (general, less than specific “you”) doing or what do you see needs to be done by the Special Operations community (or SF community if you want to narrow it further) to enable conventional forces to not be a “problem”? Everyone in the military is not going to be nor can or should they be Army SF. The Special Ops community has been getting larger relative budget and manpower increases (14,000 from FY08 to FY11) than arguably any other community w/in the military over the last 8 years. And continues under the President Obama's Budget Request and the latest defense authorization bill. The bigger problem/challenge, imo, is the necessity of a “‘whole of government’ approach that complements [special operations and conventional] military efforts with diplomacy, economic aid, and other instruments of state power.” For those interested in hearing more, recommend highly GEN Petraeus’ keynote from the recent CNAS annual conference. Among the very first thing he mentions is the need for “whole of government” capabilities (4:48). At 29 minutes or so in, he addresses the need for “special special ops” and conventional forces along with whole of government capabilities. Also see some PhD historian on “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power.” I also don’t accept the assertion or implication that this insurgency (radical Salafism) exactly fits any one of the previous models on multiple levels: use of technology (including but not limited to cyber), transnational nature, effective strategic communications, pre-dating the failed state (Afghanistan), flat network structure, lacking clear governance strategy (a, perhaps, significant difference w/Vietnam insurgency, which was largely modeled on Maoist insurgency), and the underlying adversaries emphasis on a “cosmic war.” /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Everyone? Hope that doesn't include me. Didn't General Petraeus formulate some of his doctrine for the Counterinsurgency field manual from British Counterinsurgency doctrine and experiences in Malaya and NI? Lt Col Nagl, one of the manuals biggest contributors, argues how we got it right in Malaya whilst America got it wrong in Vietnam, attributing this to the British army's organisational culture and ability to learn from unanticipated conditions. [teasingly] Who ever remembers that TE Lawrence guy these days? [/teasing] Or “St Carl” Clausewitz, everyone’s favorite dead Prussian General? (Probably the only dead Prussian General most can name, eh? ) Clausewitz on small wars, insurgencies, and asymmetric warfare, including but not limited to the “Arming of the People” chapter in _On War_. Suspect [LouDiamond]’s comments were partially genuine insight into the perspective that he brings from being entrenched more deeply and for longer than many folks. I’ve heard similar things from other folks who’ve been in the small wars and special operations communities for years or decades. Counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare (UW), and irregular warfare (IW) do seem like the ‘latest-greatest’ in parts of the defense-security community. To stretch an analogy, it's like a 100-jump wonder extolling to the guys with 15 years and 5000 jumps on the wonders of skydiving. Up until just a few years ago, COIN/UW/IW were largely consigned to parts of the special Ops communities and historians/strategic studies scholars shuffling around Carlisle Barracks (uh, maybe I should rephrase that, do retired Colonels 'shuffle'? ) and West Point. COIN is the dominant driving paradigm today, and it’s driving US defense policy, e.g., USD(Policy) Flournoy’s pre-Pentagon think-tank CNAS is the center of defense gravity. Nothing else is even close today. Before COIN, RMA & Transformation, including network-centric-warfare, were the novel, dominant paradigms. And novelty is a legitimate concern; novelty should not drive foreign policy. Being the best strategic choice to advance US (and allies) interests, should be the primary reason, im-ever-ho. That’s what I’m looking for … aka the “So What? Who Cares?” of why anyone should care about COIN rather than relegating it back to the halls of history. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Imo, a good portion of the military leadership recognizes it … or understands that it is the current path forward. Or at least the importance of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations over conventional operations w/r/t Afghanistan. Such lack of understanding, or perhaps ‘embracing’ is a better word, of COIN strategy & operations has been credited by many as a primary reason behind GEN McKiernan’s (former head of US & NATO operations in Afghanistan) removal. There are centers of gravity within the military leadership that have valid counter-COIN arguments, largely at the senior field grade officer level, imo, that should be addressed. There also are centers of gravity that resist based on other factors, e.g., there isn’t a clear role for big ships and stealth fighters in population-centric warfare and ‘rice-bowl’ budget cuts. Look at the fight SecDef Gates is having on the F-22. And it appears that he lost to domestic politics. My Senators, Johnny Isakson and Saxby Chambliss, have been among the most vocal opponents because the planes are assembled in Cobb County. (I.e., what Mike might call 'bread & circuses,' except it's sweet tea in Georgia.) As the aphorism goes: where one stands not infrequently correlates directly with where one sits. I think that’s a general human trait applies to a whole lotta things. And, from my perspective, the structures to enable lessons learned within the US military has never been more robust. In the early days of OIF, four Army Captains set up “CompanyCommand.com” in order to share lessons learned with other junior officers. Another example is the Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL). Of all organizations, the military excels at knowing history. Applying it is another hurdle. The big strategy & policy decisions are made at NSC and OSD level not at the joint staff, services, or combatant commands, e.g., CENTCOM. At the bottom, you think your issue is the *most* important – because it *is* to you. At the top, one rarely has the time to get into the metaphorical weeds and one has competing interests. One of the hardest things, imo, is to see from top to bottom. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

