Hooknswoop

“head-high” is not unstable. Spinning on your back is-unstable. Spinning on your back can, and has resulted in a reserve entanglement and fatality. If you cutaway at 500 feet, you have already made the fatal sin of losing altitude awareness. If you are that low, you can disregard the option of getting stable before pulling your reserve. You can always pull your reserve as you pull your main, launching your reserve PC as quickly or quicker than an RSL would. With an RSL, you do not have the option of falling clear after cutting away. I have about 50 intentional cutaways and several cutaway from highly loaded, fast-spinning mains. It does only takes a couple of seconds with very little altitude lost to regain some semblance of stability and fire off the reserve. I did this w/ one hand on my reserve, looking at the ground to keep track of altitude. If you do not have the altitude to cutaway, get face-to-earth/stable before pulling your reserve, you either pulled too low for your abilities or waited too long to cutaway. If the rig was twisted the other direction, he would have been un-able to locate his cutaway handle, and the RSL wouldn’t have done him any good. He could have handled the situation without the RSL by immediately cutaway, releasing the twisting forces on his harness and then he would have had no trouble finding the reserve handle. I agree with this one except that an RSL adds a step under canopy (disconnecting it) that needs to be remembered and distracts the pilot from flying the canopy and looking for traffic. I agree that RSL’s can save lives. But they can also take them. If your main riser breaks w/ and RSL attached, it can kill you. If you main riser snags the RSL, it can, and has, kill you. If you have a canopy collision and cutaway before disconnecting the RSL (good luck first remembering to disconnect it, then finding the little tab while maintaining altitude awareness and attempting to communicate to the other jumper all the while using up valuable altitude) it can kill you. In a canopy collision, a RSL complicates an already complicated and extreme situation. It can make the situation worse. The 2 reserve ripcord/RSL guide rings on a Javelin were ripped off the reserve flap after a cutaway and the reserve pin managed to position itself exactly between these 2 rings. If the rings had not ripped off, the jumper was risking a main/reserve entanglement. They are other rigs that this situation can happen with. I have seen a cutaway cable get stripped out of it’s housing. The jumper didn’t realize it and deployed normally. Fortunately it was the non-RSL riser and they cutaway safely. A tandem pair was killed when the RSL equipped riser broke, firing the reserve into a spinning main. A Navy SEAL was killed when his RSL activated the reserve as the main deployed. I agree with this one. RSL’s have Pro’s and Con’s. A lot of it depends on the type of gear you jump, the type of jumps you do, and your experience level. RSL’s can make a difference if 1) you are low, 2) you have your main out, 3) you would have failed to pull the reserve handle (either from physical inability or loss of altitude awareness) after cutting away in time for your reserve to deploy, and 4) you cutaway and do not entangle yourself in your RSL activated reserve. You must make several mistakes to put yourself into a situation where an RSL will make a difference. But make no mistake, a RSL can kill you. The RSL activates the reserve very quickly after cutting away from a partial malfunction, but removes the option of falling free from a malfunctioning main and gaining stability or separation from a canopy wrap. How many jumpers would think to disconnect their RSL after getting slammed by a pre-mature opening that then malfunction at high altitude? How many jumpers would remember to disconnect their RSL in a 2-out situation? How much valuable time would that take? How many jumpers have their AAD save their life or die because they rehearse their malfunction procedures like this; “OK I have a malfunction, cutaway, my RSL will activate my reserve, but I will follow through and pull it anyway” Then they have a PC in tow, cutaway and when nothing happens, they think their reserve is malfunctioning, or after cutting away a partial malfunction and the RSL doesn’t activate the reserve, never pull the reserve handle because the sequence of events they have pictures is not happening? Derek

"The shared-expense exception is only valid where the pilot and pasengers share a common purpose in the flight" Derek

I dunno. I haven't seen a case where the FAA got involved in that sort of situation. So I should modify my statement, “Bottom line, you must have a commercial license to fly jumpers, even if you are not being paid.”, to include a disclaimer that this applies if someone is being paid. If the DZO/pilot was not being paid, but the jumpers are paying the DZ, then the pilot needs a commercial license. It isn’t that hared to get a commercial license, basically a PPL check ride w/ tighter standards. This is just another example of DZ’s cutting corners. Derek

