Phil1111

Background checks for sporting events. What will they think of next! Imagine if they had background checks for NFL games. They would have to cancel everything.

+1 This is not a racial issue. It's a socioeconomic, lack of education, lack of respect for others, no responsibility, no accountability issue. Making this racial disrespects and insults all African Americans. Mostly right. I thought Brown was on his way to school he just skipped some classed to partake in a little strong arm robbery before classes. The socioeconomic,well he was going to be a thief before retiring to the Missouri Department of Corrections.

ATC: "Cessna G-ABCD What are your intentions? " Cessna: "To get my Commercial Pilots Licence and Instrument Rating. ATC: "I meant in the next five minutes not years." Tower: "Eastern 702, cleared for takeoff" Eastern 702: "Tower, Eastern 702 switching to departure...by the way as we lifted off we saw some kind of dead animal on the far end of the runway." Tower: "National 63 cleared for takeoff...did you copy the report from Eastern?" National 63: "Roger, Tower, cleared for takeoff... yes, we've already notified our caterers."

True conversation heard at Hanover Airport. The young woman in Tower has recently finished her training and is still not completely at ease. BA XXX is at holding position runway 09R. Another aircraft is doing approach procedures for a landing on the same runway. Tower wishes to expedite take-off for BA XXX: Tower: BA XXX, are you ready for a quickie ? BA XXX: Lady, I'm always ready for a quickie, but first I have to fly this plane to Helsinki !

I had same setup except a very nicely made aluminum housing with DUAL ac altimeters. All very confusing.

Have you actually ever personally jumped from one?

This video has all your answers. Watch it, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQ8RLpbgy8E pay for your jump here is a good place: http://www.parachutemontreal.ca/ Come back next week and tell us how it was. Bring more clothes than she has.

Go for it. Some DZs are allot tighter than the generally open country that balloons need to land. More fun than a helicopter, except that a helicopter can can put you back on the dz.

Why do you say that? That is mostly correct. http://www.wholesalesolar.com/ is about the cheapest I've seen. Keep in mind that solar panels are rated for direct sunlight. i.e. at 90 degrees to the panel so you will only get top production for 2-3 hours a day, unless you rotate the panels to follow the sun. If you are really power conscious, i.e. no TV, limited stereo, you can use solar to supplement electrical(generator) use on a RV. If you live in a rv you will need a generator or plug to a power source. Unless you really limit electrical use. To get any real production you would need 1000 watts of panels. Sailboat forums have good info on this subject.

Without beating a dead horse. The definition of a business is to operate a commercial enterprise to earn a profit to return such profits to the owner/shareholders. All of which is strictly excluded from a charity. The Harvard Business Review, Wall St. Journal, etc. have all published many studies that show NO link between Executive compensation and performance. In addition other studies have shown that it often leads to excessive risk taking and short term objectives vr. long term goals. Setting aside all the examples of CEO's that bankrupt or destroy companies and yet still walk away with the "golden parachute".

Not 100%, and the CEO should not be compensated $311,000. Hardly respectable (unless you are the CEO). Looks like this charity was set up to make money for the top executives. It's legal, but it's wrong. [url]http://asknod.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/wounded-warriors-project-a-scam/ Why shouldn't someone running and expanding a business be compensated well? Do you think you get the best from industry by paying peanuts? A non-profit is still a business you know. I like to see executive pay tied to performance but you don't tend to be able to slack at the top very long. The last few years have been hard on charities and keeping some even afloat has been a challenge. WRONG! A charity non profit is not a business. its a charity. Its purpose is to to collect funds for the designated purposes as set out in the charter. It doesn't have "competition per say. Doesn't have shareholders to answer to. Typically doesn't have bondholders and debts to service, etc.

The focus of the current investigation is on a ELT transmitter as the likely cause. Of which 6000 similar units are in service now.

Exterior fire damage to AC is right above a crew rest area. Smoking cigarettes? Smoking ganga? Cooking using too much firewood? Too much Khat?

