Should the US send more troops to Afghanistan?

[nerdgirl 0]

FOR CLARIFICATION, ALL OF THESE QUOTES ARE FROM BACEVICH

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Containing the threat posed by jihad should follow a similar strategy. Robust defenses are key -- not mechanized units patrolling the Iron Curtain, but well-funded government agencies securing borders,

Who's borders? Sealing yourself in and ignoring the enemy only allows them greater freedom and movement. Only a halfwit terrorist would be caught by the yellow pack workers that are employed by border control.

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controlling access to airports and seaports,

Actually controlling access or making the public 'feel' safer? Are airports and seaports not controled to the best of the lacking ability of border agencies at the moment? If not why not?

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and ensuring the integrity of electronic networks that have become essential to our way of life.

Technology keeps overtaking ICT security progress, good idea in principle but very difficult to negate the human screw up factor

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As during the Cold War, a strategy of containment should include comprehensive export controls and the monitoring of international financial transactions. Without money and access to weapons, the jihadist threat shrinks to insignificance: All that remains is hatred.

This statement alone demonstrates a total lack of understanding of the enemy and his tactics and stratergy. The cold war was fought against states. This is fought against organised and loosely organised groups and individuals following a doctrine of hatred.
The funding is not only from donations around across the world but also often not using traditional banking/financial structures (The Tailban et al didn't have a rough time because of Lehman brothers going under) Money is also raised from the Heroin that is produced and exported. Now last time I checked there was already a ban on such trade. As for weapons, anyone who has ever been to Dara market would know that they make them themselves, if you want a good copy of a AK thats the place to be. Also as I remember the 9/11 terrorists brought down three airliners using knifes. I went through a airport twice this week carrying razors in my hand luggage and they confiscated my contact solution as it was 120 mL not 100mL and let me kept the razors. Go figure!

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Ideally, this approach should include strenuous efforts to reduce the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which serves to funnel many billions of dollars into the hands of people who may not wish us well.”

They already have billions, if anything it would only serve to accelerate the funding against the west.

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[kbordson 8]

No.

Reason: You can't win over a population (especially a "hidden" population) by force against the entire community. England didn't do it with the insurgent Americans 200 years ago. We didn't do it in Vietnam 50 years ago. We won't accomplish the objectives with this one either... even with NATO backing.



So what do we do? What options do we have?

Lets parallel this to
"How do you protect yourself from being mugged and killed in NYC/Chicago/Rio?"

- Play the victim (Stand back and allow ourselves to be randomly attacked by cowards)
- Don't play with "them" (No one goes there and no one comes here. Completely isolate and prevent ANY foreign "threats" into our country - we're kind of doing this already, I've heard comment that some rather nice people from across the pond refuse to visit the US anymore do to treatment received at immigrations)
- Constant surveillance (Increase paranoia. Improve intelligence even to the point of limiting personal liberties)
- Remove the threat, Eliminate the criminals (send more troops....)

What is the objective? To be strong and "safe." To travel where I want without any threat of harm. Will any of those options prevent the muggings? And is the cost worth the benefit?

Are we going to make the World "safe"? Is that a reasonable expectation?

How many do "we" have to kill or attack before they will see that we are "right"?
How many military members have to be killed or attacked before they will see that we are "right"?


I'm not a "dove" but this current plan isn't working. We have to work this smarter, not harder.

[Skyrad 0]

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So we'd better have a very clear idea of what we want, it has to be something we can actually achieve, and we have to have an exit strategy planned. and in the meantime we'll need to accept ongoing and heavy losses of young American lives.

I agree, (knew if I read your posts for long enough we'd eventually agree on something)

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[Skyrad 0]

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Sure blame it on Nixon, have you ever heard of LBJ and McNamara?


So in actuality you are blaming the wrong administration.

Clinton got a blow job... Just thought I'd mention it

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[nerdgirl 0]

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How many do "we" have to kill or attack before they will see that we are "right"?
How many military members have to be killed or attacked before they will see that we are "right"?

I think you've highlighted the critical differences between conventional & to some extent counterterrorism approaches (e.g., invocations of kill all the terrorists) and counterinsurgency.

GEN McChrystal has asserted that the metric for success is not insurgents killed, or more specifically from his confirmation hearing:

"Although I expect stiff fighting ahead, the measure of effectiveness will not be enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence."

Counterinsurgency is not about killing the insurgents.


And yes, counterinsurgencies have been effective. The British in Malaya and the US-Philippines effort against Abu Sayyef Group (another radical Islamist terrorist group) over the last 8 years are two examples.