The shared-expense exception is only valid where the pilot and pasengers share a common purpose in the flight and does not apply to parachutist operations. According to the FAA, no exception to the shared expense rule if some/all of the passengers are jumper because then they don't "share a common purpose in the flight". The DZO flying jumpers with only a PPL is violating the FAR's. Derek

The FAA had violated pilots for flying jumpers w/o a commercial license. It is not legal. Jane F. Garvey (FAA) vs. Robert R. Rawlins. Docket SE-14006 August 21, 1997 The private pilot's license was suspeneded for 90 days for flying jumpers. The FAA argued that the DZ, even though it was a club, was being paid. Not all of the jumpers (tandems, students, etc) were members of the club and the club advertised like a business. Even though the pilot was an unpaid volunteer, they were not sharing expenses with the passengers. The shared-expense exception is only valid where the pilot and pasengers share a common purpose in the flight and does not apply to parachutist operations. Bottom line, you must have a commercial license to fly jumpers, even if you are not being paid. Derek

The only e-mail address I recieved was from another Inspector, who didn't return my e-mail. I didn't recieve any contact info for the official ruling. Derek

Anyone want to count the number of FAR violations? I lost count at 4 (CG limits, seats, flying jumpers w/ a Class III medical, hanging bar installed)................... Edit: A search reveals the Mr. Moreau no longer has a medical or pilot certificates: Name : MOREAU JR, LLOYD JULE Airman's Address : 426 S HANCOCK AVE APT C COLORADO SPRINGS, CO, 80903-3788 FAA Region : Northwest/Mountain Airman Certificates : Ground Instructor Basic : Mechanic Airframe Powerplant : Senior Parachute Rigger Back pack NTSB Identification: DEN03FA028. The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number DMS. 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation Accident occurred Sunday, December 29, 2002 in Steamboat Spgs, CO Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/30/04 Aircraft: Piper PA-32-300, registration: N7989C Injuries: 1 Fatal, 3 Serious. The pilot departed with three passengers and three dogs, but only two seats. The airplane had been reconfigured (STC SA00352DE) for parachute jumping operations. The STC included the stipulation that the airplane could be used only for parachutist launching operations. Also, Title 14 CFR Part 91.107, (a)(3), states that each occupant of a civil aircraft must be provided with an approved seat [the fatally injured passenger was not] with seat belt, for movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing operations. The pilot proceeded to fly up a heavily forested mountain valley with a 14 to 18 knot tail wind (increasing ground speed while reducing climb performance). The airplane's center of gravity was calculated to be 2.33 inches aft of allowable limitations. Due to insufficient altitude, the airplane impacted tree covered terrain with approximately 4 feet of snow at 9,527 feet (10,200 feet density altitude). One occupant was trapped under aircraft debris for 4 to 5 hours; she died shortly after reaching the hospital. An examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision making resulting in insufficient altitude to fly over the mountain, and the subsequent inadvertent stall/mush into tree covered mountainous terrain. Contributing factors were the tail wind and high density altitude weather conditions, the airplane's aft center of gravity condition exceeding limitations, and the improper use of the airplane by the pilot [STC limitation to haul parachutist only; two passengers flying without seats]. Full narrative: DEN03FA028 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 29, 2002, at approximately 1300 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-32-300, N7989C, was destroyed when it impacted terrain while maneuvering near Steamboat Springs, Colorado. The commercial pilot and one passenger were seriously injured, another passenger received minor injuries; however, one passenger was fatally injured. The airplane was being operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal, cross-country flight that originated from Bob Adams Field (SBS) Steamboat Springs, Colorado, approximately 20 minutes before the accident. No flight plan had been filed, but the pilot said he was en route to Canon City, Colorado. The pilot said he had flown his three passengers and three dogs from Canon City, to Steamboat Springs, for Christmas celebrations. He said that on Thursday, December 26, he departed Steamboat Springs, on a solo flight back to Canon City, to fly parachutists up for jumps. He said that he flew the same departure path up Harrison Creek to cross Rabbit Ears Pass (elevation 10,007 feet). This flight was uneventful. On Saturday, he returned to Steamboat Springs to fly his passengers and dogs back to Canon City on the following day. The pilot