Asiana 214 Pilot Hints At Autothrottle Confusion By John Croft john.croft@aviationweek.com July 09, 2013 The instructor pilot in command of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 arriving into San Francisco on July 6 said he had assumed the aircraft’s autothrottle system would keep the aircraft flying at 137 kt. as he and the “pilot-flying” in the left seat guided the 777-200ER to Runway 28L in visual conditions. Too low and slow on the approach, the aircraft clipped the sea wall leading to the runway threshold with its main landing gear and tail as the pilots attempted to abort the landing. The left-seat pilot was in the process of getting qualified to fly the 777 for the Seoul, South Korea-based airline. During interviews with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, Korean investigators and the airline on July 8 and 9, the instructor pilot told officials that the aircraft was “slightly high” when it descended through 4,000 ft. on the approach. He then set the aircraft’s vertical speed mode for a 1,500 ft./min. descent rate, NTSB chairman Deborah Hersman said at a July 9 report on the investigation. During a July 8 update, Hersman said the pilots disconnected the aircraft’s autopilot at 1,600 ft., presumably to hand-fly the approach. The instructor pilot told investigators that at 500 ft. altitude, he realized the aircraft was below the visual glideslope provided by the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights on the airport, since the system showed three red and one white light. When on the proper glideslope, pilots see two white and two red lights. All red indicates a position significantly below the glideslope while all white lights indicate being well above the reference glideslope. The electronic glideslope generally used as part of an instrument landing system was not operating due to runway construction at the airport this summer. “He told [the left-seat] pilot to pull back [on the control wheel],” says Hersman of the interview. “He had set the speed at 137 kt. and assumed the autothrottles were maintaining the speed.” Autothrottles, if armed and turned on, will automatically increase or decrease engine thrust to maintain a preset speed, in this case 137 kt., the reference landing speed for the 777-200ER that day. The NTSB is investigating why the autothrottle did not work as the instructor had expected, an issue that could include mode confusion related to the interaction of various auto-flight modes. Hersman says investigators documenting switch positions is the cockpit after the crash noted that the autothrottles were armed. In that state, the system will automatically activate when speeds are low regardless of whether pilots have the autothrottle system turned on or off. Preliminary data from the aircraft’s flight data recorder shows that the speed had already decayed to 134 kt. as the aircraft passed through 500 ft., and would ultimately drop as low as 103 kt. at 3 sec. before impact. The 777 continued to slow as the pilots attempted to “correct a lateral deviation” as it descended from 500 ft. to 200 ft. “At 200 ft., the four PAPIs were red and the airspeed was in the hatched area,” says Hersman. The “hatched” markings on an airspeed tape warn pilots of an impending stall. The instructor pilot at that point recognized that the autothrottle was not maintaining speed and established a nose-high go-around attitude. He attempted to push the throttles forward for more power, but says the pilot-flying had already done so. Information from the flight data recorder showed that the pilots first increased engine power from flight idle at 125 ft. altitude, reaching 50% thrust 3 sec. before impact. The pilots said that after impact, the aircraft “ballooned”, yawed left and went into a 360-degree spin, according to Hersman. The left-seat pilot was mid-way through the airline’s initial operating experience phase for becoming qualified as a 777 crewmember, a process that requires 20 flights and 60 hr. of flight time with an instructor pilot, according to Hersman. He had completed 10 legs and 35 hr. of flight time. Hersman says three of the four pilots were on the flight deck at the time of the crash. In addition to the pilot-flying and the instructor pilot, a relief first officer was in the jump seat. The relief captain was in the main cabin. Relief pilots fly the cruise portion of a flight. This flight was the instructor pilot’s first mission as an instructor pilot, and it was also his first time flying with the left-seat pilot. Hersman says none of the pilots were given drug or alcohol tests after the accident, a requirement for U.S.-based airline crews but no so for foreign airlines. http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_09_2013_p0-595503.xml It has been extensively reported that the target airspeed(final approach speed) Vref, the landing reference speed was 137kn. Most pilots and airline flight procedures use a Vref +5 company mandated policy, plus in some cases Vref +5, plus 1/2 wind gusts.