I'm not sure that's completely unreasonable. Her undergrad was in journalism, yes? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

You're definitely among my favorite folks around SC; I would really like to 'hear' what [downwardspiral]'s thoughts are on Gov Palin's motivations to resign too. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Why do you think she resigned? I'm curious as to what you think were the motivating factors. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Your comments reminded me of some I heard in early 2005 by Kimberly Marten, who had been embedded as a researcher with Canadian Forces in western Kabul, Afghanistan in 2003 & 2004. She gave a talk entitled “Enforcing the Peace: There Aren’t Enough Canadians.” To synopsize w/inherant risks over-simplification, the argument is largely reflected in the 3rd sentence of your comment quoted above because at the time Canadian soldiers were operating in a much more population-centric manner, for a number of underlying reasons. In reading BG Nicholson’s bio, I noticed he was born in Toronto. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

That's a legitimate criticism of counterinsurgency strategy. And I still think those who try to apply, like some sort of carbon copy, the COIN strategies used in Iraq to Afghanistan will be a set-up for results that do not advance US interests. Given the rural nature of the Vietnamese insurgency, one can build a good argument that it may be a better model for comparison with the overwhlemingly rural insurgency of Afghanistan than the largely urban insurgency of Iraq. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

W/r/t drinking rancid yak butter tea I do have experience. In Nepal not Afghanistan tho'. I drank it and said thank you. Will defer to other folks w/r/t goat meat. More detailed, wonk-ish comments w/r/t the significance of eating and drinking here. The cups of tea is in some liklihood something of a reference to Greg Mortenson’s book and his very successful efforts to build girl’s school in rural Afghanistan. “When Gen. Petraeus read Three Cups of Tea,” Mortenson says, “he sent me an e-mail with three bullet points of what he'd gleaned from the book: Build relationships, listen more, and have more humility and respect.” /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Admittedly I’m running this through a wide band-pass John Stewart-esque filter … And if anyones wants me to go into earnest acronym-filled, defense wonk mode on counterinsurgency strategy, counterterrorism, strategic culture, SSTR, PRTs, etc, have no doubt that I’m willing & able to do so. BG Lawrence Nicholson to a group of Marines at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan on Sunday: “We’re not going to measure your success by the number of times your ammunition is resupplied. . . . Our success in this environment will be very much predicated on restraint. You’re going to drink lots of tea. You’re going to eat lots of goat. Get to know the people. That’s the reason why we’re here.” I’d be in trouble (in more ways than one) cause somehow I don’t imagine that there’s tofu-goat in Helmand. Frankly, don’t think that it’s a completely farcical metric – eating the local food – for population-centric COIN and in line with what the new guy in charge in Afghanistan & others have been advocating. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

Thanks for the link … followed it to the National Security Archive and the primary documents … W/r/t WMDs, there are a lot of interesting statements. Perhaps the most interesting to me w/r/t WMDs are three “Casual Conversations” summaries. To be explicit, I think all the statements should be read with a healthy does of skepticism. As the FBI interrogator records from their exchanges, what he is recording will affect history. He invokes a "miitary-industrial complex" explanation as part of why the US invaded Iraq. Also some more comments from the FBI Speacial Agent on effectiveness of traditional interrogation techniques are noted in the methods summary. Thanks again for the heads’ up on the release of the documents!

