yoink

to me, this is the biggest revelation of this thread. That there is circumstantial evidence the harnesses and canopies that we currently jump may not meet the TSO requirements for reserve activation because they are based on an old design which did, but in reality bear little resemblance to that design. I'm all for shortcuts, but that loophole is a biggie. The hypothesis that some people have put forward (and I can only go on what I've read here) is that some configurations do not meet that standard. Riggers have chimed in here saying they've refused to pack tight rigs - OK, that's a starting point. Compile a database of those containers and canopies and see if there's any commonality. Then test those suspect commonalities first, rather than saying 'test everything'... You're an engineer Bill - you know how this works. I refer you back to my earlier post though - this could potentially be an even bigger can of worms to open.

because they feel the same as you - that the harness and canopy companies have put skydivers in a dangerous position by not conforming to the TSO requirements. They have a product that is reliant on that requirement being met. I just don't see the AAD manufacturers as the bad guys here, Ron. If you're right about the tight containers being the cause for people going in after an AAD fires then they're reacting to the harness and canopy guys putting them in an impossible situation. As has been said before, 750ft used to work fine... It might just be me, but discussing about 1) whether the increase is a good or bad thing / whether is should be a recommendation or BSR, 2) what the root cause is and how to solve it (tight container issue), and 3) whether the USPA are just mouthpieces of manufacturers in a single thread seems to detract from the positives that could be had from all of those discussions because of the overlapping noise... to me, they can be discussed separately more to more value. I wish I had some evidence that this BSR was temporary. It seems like that would be the simplest solution - it's in place to mitigate a specific situation - the unknown of what canopy / container configurations don't meet TSO standards... but if that was the case, how do you remove it? "If you have this container configuration with that canopy you must pull at 2500ft if you are jumping with an AAD... "? That would get unmanageable. Safety rules should be as simple as possible. So we come back to the simplest answer - make ALL manufacturers meet TSO requirements, which we can't validate without testing....

Fund our own independent analysis separate to PIA out of USPA funds? I've no idea how feasible that is by the way, but it's one solution. I'm not convinced asking PIA to investigate something that potentially puts their members at risk was the most sensible idea in the world anyway... talk about a conflict of interests!

How is it unrelated? Raising the minumum pull altitude allowed the activation altitude of the AAD to be raised in turn... Look at it this way - if there is a safe distance between pull altitude and AAD activation in order to minimize the chance of a 2-out, then necessarily you must raise the pull height if you raise the AAD activation height in order to keep that distance and chance constant.

I'll put my hand up - I may be one of them. I don't understand if Ron is against the raising of the opening height altogether, whether he's against it because of the way it was implemented (and if that is the case, is it better to remain a danger?), or whether he's for it but objects to the way it came about. Communication by text is always more difficult and this would be a great discussion to have over a beer. As far as I can see there's an issue: There might not be enough height for an AAD to safely get a reserve open at their current settings. Is that stating the problem in it's simplest terms? If that is the case then there solutions as I see it are either: 1) Make it so that reserves / harnesses work together to meet the TSO requirements. 2) Give the AAD more time to function. Doing nothing (advising people) isn't an option if you know there is a specific danger. 2 is MUCH more straightforward than 1 so why not do that first while we try to get our heads around the more complex problem?

No one is saying that the reserve / container situation shouldn't be fixed (although I do think we need to confirm it's the issue first - hence the USPA request to PIA. Fine. Ban skydiving in its entirety until that PIA data is reviewed. You're stating as fact that an unknown combination of reserves and harnesses are unsafe as they don't meet the TSO which our safety procedures are based around. If the USPA is really looking out for the jumpers, that would be the only logical recommendation. 'Do not skydive until we know definitively if there is a problem with specific reserves / containers' No band aid required.... OR you can put in place a temporary restriction that might help a few people by indirectly addressing the issues caused by that unconfirmed problem.

Same here. I used to like low hop and pops when it was solid cloud from 2000ft up. If the BPA follow suit then there goes the majority of skydives done in the North of Britain! Interestingly I did see that the BPA has a separate opening altitude specifically for demos - the USPA could follow suit and take the liability back from the S&TAs.

By getting a timeline for delivery out of the PIA for a question that was asked of them 3 years ago? At least then we can have some expectations - right now we're in limbo.

To inform discussion in the USPA BOD thread, I thought it might be interesting to try and gather some data. So for C and D license holders only - On your typical skydive will this mandatory increase in container opening height change your skydive?

Because it's a step in the right direction by indirectly addressing a problem that would be an even bigger can of worms to open? How many people do you think raising the deployment altitude to 2500ft is going to affect on their average skydive? 5%? I suspect even less than that. How many people a year might that extra 250ft feet save? Even 1 or 2 is OK in my book... Now what happens when we get the data back from PIA that the USPA has asked for and it comes back saying that 20% of the rigs out there don't meet reserve release requirements? These are expensive bits of kit! Do they have to get alterations made and would they be possible or cost effective? Who pays for them? I can't believe the manufacturers could afford to, so do people start suing the manufacturers?! Bankrupting them doesn't help our sport any... The fallout of that data might be really bad news. Raising the AAD activation height is picking off the low hanging fruit to help in the meantime while we chew on the much bigger questions of 'do we really want to know if the rigs we're jumping don't conform to published safety standards' because that would put the USPA and DZOs / S&TAs in an even bigger problem. Suddenly it's not a case of denying someone the extra 500ft of a skydive - now they're not going to be allowed to skydive with that equipment at all!