Got this in my eMail this morning. It's not me. After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats. One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program. We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there. This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was. Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL). This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED! The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture. The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock! Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm. Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks. So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck. __________________ http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/75814-asiana-777-crash-sfo-38.html A guide to crash speak The more complicated planes get, the harder it is to fly them. There are more ways for pilots both to mess up and to compensate for their mess-ups, and there are more dials, flashing lights, and doodads for them to keep watch on. That said, there are a few basic principles of flying that apply to the Asiana crash, principles that might be obscured by some of the aviation lingo that's being thrown around. I'm not a pilot, and so I write only as an interested observer who is, himself, trying to understand what happened. My own definitions may not be precise enough for the FAA or Cockpit Confidential, but I hope they help explain some of the concepts. First, a few words: Associate pitch with moving up or down, the "stick" with pitch, yaw with left or right horizontal movement, rudders with yaw, and thrust with force and speed. How important was it that the glideslope wasn't working? It's not an easy question. Potentially, very important — if the pilot really, really preferred to use this method. But practically, probably not. A glideslope refers to a beam of energy that's part of the Instrument Landing System and keeps a plane on a vertical descent line. When cleared by the tower for an ILS approach to a runway, you tune your plane to the frequency of the glideslope emission; you adjust your speed, using the throttle, and pitch, using the stick, to keep the glideslope line as close to the center-line of an indicator display in the cockpit as you can. Another beam provides lateral guidance, so you're using your rudder pedals to slightly adjust the yaw to keep the line as close to the horizontal center-line in the same indicator display. If the lines stay tight, you'll land precisely in the touchdown zone of the runway, which is usually about 1,000 feet in from the threshold, or the start, of the runway. That's how planes land in bad weather. For most ILS approaches, though, the pilot has to make a decision at some point close to the ground. Regardless of what his instruments are showing, can she see the touchdown zone, enough of the runway, and the runway lights? This "threshold" changes depending on the runway, but it's usually between 300 and 500 feet, which will give the pilot enough time, if she doesn't see anything because it's too rainy, snowy, foggy or cloudy, to declare a "missed approach," throttle up, retract most of the drag-inducing flaps, and then retract the runway gear, and pitch up. So how did the pilots know how to stay on the right path? On a clear day with no visual distortions, there are other ways for a pilot to know if he's flying the correct approach path. Runway 28L had a functioning PAPI, or Precision Approach Path Indicator. The PAPI is a series of lights set to one side of the runway threshold. It doesn't matter precisely where. The angle at which the pilot's eyes catch the PAPI is key: if the pilot is on the correct glidepath, he will see two yellow lights next to two red lights. If the pilot is coming in high, he'll see three yellow lights and one red light. If he's coming in too low, he'll see three red lights next to one yellow light. If you're coming in too low, it means that you need to increase the ground speed of the plane relative to the rate of descent, so you push the throttle forward a bit, or perhaps adjust the pitch. If you're coming in too high, you ease back on the throttle or change the angle of the plane relative to the descent, pitching up a little. In any event, when you see the two-two configuration, you're good. Is that the only way for a pilot to tell if she's going to land at the right spot? No. Look at the landing threshold. It should be, relative to the rest of the stuff in your band of vision, at the same place it was when you first saw it. It'll get bigger and bigger, and bigger and bigger, but it won't move. Is that's the case, your ground speed is sufficient to land in the touchdown zone properly. So there were at least two cues — one electronic, and one visual, that the pilots were relying on. What does it mean that the "speed" was too slow? How would they know what the right speed was? The way you get a plane in the air is to generate enough thrust to overcome its weight, so that the thrust plus the weight of air itself is higher than the weight of the plane. The way you get a plane to land is to reverse the process that generates the thrust. This does not mean that you lower the power and point the nose toward the ground. It's kind of complex, because you want to land at a specific spot, like, say, on a runway, where you can burn off all the excessive energy that the plane has in a way that doesn't kill anyone or wreck the thing. The way to do this properly is to calculate a descent rate from a particular spot close to the runway threshold. The descent rate depends upon the weight