said he departed Steamboat Springs, at approximately 1230, on runway 32. He said that he headed south towards Rabbit Ears Pass, and was climbing to approximately 10,700 feet. He said that while flying up Harrison Creek, he encountered a "wind sheer or downdrafts," and the airplane would not clear the mountainous terrain. The pilot said he "decided to put the aircraft down in terrain with trees." At 1304, a "9-1-1" call was made to the Routt County Sheriff’s dispatch office by one of the passengers, reporting that the airplane had gone down. Search and rescue efforts were initiated, and the airplane was located at 1612 by two helicopters. Rescue workers arrived at the scene at 1700, and the pilot and three passengers were transported out by snowmobiles. The three dogs were rescued on the following day, December 30th, 2002. A pilot at Steamboat Springs airport observed an airplane, matching the description of the accident airplane, depart at approximately 1245. He stated it looked "slow with a low angle of attack. It appeared to be laboring, and turned west and downwind with very shallow turns." He said "It just didn't look right. It appeared to be having difficulty climbing." Another witness, located in the valley approximately 2 miles west of the Harrison Creek mouth, said she heard a "loud airplane, which sounded like an 18 wheel truck using its Jake brake" flying low towards Harrison Creek. She said that it was between 1230 and 1300. The fatally injured passenger had been trapped under debris of the airplane until the rescue team could cut her out. She died shortly after reaching the hospital in Steamboat Springs. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot holds a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single and multiengine land, and instrument ratings. He also holds a basic ground instructor certificate, a mechanic's certificate with airframe and power plant ratings, and a senior parachute rigger's (back pack) certificate. He had accumulated 3,500 total hours of flight experience; 600 hours in make and model. The pilot also stated he had 6 hours of flight time in the airplane within the preceding 24 hours. The pilot received a second-class FAA medical certificate on October 10, 2001. The certificate required that the holder wear lenses for distant vision and possess glasses for near vision. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane (S/N 32-7640051) was a single engine, propeller-driven, fixed landing gear, two seat airplane (normally a 6-place airplane, but 4 seats had been removed to allow parachute operations). It was manufactured by Piper Aircraft Company in 1975. It was powered by a Lycoming IO-540, six cylinder, reciprocating, horizontally opposed, direct drive, air cooled, fuel injected engine, which had a maximum takeoff rating of 300 horsepower at sea level. The last annual inspection was performed on April 10, 2002. At the time of the accident, the aircraft maintenance records and tachometer indicated that the airframe had accumulated approximately 8,597 hours. The airplane's current registration, in the pilot's name, was dated February 25, 1997. On July 17, 1998, a Supplemental Type Certificate was issued for the "installation of a bolt-on departure bar assembly, handrail assembly and step assembly. This installation was approved for use in parachute jumping operations only." The most recent weight and balance measurement for the airplane was performed on January 19, 1999. "The airplane was in parachute jumper airlift configuration. Alteration was in accord with STC SA00352DE." The parachute jumper configuration involved removing the rear passenger seats and cargo door. In place of these seats was a piece of plywood with holes cutout for the seatbelts (this is where the fatally injured passenger was sitting). The airplane's manufacturer representative said that the service ceiling of this aircraft was 16,250 feet. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1255, weather conditions at Hayden, Colorado (elevation 6,602 feet), 280 degrees 23 nautical miles (nm) from the accident site, were as follows: wind 270 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 statue miles (or greater); sky condition, clear; temperature 36 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 18 degrees Fahrenheit; altimeter setting 29.69 inches. According to search and rescue pilots flying Enstrom 280C piston powered helicopters in the area of the accident, there were "no unusual sinks or down drafts," and no turbulence was reported. A landowner, standing in front of her barn (approximately 6 nm west of the accident site at the mouth of Harrison Creek), said there was a "bit of a breeze directly out of the west." She estimated the wind to be approximately 14 to 18 knots. The density altitude at the accident site (elevation 9,527 feet) was estimated to be 10,200 feet. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane was found in a heavily forested, steep mountainous valley (elevation 9,527 feet; N40 degrees, 20.08 minutes; W106 degrees, 41.33 minutes). The conifer trees were up to approximately 18 inches in diameter and up to approximately 75 feet in height. An approximate 150 foot long debris path (tree branches and aircraft parts) was oriented approximately 140 degrees (the Harrison Creek had a 085-265 degree orientation). The summit of Rabbit Ears Pass was 4 nm from the accident site, on a 010 degrees heading. To the north (340 degrees; 1 nm) of the accident site was Walton Peak, elevation 10,599 feet. The fuselage was found nearly upright (approximately 35 degrees right rotation), with both wings, and most of its horizontal stabilizer and elevator separated. All of the airplane's major components were accounted for at the accident site. All the flight control surfaces were identified; flight control cable continuity was not possible due to impact damage. The left wing was found inverted in trees, approximately 25 feet above the ground. The wing spar's longitudinal axis was nearly level, and the leading edge was sloping approximately 35 degrees down. At approximately the midsection of the wing, a tree (approximately 12 inches in diameter) was imbedded in the wing. This impact arc extended from the leading edge aft to the main spar area. The main fuel tank was fractured, and the main landing gear was partially separated. The inverted left wing was found on the right side of the airplane's impact energy path. The right wing was separated from the fuselage and broken into several pieces. The section forward of its main wing spar was separated. The fuel tank was fractured. The empennage displayed substantial impact damage, and only the vertical stabilizer and its rudder remained attached. The fuselage was minimally deformed, but the occupiable space for the two front seat occupants was reduced considerably. The remaining seats had been removed during the STC conversion, and only sheets of plywood could be seen in the aft section of the fuselage. Due to the deep snow and seasonal weather, the airplane wreckage was not recovered until June 10th, 2003. The engine and airframe were inspected on August 19th, 2003. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was verified. During the initial inspection, thumb compression was verified on all but number two cylinder. Its valve cover and rocker arms were removed, then thumb compression was obtained. One propeller blade was bent aft with some twisting, and the other blade displayed minimal back bending with significant twisting. Both blades exhibited chordwise striations and green transfer material. The yellow propeller spinner exhibited minimal damage. No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies, which might have affected the airplane's performance, were identified. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION Toxicology tests were not performed on the pilot due to his immediate medication and hospitalization. TESTS AND RESEARCH According to one of the passengers, there were only two seats in the airplane. He and the fatally injured passenger were sitting on a "pad of some kind." The passenger reported he had a seat belt around him. According to Title 14 CFR Part 91.107, (a)(3), "Each person on board a U.S.-registered civil aircraft must occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about him or her during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing." A weight and balance calculation for the flight was performed using the airplane's last weight and balance data (January 19, 1999), and the occupants and the cargo weight which was acquired from interviewing the survivors. The airplane was certified for a maximum gross weight of 3,400 pounds, and center of gravity limits of 76 to 96.33 inches aft of datum. The airplane's gross weight (with occupants and cargo) at the time of the accident was estimated to be 3,280 pounds. The center of gravity limits at this weight were 88.30 to 96.33 inches. The calculated center of gravity of the airplane at the time of the accident was 98.66 inches, or 2.33 inches aft of the aft most limit. According to Title 14 CFR Part 91.9, (a) .....no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards....." A 3-D topographical study of Harrison Creek, by the Investigator-In-Charge, revealed a perpendicular ridge, orientated approximately 175 degrees jutting into Harrison Creek. The valley makes a semicircular diversion to the south, right at the impact area. The airplane was found on this southerly protruding ridge. The Investigator-In-Charge determined that the 14 to 18 knot wind that was reported by the witness at the mouth of Harrison Creek, would have been blowing right up the creek. This would have made any airplane's ground speed just that much faster, and their rate of climb per mile would be correspondingly less. ADDITIONAL DATA The airplane, including all components and logbooks, was released to a representative of the owner's insurance company on January 18, 2003. Derek