I don't see the conspiracy between the USPA and the manufacturers that Ron is upset about. I am deeply concerned that that TSO certification of many rigs may have been submitted on a design that is no longer in production. If the USPA were concerned enough about it to ask PIA to look into it 3 years ago, that's enough to raise my eyebrows. Where are the results of that testing? What is the timeline for it? It's been 3 years... There has to be some data available, yes? You can't ask for something like that, then not care about when the answer is delivered.

Why? We're watching a video and discussing getting stable after a cutaway.... Being stable through freefall has nothing to do with any of this.

I'm not aware of any emergency procedure taught that goes: Peel Pull Get Stable Punch Arch.

Are there progress milestones and timescales for this process? 3 years seems like a fairly long time for a limited piece of research... Have any interim results been published?

*facepalm. 28 seconds to get under a reserve from a malfunctioning main... Take up bowling, guy.

No.

*** It ain't just parachutes, fella. Too right Jerry. Most big medical machines now bear little or no resemblance to the one the original license was granted for!

Dentists I don't mind so much. It's Orthodontists who are the sadists...

Not a bad idea. I don't want to be taken out by a drunk skydiver any more than I do a drunk driver.

You're missing the point. Maybe deliberately. By training at 12,000ft you're INSTILLING a learned behavior - that 3000ft exits are bad and should be feared. That's simply not true. You want proof? What about the tens of thousands of Static line students that learned to exit at or below 3000ft? How many more do you need? By instilling that behavior in students, when the shit does eventually hit the fan they won't react calmly. They'll panic, and just maybe kill everyone on the plane when they do - all for no reason. Exiting at 1000 ft on modern gear is unsafe. Exiting at 3500 is not. It's just like any other skydive exit and that's the point. AFF students have to be taught that.

Hey. USPA. Do this. *include exiting safely in the basic parachutist training.

That's just about every rule ever.

This is a really good point. Is a TSO good for the life of a container? Is there no need to renew it ever?

The USPA is acting to reduce *manufacturer liability*.... The USPA is not the PIA. That is a conspiracy, even if you don't want to see it So these proposed changes to AAD firing heights have come about because of experience - we've got data that shows 750ft is still too risky? I just want to check that assumption? If so, what's the other side of the coin? That the AAD manufacturers raise their lower limit to 1000ft to increase the safety margin and trust skydivers to alter their behavior appropriately and risk the increased liability if they don't? I tell you what - I wouldn't do that if I owned a company. Would you? Why would I assume all the risk when I was trying to make equipment safer based on increased understanding of how it's being used in practice. and even if they DID that, then got sued out of existence or started having multiple misfires that ruins their reputations because of people who DON'T alter their behavior voluntarily, how does that help our sport any? Awesome. Now we go from 2 AAD options to 1, or none... It's not a case of not seeing collusion. I sort of do. I just don't see it as collusion to just benefit AAD manufacturers or reps.

I don't know where to start with this... I'm going to assume that you're relatively new because I can't imagine any experienced jumper making these arguments. You have to realize that 3500 feet is NOT low - no matter what you think. It's a psychology that's been insinuated into AFF students because they're used to having time and altitude to deal with things. Students who have trained on static line simply don't see a 3500ft exit as 'low' because they're comfortable with it. There's a full 15 seconds to deploy before things get gnarly. It's this 'comfort zone' that causes AFF students to worry, and it's EXACTLY why we need to train it out of them before it becomes so ingrained that they CAN'T get rid of it. You say that aircraft emergencies are rare events, and they are - but to my perspective so are malfunctions on my parachute. Particularly on student parachutes... I jumped for a decade without any malfunction - does that mean I shuoldn't train to deal with them from day 1? Emergencies in skydiving are like blackjack - you can look at the statistics all you want, but the reality is that anything can happen on your next jump. You could have 3 malfunctions in a row... or you could have an AC emergency on your first jump when you're not being shepherded around by an instructor. Just because it's unlikely doesn't mean that you shouldn't know how to deal with it competently. You talk about 'freefall, and getting stable and relaxing'. The truth is that these are all nice to have things in skydiving. In training for emergency situations we're talking about survival and that will always be the priority. Being comfortable with exiting a plane and being able to get stable without 10,000ft of altitude under you is a survival priority. You've heard of the phrase 'plan for the worst, hope for the best'? That's how you survive in skydiving. Picture this scenario: A newly licensed skydiver, call him Bob, who has completed training according to your progression has say, 30 jumps. Bob's taken a little while to get through AFF but he's now very relaxed in freefall and when the time to pull comes he's in great shape. It's no problem that Bob takes a couple of thousand feet to sort himself out after the exit because the rest of the freefall is spectacular. On jump 31 the engine starts to splutter at 3100ft and then quits. The pilots calls for an emergency exit and EVERONE in the plane starts yelling and bustling. Bob is terrified. 3100 feet?!!! He's right next to the door and people are screaming at him to get it open and exit. Someone pushes past, opens the door and goes... another person is right behind them. There are lots of nightmare scenarios from here. Bob exits but cant get stable because he's freaking out and pitches himself into an entanglement. Bob is so scared he doesn't try to save himself at all. (it's happened) Bob panics and screws up his exit, throwing his PC way too early and tossing itinto the door he's trying to leave from where it gets caught on something and brings the plane down with everyone still on it. Bob simply curls up in a ball in the tail, doesn't exit and goes down with the plane. The list could go on. The point is that there is no reason to panic. He had loads of time but because it's not something he's done and practiced, he's making bad choices. The argument of 'it's a rare event' is utterly invalid when compared to the potential outcomes. I completely agree with Remi - if it were up to me I'd have multiple hop and pops from lower than 3500 as a requirement for an A-license just to teach people that it's not a scary place to be exiting.