mark

I had not noticed that our discussion is locked, but perhaps you are more perceptive than I am. A steel ball in that cutter may have interfered with its performance, sure. But we don't know. Would you still say the ball caused the malfunction if it were found to be undamaged? The investigator did not say one way or the other. That goes to the investigator's competency, not his honesty. Mark

Aviacom has not completed its investigation into the "foreign object." We still do not have photos of the ball to show the scarring or deformation which one would expect if it interfered with the cutter, and Aviacom has not said anything about being able to reproduce this failure mode. We might know there was a foreign object present, but we do not know if it was involved in the failure or if its presence was just an unfortunate coincidence. Additionally, this incident was just one of a series of incidents in which cutter problems were suspected. Jeff Johnston wrote about this series in an article posted on the PIA website. Mark

Well someone @ PIA & USPA dropped the ball then cuz the public comment ended Feb. 4 2011, I commented on it. And for anyone to say the FAA fucked it up or was slipping one by us...... NOT! this is old news. In fact there is some very important info changes in there for airport access. I think you've misunderstood councilman24's comment. USPA and PIA had some part in drafting the version of AC 105-2D you commented on. The published version is different from the draft in critical ways, and it is the changes since February that were new to us. Mark

Can you say a little more about this? It seems like if all rigs will need some sort of approval, the simplest place to do that is with the rig manufacturers -- but then we wouldn't need field approvals, would we? Or, since this is an Argus thread, are you suggesting that field approvals would be a way to get around the manufacturers' disapprovals? Mark

How much drag does a pilot chute generate in a normal deployment and in a subterminal deployment? Mark

It depends on what you mean by "better." If the airplane is above a safe landing area, then a minimum sink speed allows the pilot more time to deal with the problem. The minimum sink speed is lower when the airplane is lighter. Jumpers out! If the airplane needs to glide somewhere to land safely, then it still depends. Higher weight means a higher speed and better penetration into headwinds. If the airplane is downwind of the landing area, keeping jumpers on board for a little while longer is helpful. If upwind, then lighter weight (jumpers out) and lower speed might be able to take advantage of the wind to make it back -- a little bit like hanging in brakes to get back from a long spot. Mark

QuoteThe decision by some manufacturers to disallow Argus AADs in their rigs came after the San Marcos incident, but that incident was just the most recent in a series of similar incidents. Jeff Johnston's analysis (http://www.pia.com/TechnicalArgusDocuments/OtherDocuments/ArgusIncidentAnalysisRev1.pdf) is, I think, representative of how those manufacturers regard Aviacom's explanations of those previous incidents -- as essentially implausible. Their decision was not based on a single incident, but on the series of incidents and Aviacom's response to them. We can argue about whether their actions should have waited for a more complete investigation of the San Marcos unit by Aviacom, but the fact is that to date Aviacom has not published any further findings since that initial one where they showed the steel ball. We still have not seen any close-up photos of the ball, and the photos we do have do not show the sort of scarring or deformation one would expect if it had interfered with the cutter action. Nor has Aviacom shown their ability to reproduce a steel ball-induced malfunction. The longer Aviacom delays, the more it appears that the steel ball is just a side issue, and the more it appears that there really is a problem with the cutter. The issue of pencil packing has been covered in Kirk Smith's investigation (http://www.pia.com/TechnicalArgusDocuments/IncidentReports/Texas/SanMarcosPreliminary.pdf). Mr. Smith found evidence of sloppy record keeping, but the best evidence was that the rig was in date. Also in Mr. Smith's investigation, there is no evidence of mis-rigging. Mark

Thanks! Mark

There is very little load (on the order of a few pounds) on the white loop. Except for the RI bulletin mentioned above, I can't think of any cases where the loop failed because the bartacks failed. Having the bartacks readily visible exposes them to additional wear. And there are plenty of other load-bearing stitches on your rig that are more important and less accessible. The real reason for the "confluence wrap" is to make the risers pretty. Sure, a rigger could take the cover off, and you could safely jump the risers that way. Except you'll need to watch out for the fashion police. Mark

Depending on how the reserve canopy bulk is distributed, the tuck tab may not seat fully. I've replaced a couple, which is either very few, or, compared to the number of Vectors I see, quite a few. Mark

Do you mean the report he did on the San Marcos incident specifically? It's been up on the PIA website for about a month: http://www.pia.com/TechnicalArgusDocuments/IncidentReports/Texas/SanMarcosPreliminary.pdf Mark

Look mate, you are twisting my words, Um. No, I am just quoting your words. it was not me that issued a letter to the manufacturers saying these units were unsafe. I'm not sure how that clause follows. In any case, Mr. Singer's letter (available on the PIA web site) does not say the units were unsafe. All it recommends is that manufacturers ensure AADs don't interfere with TSO'd components. PIA made no decision. Some harness/container manufacturers made a decision to withdraw approval, other harness/container manufacturers made a decision to continue approval. I suspect, but do not know, that the harness/container manufacturers regret the Aviacom is taking so long to complete their investigation. What was known was that there was a cutter fault, and some history of other incidents where the cutter was suspect. Some manufacturers apparently thought the risks were great enough to withdraw approval, other manufacturers evaluated the risks differently. We still don't know what the cutter fault is, if any, and we won't know until Aviacom finishes its investigation. That is hardly the fault of PIA or the constellation of harness/container manufacturers, or Airtec or AAD. Mark