Because of your background and your knowledge (that's a compliment btw), your response in this post is perhaps the most interesting and informative to me thus far.

Another critical piece of effective counterinsurgency is the views of the domestic population of the counterinsurgents, aka the American public. If you as a smart, knowledgeable individual are seeing the current strategy (which reflects shifts in military/DoD going back to 2004 not the Obama administration) as "how many do "we" have to kill or attack before they will see that we are "right"?" then the US and the DoD are failing at domestic strategic communication as well as the international deficits that SecDef Gates has spoken about.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Skyrad 0]

I know, you're a lot more switched on than that.

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[Skyrad 0]

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Because of your background and your knowledge (that's a compliment btw), your response in this post is perhaps the most interesting and informative to me thus far.

Note to self... Must try harder

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[wolfriverjoe 1,523]

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The only publication to cover it on a regular basis was Soldier of Fortune magazine.

While I would agree that the threat was not recognized or down-played for much too long, "only" is perhaps a bit hyperbolic. At least 110 publications & citations dealing with Taliban between 1980 & 1990.




/Marg

Perhaps a bit, but not that much. 110 articles in ten years? I'm not going to dig out all my back issues, but SOF probably had that many article in the same time period. They had people on the ground for much of the time. They also brought out the first samples of the new (at the time) AK-74 and it's 5.45x39mm ammunition.

And while I didn't look at all of the cites, I didn't see any "major" media articles. And no, SOF isn't all that "major"

Yes, the major papers and periodicals had stuff from time to time, but continuing coverage that allowed an overall picture to form was strikingly absent.

Afghanistan was not the only conflict where this happened. The Karen conflict in Burma (or Myanmar) the Shining Path rebellion in Peru, the West Timor/Indonesia conflict, along with a lot of the Central American, African and Balkan civil wars were covered extensively by SOF, including aid and training teams sent in. Very few other publications sent reporters to the countries, let alone out in the field there.

Admittedly the coverage was far from unbiased. There was a clear level of antagonism against any communist group, and one of the mottos was "Death to Tyrants".

But they gave publicity to people who were getting slaughtered. And aid. They were one of the few groups getting supplies into Sarajevo during the seige.


As to the troops, I agree that "door kickers" aren't needed. But troops for basic security (the cop on the corner) and training are essential.
The fairly recent Marine offensive that based Marines in a specific villiage and kept them there is a great example.
At first the Afghans were leery. Americans had come before, then left. And then the Taliban returned to punish the "collaborators".

Giving them the confidence that we won't abandon them next week will do a lot toward "winning the hearts and minds".

The Marines had a similar "Combined Action Platoon" program in Viet Nam that was reasonably succesful. Working alongside and training local troops to defend their own homes and families.

Of course because there was little "body count" or "ground taken" from the enemy, the powers that were in charge failed to see the benefits and ended it, abandoning the villagers to the VC, who then "dealt with" the "collaborators".

This style of "home defense" also was successful against the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru. A training platoon teaches the villagers how to defend themselves, provides arms, and leaves a squad or even just one or two soldiers for organization and ongoing training. When the terrs showed up, they met organized resistance, not helpless peasants.

"There are NO situations which do not call for a French Maid outfit." Lucky McSwervy

"~ya don't GET old by being weak & stupid!" - Airtwardo

[nerdgirl 0]

When someone highlights something I don't know/a thoughtful perspective that I was missing, that's the most interesting to me (very much owned as my subjective interpretation of interesting). It's the 'what am I missing'/not seeing that I want (and the 'how' & why,' but those are often better dealt with over beer than html markup text). Those are the things needed to solve the really challenging problems, e.g., those are 'unknown unknowns.'

Both the British in Malaya and the US in OEF-Philippines have essentially dealt with the domestic audience by being quiet about it. That approach won't work with Afghanistan.

You bring an international perspective that I appreciate. [DanG] brings operational perspectives that I appreciate and frankly, don't have. Marc brings another perspective that I value. All teach me.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is specious - we're neither looking to occupy nor fighting a conventional war nor is it a Cold War conflict.

Apparently you simply don't understand the correlation if you don't see the relevance. The comparison is the more analogous to the current war than any you've mentioned. It has nothing to do with whether or not we are in a Cold War or whether the war is being fought conventionally.

Like the Soviets, we were drawn in to an unwinnable war of attrition. We can be intelligent and learn from their mistake, or we can continue throwing away lives, limbs, and treasure. Personally, I'd prefer we make the intelligent decision and recognize that this is not a war that can be won militarily.