of the airplane, because it represents the safest, slowest possible speed that the plane can lose its thrust, stay on an angle, and maintain control. Pilots will know that they'll need to land with a specific approach speed. Air Traffic Control will give them time to reduce their speed slowly; obviously, a plane can't fly at 300 knots until two miles out and then suddenly hope to slow down to between 150 and 160 knots right at the runway threshold without something going wrong. Usually, planes step down their speeds and altitudes gently, and are given several miles to set up their approaches — both the speed (the groundspeed, not the airspeed) and the angle (the glideslope). Generally, a plane's approach speed is a relative constant. The airframe accounts for a set weight, but variations in fuel aboard, the passenger count, the tailwinds on the ground and even the temperature can push the number higher or lower. The pilots and their dispatches can calculate the figure very quickly if conditions rapidly change. But they can't and never do ballpark the figure. So how do pilots stay at the exact speed? They adjust the thrust and the pitch of their aircraft. Generally, pilots will turn on the "autothrottle," and will use one of their several autopilots to set the speed. The plane, in theory, will then automatically adjust the throttle to make sure the speed is constant on the approach. Of course, the autopilots can't violate the laws of physics. Pilots themselves have to make sure the plane is within a certain set of physical parameters in order for the autopilot to work properly. Some pilots like to manually adjust the throttle to maintain the speed; some don't. And right before landing, the autopilot has to be disengaged because the plane is supposed to touch down and then slow down, something it can't do if the plane itself wants to keep the speed constant. (Some autopilots automatically disengage at a certain height). For all the talk of how "planes land themselves," pilots are the ones who decide when to disengage the autopilot and when to retard the throttle to idle, and how and when to begin the "flare" — which is that nose-up maneuver that both increases drag, slows down the plane, and allows the aircraft to touch down on its rear wheels as gently as possible. (Some planes can land themselves; these "category 3 ILS approaches" are still kind of rare, because airports have to be certified for them, pilots have to be trained extensively for them, and a lot of people still can't get over the idea of letting a plane decide when to cut off the autothrottle and automatically pitch up.) What happens when the autothrottle is disengaged and the pilot must increase speed before the plane is over the runway? Once the autothrottles have been disengaged, a pilot efficiently increases speed during landing by (a) keeping the pitch constant and adding more thrust to the engines, (b) and then very slowly adjusting the pitch down as the added thrust kicks in to make sure the plane's altitude aligns with the visual cues or ILS glidescope as necessary. Problem is, if you're trying to do this 10 seconds from touchdown, the plane is usually not going to respond as quickly as you need it to. If the pilot lowers the nose first, the altitude will drop before the speed increases, so pilots are instructed, generally, to not adjust the pitch of their aircraft when they're trying to make sure they're on a proper path to land until the plane has begun to speed up. The last thing these Asiana pilots needed to do was to go lower faster. By the way, human instincts would have you pull back on the stick as soon as you can, because up is up, but pitching up quickly during landing will not increase the altitude quickly enough and will decrease speed too quickly. Pitch up, speed down. Pitch down, speed up. And when you're landing or taking off, the relative effects of these actions will differ too. What's this about a "go-around?" Why didn't the pilots do this "go-around" thing if whatever they were doing wasn't right? The latter question is hard to answer; perhaps the pilots genuinely did not notice they were in trouble until it was too late. For the most part, though, if a plane is more than 15 seconds from touching down, it can safely and seamlessly execute a go-around maneuver. The flaps and slats — the thingies that extend from the wings during takeoff and landing — are retracted to a takeoff posture; the throttle is pushed up; then the plane pitches up slightly; once positive climb (i.e., it's going up) has been established, then the pilots will retract the landing gear. Every runway comes with its own "missed approach fix," which is where a plane knows to go automatically if it can't stick the landing. Before landing, a pilot will input the height of that fix, usually around 3,000 feet, into an autopilot computer. It won't be activated, though. (Each plane you fly has at least two these days, two separate autopilots). The pilot flying the plane relies on his or her co-pilot to look at the electronic landing cues and instruments to make sure that the plane is on track for a landing. He or she is ready to perform the final landing maneuvers (see below), or switch gears and do a "TO/GA." What a cool button this is. It basically tells the plane to ignore everything, including the autopilots, and increase the throttle as quickly as possible. Once the engines have spooled up, a process that can take anywhere between eight and 10 seconds, then the pilot not flying might activate the autopilot with the missed-approach height setting. http://theweek.com/article/index/246611/a-guide-to-crash-speak