Are you sure ? I thought it was Mustard gas. I'll have to check. No, I'm not sure. He references being affected by some unspecified chemical warfare agent (CWA) in Mein Kampf … a number of years after it happened. There are debates as to what it was. The characteristics and symptoms he describes, some 4 to 6 years later, don’t fit chlorine perfectly nor do they fit sulfur mustard exactly. Both cause temporary blindness. Chlorine is more likely to cause hoarseness and sore throat than sulfur mustard. The delay he remembers suggests sulfur mustard, but the lack of blisters suggests it’s not. The smell that he recalled, something similar to the iodoform, which he remembered from it being used medicinally as part of the treatment of his mother’s breast cancer, is closer to chlorine (sharp acrid) than sulfur mustard (garlic) but also notably different from both. Could have been phosgene (freshly cut grass) or chloropicrin (also sharp acrid – mixed with chlorine it was “Yellow Star”) as well. Most likely, the CWA came from the British, who had all in their arsenal at the time. If you want to call it sulfur mustard, you’ll have plenty of good & smart company. NB: sulfur mustard isn't a gas at any temperature you would want to be around. The boiling point is above 400F. It decomposes in an oxygenated atmosphere before boiling. The vapor pressure is fairly low (0.072 mm Hg at 68F). It solidifies at ~56F, depending on purity. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Reply] Well unconventional does neccessarily have to equal wmd. The 911 attacks were highly uncovnetional. Suspect that you may have meant to insert a “not” in that first sentence, yes? If so, concur. Sometimes the concept is called “black swans” – anticipating the unexpected in the enemy or other systems. The lesson that you originally suggested (inventory drives weapons choice) seemed to be quite different from your second response: Appreciate the expansion & clarification. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

yup

I hadn't. And probably wouldn't if you hadn't mentioned it.

"Command and Control," which gets even more expansive as C^4ISR, aka Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Some submissions for most awesomely bad military acronyms. Another short collection of some note. The one that still makes me laugh is NORTHCOM’s … uh, Northern Command’s … CCMRF aka the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. It’s both an acronym with in an acronym, and it’s is pronounced “see-smurf.” [double]- I was sitting in a FLA-designated (four-letter-acronym) room on Tuesday afternoon and started keeping a list of acronyms used: JPEO, DRC, TMTI, NIE, the JASONs … & on to a list of 32 acronyms. Prolly missed a few too. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

It was on the front page of the NY Times, WSJ, and USA Today yesterday. Today, I'm more interested to be honest in the launch of major operations in southern Afghanistan. /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

yup

If you were a decision-maker, what would you propose the US do w/r/t Iran and DPRK differently than what is currently being done? What is your desired end-state? How do you plan to achieve that end-state? What specific actions would you pursue and by what means? E.g., by what methods & means are securing access to the nuclear facilities, and what consequences are you willing to accept for your decisions? How will you deal with China w/r/t DPRK? How will you deal with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran limiting transit through or closing the Straits of Hormuz? It is tempting and easy to toss out one-liners. I look forward to hearing your specific plans. And to show that I’m not asking of others anymore than I am willing to do myself, I provided some of my own detailed proposals on ends, ways, and means w/r/t US foreign policy toward Iran in this thread (posts 1, 47, 49, 50-53, 56, 59, 63, 64, 69, 72). And, as is true in the real world, things change all the time, how do you also plan to deal with the indications that the DPRK is (trying to) exporting missile technology to Burma, aka Myanmar? There have been allegations of Myanmar's Gen Thura Shwe Mann -- the oppressive military regime’s #3 -- and Shwe Mann -- Chief of Staff of military -- making secret visits to DPRK in late 2008 to discuss procuring medium range missiles and anti-aircraft and radar systems. There also have been, for years, low-level and low-confidence suspicions regarding desire by Burma’s oppressive military junta for nuclear capabilities. Who cares the most about Burma having advanced military capabilities? (It’s not us.) I.e., who is/perceives Burma as its biggest military and stability threat? How will you deal with potential foreign policy ramifications and concerns of that long-time, key MNNA (major non-NATO ally) in Southeast Asia? /Marg Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters. Tibetan Buddhist saying

I'm guessing that you're referring to the missile strikes, yes? Am confident that you'll tell me if you mean something else.

I'm guessing that you're referring to the missile strikes, yes? Am confident that you'll tell me if you mean something else.