Until Aviacom has completed its investigation, we do not know what the actual problem is. Until Aviacom has conclusively identified the problem, then yes, it is reasonable for manufacturers to withdraw their approvals. Mark

That is up to them to decide, they have plenty of riggers at hand. If they had waited a few more days they would have had the relevant information, but it seems they were too keen to eliminate the opposition to 2 of their members! Are you suggesting that it is reasonable to ban something based on assumption without any attempt to recognize the actual problem? You would want PIA to select the investigating rigger? Really? The same PIA that was -- your words -- "keen to eliminate the opposition to 2 of their members"? Until Aviacom has completed its investigation, we do not know what the actual problem is. Until they have conclusively identified the problem, then yes, it is reasonable for manufacturers to withdraw their approvals. Mark

Before we can make such statements with confidence, we should allow Aviacom to complete their investigation. Mark

Who is the "they" in PIA who could have investigated? Mark

What course of action would you propose for the PIA when they are next made aware of a potentially serious problem? The actual sequence of events: . . .PIA business meeting: 11-13 Feb 2011 . . .San Marcos incident: 21 Feb 2011 The San Marcos initial report was sent to USPA. USPA in turn forwarded the report to PIA. asking essentially, "What are you going to do about it?" PIA's response after the San Marcos incident was (1) publication of a letter from the Chairman of the Technical Committee Dave Singer to harness/container manufacturers, and (2) the setting up of a web page to collect in one place all available information, including information from Aviacom. Everything Aviacom has made public has been published. All of it. As Mr. Singer noted in his letter, PIA is not a regulatory body (unlike, I gather, NZPIA, so I can understand your confusion). And in fact, some manufacturers have chosen to continue their approval of Argus AADs in their rigs. It has now been three weeks since Aviacom issued its own initial report on the San Marcos incident. They would greatly advance their case if they would complete their investigation, including showing: -- close-up photos of the steel ball, showing scarring, scuffing, or deformation caused by interaction with the cutter, and -- photos of the cutters involved in the other three incidents, and -- photos of cutters after normal firing in use. Mark

! Mark

TS 330 main @ 400 pounds = wingloading of 1.2 7' tall and 400 pounds + C182. Video, please. Have you tried advertising in the dz.com classifieds instead of on the forums? Mark

I agree. However, the rule now is a great improvement over the previous rule, which required US-approved and FAA rigger-packed equipment for everybody, including visitors. Mark

The PIA has not grounded any AADs. Some of its members have chosen to withdraw approval for Argus AADs in their rigs. Some have not. As you know, the FAA's position is that they cannot legally issue an AD because our sport parachute systems are not "aircraft appliances." Even if an AD is not warranted in this instance, how would you propose to proceed if there were a case where there is no doubt there is a serious problem? Mark

Yes, if any part of the gear is TSO’d and by an FAA Certified rigger. Sparky Michalm21: almost entirely correct. If the reserve were TSO'd, the Vector-3 repack would have to be done by an FAA-certificated rigger to be legal in the US. There are several FAA riggers in Switzerland. Sparky: Not quite. If the reserve is TSO'd and the h/c is not (or vice versa), then the system is not FAA-approved and foreign jumper rules apply. Mark

US TSO'd reserve in US TSO'd h/c (for example, Tempo reserve in Icon container) = 180 days if packed by an FAA certificated rigger, 0 days if packed by a non-FAA rigger. Special rules for foreign rigs in the US apply only if: . . . (1) The system is not approved by the FAA (that is, either the reserve or the h/c or both are not TSO'd); and . . . (2) The rig belongs to the non-US jumper (who must be a visitor, not a resident), who is the only one who gets to jump it; and . . . (3) The rig is legal to jump in the owner's home country. Many folks miss (1) above, and mistakenly assume that only (2) and (3) need to be true for the rig to be legal to jump in the US. Mark

Just a slight correction: PIA has not banned anything. Some (but not all) harness/container manufacturers do not allow Argus AADs in their rigs; some (but not all) national skydiving organizations do not allow Argus AADs. But PIA has not banned anything. Mark

Some harness/container manufacturers have chosen to disallow Argus AADs in their rigs, some have not. Have you tried contacting the manufacturer of your rig to see if they will provide more detailed reasons for their decision? Better yet, have you tried contacting rig manufacturers who accept Argus AADs to see if they will provide reasons for their decision -- and what role PIA played in the process? Have you looked at the list of PIA members? The sport market is just a small part of the industry; the military and government sectors are much more important players. Can you think of a reason why those members would want to risk the reputation of their Association on this dispute? Mark