I haven't received anything from the FAA. I would like to question the FAA office you contacted and ask them why, after over 4 months, they still have not issued an official ruling re: Part 65.111. I think 4+ months, especially after given the expectation that it would be issued in less than 1 month, is an absurd length of time for a simple ruling. Derek

masterrigger1 wrote: and; Well it is now April 19th. Any official word from the FAA yet? Who within the FAA can I contact to inquire about the FAA’s ruling on Part 65.111? Phone # or e-mail? Derek

Yes, I was wrong. Thank you for explaining it to me and for everyone else's patience with me. Derek

An aircraft flying at 90 knots indicated has the same amount of air going over the wings regardless if it happens to be flying down wind, cross wind, or into the wind. Derek

Kallend- This is your forte. We have thoroughly discussed this and don’t seem to be convincing anyone. Please tell me if I am wrong and explain why. Thank you. Derek

***If the differential is large, you need more time between groups. If the differential is less, you can give less time. *** That doesn’t work though. 80 knot uppers and 80 knots at deployment is zero difference and means there will be zero separation between opening points. Derek

Not any more likely than exiting with 80 knot winds from exit to opening. The second jumper would hit the first jumper, even though there was 40 knots of wind at the exit point. No ground speed resulted in zero separation of opening points. It illustrates my point though. As you increase the wind speed at the opening altitude in my example, separation is created by canopy drift. Say the wind is 15 knots at opening altitude and 10 seconds is left between groups. That means the canopy of jumper 1 will drift 253 feet down wind in 10 seconds. This is not enough room between jumpers, as that distance can be easily tracked and flown under canopy, eating up the separation created by the drift at opening altitude. Now let’s make the tower an aircraft and give it a ground speed of 15 knots instead of the zero for the tower. Same 10 seconds between exits. The aircraft will cover 253 feet over he ground in that 10 seconds and jumper 1’s canopy will drift for another 253 feet. More separation due to the increased ground speed of the aircraft. More room must between exits as the upper winds increase in speed. Some examples from Kallend’s simulator (the only variable I changed for each simulation is the upper winds): Indicated airspeed: 80 Upper winds: 20 Lower winds: 0 Altitude of wind change: 3000 Exit delay: 10 Both slow fallers Separation: 1337 Upper winds: 30 Separation: 1168 Upper winds: 40 Separation: 999 Upper winds: 50 Separation: 830 Upper winds: 60 Separation: 661 Upper winds: 70 Separation: 492 Upper winds: 80 Separation: 323 Upper winds: 90 Separation: 154 Upper winds: 100 Separation: 15 As the upper winds increase, the separation between opening points decreases. What am I missing? (Honestly, if I am wrong, and that is a real possiblility, I will admit it

Why would he drift at 40 knots from the opening point, when there is zero wind at the deployment altitude of 3,000 feet? Derek

Rank? Me? Ha! Correct, if you did not know your ground speed, you couldn't know your separation. Again the tower analogy; *14,000 tower. Winds are 40 knots at the top, tapering to zero, linearly, at 3,000 feet, the deployment altitude. Two jumpers, jumping rounds, exit 5 seconds apart. The second jumper pulls a little late. He will hit the first jumper. *Same tower except the winds taper off to 10 knots, linearly. The second jumper will miss the first jumper as the first jumper drifts for 5 seconds at 10 knots. They won't miss by much. No one seems willingy to answer my question: Do you believe that at a given ground speed, 10 seconds delay produces 1,000 feet of separation. As the uppers increase, and the airspeed remains constant, does the same 10 second delay produce the same 1,000 foot separation between opening points? The only change being ground speed. Derek

I read the thread and it seems that the majority agree that referencing groundspeed to ensure separation is the way to go........ Derek