Oh really? My wife, who has 33,000 hours in large jets 'hand flys' them all the time... Yes...she flys the controls manually for all takeoffs and landings that are VFR. She must be stupid I guess... That's not what I meant and you know it... C Sorry...thought you meant what you said~ In my world, the stupid comes from the number of passengers that have been reported to block the isles of this aircraft whilst they retrieved their overhead luggage! With smoke rapidly filling the cabin???? If that wasn't enough the poor kid gets run over by a fire truck while running from the plane???? That is stupid! I get really pissed when so many think this thing is a piper cub, it is not. Would somebody please post their copy of the Boeing 777 FM? So you can see just how much work is involved in flying on of these things? Saying that the aircraft stalled is to me, like holding up a sign,...yes I apologize that everyone wants to take short cuts and I did use the word stupid but I am at war with the NTSB, I understand that is not your war, and I am sorry to get all caught up in this , you are ceertianly not stupid!....and again I apologize for the use of the word. There is so much that has not been talked about and just as much stuff coming out of the NTSB that is so far to the west of reality, that it takes someone who has been thru this in the past to see much of what I'm speaking about. Airline crashes can be very complex issues, with a multitude of issues, some of which we may never fully understand. I have written at length about the relationship between safety and the ability to handle a certain amount of traffic in a certain time...this means cash for the airports. Nothing more nothing less. There is a complex relationship between the FAA and a number of airports, where the Authority has the final word on safety, not the FAA. In our governments wisdom they have exacerbated this issue by introducing money and authourity to a realativly new NTSB, they have increased and redefined areas of operation and responsibility, and this has not been for the better. In the NY area many controllers, pilots, and concerned individuals that work in the aviation field are and have been for many years about the workload of aircraft into certain airspace. The justification the authourities use is that: " We haven't had any accidents, because of this issue, so we are going to continue to do business this way..." This is not the FAA viewpoint on this subject. In other words the agency you have trusted to ensure your flying safety, can not do it's job! The FAA has long said that certain airspace is needlessly and to the detriment of safety being overworked. But they don't have any power to change this current system. The approaches have long been a source of controversy in the SAn fran area, for years. But all you guys see is that one plane has crashed, I see a system wide problem, that is very difficult to fully explain. Again sorry if anyone took offense to the word stupid... C And I can't believe that these idots took the time to get stuff from the overhead bins and blocked the isles of the aircraft... The passengers are more properly refereed to as "guests". The safety of which rests in whole or in part to the crew and the aircraft. The only person in charge of "safety" of the AC is the PIC. Any PIC that defers the safety and operation of the AC to a airport authority, or ATC, or anyone else is not a pilot. The paying passengers were just slammed onto the runway sufficiently hard to break the 150 tonne AC completely up. They just survived a groundloop hard enough to tear off a wing. They likely ranged in age from 1 to 80 years and made the best of a situation most likely caused by the PIC . Preliminary NTSB data analysis shows the 777 at 118 kn 16 seconds before impact and that a go-around was only initiated 1.5 seconds before impact @ 103-106 knots. At least 31 kn below what it should have been. The NTSB and/or the FAA wasn't operating Flight 214, the PIC was.

