You'd have to pay attention to how they define "save" to see if the numbers are comparable.
And how would you define "fail?" The AAD's job description isn't to save someone's life -- no machine can be designed to do that.
The AAD is a machine that responds to physically-detected stimuli; primarily the rate at which air pressure is changing, as compared with a baseline set by initializing it at ground level.
If you initialize it at the wrong place, it can "fail."
If the barometric pressure changes significantly, it can "fail" (although that's low on the likely tree).
If the AAD happens to be in a burble because of the jumper's body position, it can "fail."
If the reserve chooses that day to have a pilot chute hesitation, it can "fail."
If there is debris blocking the sensing unit (unlikely, but hey), it can "fail."
But none of these are failures of the unit; they are all violations of its operating parameters. A person is required in the loop, to make the complex decisions needed for skydiving; a machine that could make all of those decisions would be incredibly more complex, more expensive, and have far more (and more sophisticated) failure modes.
Wendy P. There is nothing more dangerous than breaking a basic safety rule and getting away with it. It removes fear of the consequences and builds false confidence. (tbrown)