Isn't that usually the case, or do you usually jump in winds where the uppers are 80 knots and 80 knots at 2,000 feet? You are relying on canopy drift for separation, but there isn't much wind at deployment altitude to give you that drift/separation. Hence the longer amount of time required to wait for that drift to provide separation. With a low ground speed, more time must be left between groups than with a high ground speed. I didn't get a straight answer before, so I'll ask you; Do you think that for a ground spped that provides 2,000 feet of separation between opening points for 10 seconds between groups provides that same 2,000 feet with 10 seconds between groups as the ground speed decreases from increased upper winds? Go back to my tower example, zero ground speed and zero separation because of zero wind at deployment altitude. Now change it to 80 knots of ground speed and zero knots at deployment altitude with time left between groups, you get separation. What is the difference between my tower example and this one? Ground speed providing separation. You cannot rely on canopy drift to provide separation. Derek

1) The bag will lift clear as the PC pulls at a 90-degree angle easier than lifting the bag at an angle. 2) You want the free bag to stay in the container until the PC pulls it out. Id the bag leaves too soon, the PC could get through the lines, causing a bag lock. 3) The PC will pull the free bag out and open the riser covers, no problem. Derek

Sure, but let's use an example that is not extreme. Let's say the winds are 40 knots at the top and zero at 4,000 feet, my deployment altitude. You plan on deploying at 3,000 feet. How long would you wait after I exited to follow? Jumping in winds of 60 knots at deployment altitude is not realistic. If you did, yes you wouldn't have to wait very long between groups because of canopy drift. Usually winds at deployment altitudes are a lot less than 60 knots and therefore a lot of time is required to alloy the previous group to drift out of the airspace for a zero ground speed jump run. If the winds are equal to the canopy's airspeed at deployment altitude and the jumper holds into the wind, they are slowly descending down the same airspace the next group will occupy shortly. IF the first canopy pulled a but high and the second canopy pulls a bit low, there is no separation and risk of collision. Derek

*Let’s take the high wind example again. Let’s say there is 80 knot uppers and the jump ship has an airspeed of 80 knots and a ground speed of zero knots. Let’s also say these winds taper, linearly, to zero knots at 3,500 feet. Group 2 exits 10 seconds after group 1. Group 1 pulls at 3,500 feet, group 2 pulls at 3,000 feet. Do see a reason to be concerned here? *Let’s take it another direction. Let’s say the uppers are 90 knots and the jump ship has an airspeed of 80 knots. The jump ship has a ground speed of –10 knots. Let’s again say these winds taper, linearly, to 10 knots at 3,500 feet. Group 2 exits 10 seconds after group 1. Group 1 pulls at 3,500 feet, group 2 pulls at 3,000 feet. Do see a reason to be concerned here? In zero wind, at 80 knots, the jump ship covers 674 feet across the ground. In both of theses examples, airspeed has not changed, only ground speed. I would like for Kallend to weigh in on what is more important for separation, airspeed or ground speed. Derek

Ground speed is the only way to determine distance between opening points. *With 5 seconds between exits and 80 knots of airspeed and 80 knots of uppers for zero grounds speed, the groups will open at the same point in space, 5 seconds apart. The only thing that will prevent a collision is the first group drifting downwind once they open. *With 5 seconds between exits and 80 knots of airspeed and 0 knots of uppers for 80 knots grounds speed, the groups will have opening points 674 feet apart. Same airspeed, different ground speed, increased separation of opening points. No one has contradicted this. Same airspeed, change in ground speed caused change in separation between opening points. *With 5 seconds between exits and 180 knots of airspeed and 180 knots of uppers for zero grounds speed, the groups will open at the same point in space, 5 seconds apart. 100-knot increase in airspeed, no increase in separation between opening points. Again, the only thing that will prevent a collision is the first group drifting downwind once they open. Derek

They have to wait until the previous jumper(s) are below where the next jumpers will be opening and that when the next jumper opens, there will be separation between the already open canopy and the opening canopy. You can’t have someone take a 1 second delay followed immediately by a 3 second delay from the same exit point. They do not do that a bridge day. Derek

Or the second group funnels and falls fast while the first, and larger group builds a slow, tight formation. The second group catches up to the first group and eats up the separation they would have had from canopy drift. Derek

Fulton Story Derek