The 'chief instructor' were I started had 35 jumps at the time. We had only 6 regulars jumpers and you had to work your butt off to get more than one jump a day. The whole concept of 'qualified' was something we knew nothing about. We just stuck anywhere from 2 - 5 guys in a plane ( if we had one ) and would take off. I remember vividly a 4-man load, in 1967, that went to 12,500 ft in a C-180 and nobody, I mean nobody touched anyone in freefall; and we were ( supposedly ) trying to build a 4-man. Ah, those were the days. JerryBaumchen ^^^^^ THIS! Skydiving in the 1970-80's was much more expensive. Jumps in 1977 were $1/ 1000 plus a $2.5 usually 7500'. so $10. That was 35 years ago which would put the price today at $35.00 A used P.C. was $400-$500 so $1600 today USED. The biggest drawback was finding out about new techniques was word of mouth. No internet, no Youtube, etc.

Ben wasn't paying attention to them because he was thinking of his next stupid penalty. He was benched in the next game(last night).

Finds That London-Based Doncasters Used Non-Standard Alloys In Engine Maintenance A jury in Kansas on Thursday awarded $48 million to the families of five of the six people fatally injured when a DHC-6 Twin Otter carrying skydivers suffered a catastrophic engine failure just after takeoff and went down near Sullivan Airport in rural Missouri southwest of St. Louis. The family of one of those killed in the accident did not participate in the lawsuit. The Union, MO jury ordered London, U.K.-based Doncasters to pay $4 million to each family, along with an additional $28 million in punitive damages to be divided between the families, according to a report in the Kansas City Star. The right engine of the aircraft "blew up" on July 29, 2006 just after takeoff. The plane narrowly missed a house when it went down. No one on the ground was injured. The plane was being operated by Quantum Leap Skydiving of Sullivan, MO. On its website, Doncasters says it is an "international engineering group that manufactures precision components and assemblies for the aerospace, industrial gas turbines, specialist automotive, petrochemical, construction, industrial, transportation and recreation markets." Gary Robb, the attorney who represented the families, said court testimony revealed that Dorncasters used an engine part made from an alloy not approved by the manufacturer, Pratt & Whitney Canada, which was possibly responsible for as many as eight other engine failures. "Lives will be saved because of what this jury did," Robb said.

A FAA investigator has many "catch all" sections such as "Dangerous operation of a AC", Failing to ensure safe vertical or lateral distance to another AC, You assume that a FAR spells out a specific violation. Not so. A FAA "Letter of Investigation" may start out with a accusation of "Creating an Unsafe Condition" or make no reference to any specific FAR at all. Specific FAR's would include but not be limited to: 91.13(a), and (b), 91.111(a), and 91.113(b),(d). To suggest that an unpowered parachute with a level speed of 30kn's compares to a AC capable of climbing and using a radio to determine a safe takeoff time or time of arrival. None of which is available to a parachutist. Is silly. Since this thread is in general reference to a AC flying under skydivers while under canopy. Consider all of the above quoted FARS to apply. Once the full scope of a violation has been ascertained by the investigator. Then you are charged. The BS that an investigator can put a pilot through is extensive and expensive. Most aviation attorneys won't even look at you without a $5000 retainer.

HaHaHa, LOL yeah I guess in Utah things are a little different!

Exactly. Most pilots assume that one, or one group of jumpers is all that will ever come out of a AC.

Aviation authorities(FAA,EASA,etc.) recognize hot air balloons, sailplanes, aircraft, helicopters, etc. In general the lower and/or unpowered machine has the right of way. After that a machine landing has the right of way over one taking off. A AC passing under a parachute at a airport where a NOTAM is in effect could be subject to an investigation by the FAA if a complaint was made. A AC has every equal right to land or take-off at a airport where parachuting activities is underway. It's incumbent upon the pilot to see and avoid descending parachutists. Just as it's the duty of a parachutist to avoid the runways. At an uncontrolled airport most pilots would contact the jump plane and/or other aircraft to discuss departure/arrival intentions to avoid potential conflicts. PRIOR to departure or arrival. Don't necessarily assume any pilot has done this.

A couple decades ago we had a two completely different students at the DZ. One was a student and would bring out bologna sandwiches for both lunch and supper. When we all went to the bar he would find a excuse about why he couldn't come. Although he did drink. It was all to save up for a extra jump. He bought about 1/3 of the cases of beer that most others bought but nobody ever said a word about it. The other student had some sort of job and never seemed to have any money to buy beer. But he had a new car and always seemed to have a liberal supply of weed. Well it was suggested to the second student that if he had money for weed, perhaps he might buy some beer. But nothing changed. Well low and behold there was a bad spot and he ended up walking back 5 miles on the last load of the day. A week later his T-10 accidentally deployed at about 4000' and he had to walk again. Obviously times have changed.....

NOTAM or NoTAM is the quasi-acronym for a "Notice To Airmen". NOTAMs are created and transmitted by government agencies under guidelines specified by Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. A NOTAM is filed with an aviation authority to alert aircraft pilots of any hazards en route or at a specific location. The authority in turn provides a means of disseminating relevant NOTAMs to pilots. NOTAMs are issued (and reported) for a number of reasons, such as: * hazards such as air-shows, parachute jumps, kite flying, rocket launches, etc.