Of course, if the purpose of your discussion was not to actually discuss all relevant viewpoints …

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[Skyrad 0]

Thanks Marg, but I was only kidding

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[nerdgirl 0]

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Thanks Marg, but I was only kidding

Aah, yes ... the British sense of humor. Also somewhat foreign to many Americans.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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I'm not going to dig out all my back issues, but SOF probably had that many article in the same time period. They had people on the ground for much of the time.

Who is SOF following today? Over the last 3 years?

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Skyrad 0]

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Thanks Marg, but I was only kidding

Aah, yes ... the British sense of humor. Also somewhat foreign to many Americans.

/Marg

Here you go:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teMlv3ripSM

This will help you better understand British humour and sharpen your Speakers Corner skills all at the same time.

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[wolfriverjoe 1,523]

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I'm not going to dig out all my back issues, but SOF probably had that many article in the same time period. They had people on the ground for much of the time.

Who is SOF following today? Over the last 3 years?

/Marg

Unfortunately, not really anybody.

They went downhill fast in the past 4 or 5 years. Very little "on the scene" reporting. A lot of "reports" that were little more than reprinting what was released by the military combat reporters. Attributed to the original writer, but when you see a byline including a rank, it loses what little impartiality it might have had.

The guys who did the real cutting edge stuff in the 80's and 90's have gotten old (a few have gotten killed, RIP Lance Motley) and it seems that noone is willing or able to replace them. LTC Robert Brown, founder and publisher is well into his 70's now, he won't be climbing the hills in Afghanistan any more (he was there in the 80's). He was the one who had the quote from the first Gulf war (something like) "I had expected to ride the lead tank into Kuwait City, but I'm stuck with all the boobs and idiots here in Riyadh".

It's a real shame, I was a subscriber for about 25 years, since 83 or so (and have all the issues), but I let it go about a year ago.

"There are NO situations which do not call for a French Maid outfit." Lucky McSwervy

"~ya don't GET old by being weak & stupid!" - Airtwardo

[nerdgirl 0]

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I'm not going to dig out all my back issues, but SOF probably had that many article in the same time period. They had people on the ground for much of the time.

Who is SOF following today? Over the last 3 years?

Unfortunately, not really anybody.

Bummer.

Still think it would be interesting to see how well SOF has identified emerging threat groups, i.e., a post-hoc analysis.
Would have been cooler if they were really accurate and were still doing it. (Lots of 'ifs.')

If they aren't doing it, who is? A blogger?
Lots of folks make predictions; very few go back and analyze accuracy rates.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[downwardspiral 0]

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Remind me...isn't McChrystal a former SF commander and current COIN guru?

Yes, he's Special Forces. More specifically Army Ranger. (Others can debate/disagree with me whether or not or too what extent that qualifies as SF.) One of the best, imo, ....oh, what's the word I'm looking for (brain-farting at the moment ) ... narrative biographical sketches by another SF officer: The Pope.

I wouldn't necessarily call him a COIN guru. He's a definite convert and viewed widely as an operator who can execute and implement COIN-based strategic objectives. Dave Kilcullen is a COIN guru.

/Marg

Thanks Marg. I remember the pope article now. Weren't you pleased with his promotion to his current position due to his knowledge in COIN theory?

I'm not aware of McChrystal's reasoning for wanting more troops (I may have missed it in the article and admittedly I'm not as knowledgable about the region as I should be) but Kilcullen himself says,"We need to get into the business of making people feel safe and making them feel willing to participate in a political process that doesn't involve violence." In light of this, I don't necessarily see a request for more troops to be synonomous with a departure from COIN theory. More boots on the ground doesn't necessarily mean more boots kicking in doors unless they are deployed to do so. It could very well mean increased security and a more focused humanitarian mission.

One thing I fear in implimenting COIN theory is as our focus turns more toward the Afghan people, so will our enemies' and we could very well unintentionally make the Afghan people targets.

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[wolfriverjoe 1,523]

SOF's crystal ball was fair at best.

They did recognize the Iranian nuke threat fairly early on, and were one of the few I noticed that pointed out how often Hamas or Hezb'allah would get frisky whenever Iran was on the hot seat.

And they were screaming for real action against the Islamic fundamentalist groups in the mid 90's when Al Queda was coming to prominence (USS Cole and African Embassy attacks), saying that if they weren't dealt with promptly there would be more serious attacks in the future.

But they were mostly Viet Nam era guys, and spent the later 70's (before my time) and 80's fighting against the Soviet supported conflicts in Central America and Africa.
They were big proponents of the "Domino Theory" and supported the Contras in Nicaraugua, the governments of El Salvador and Columbia, UNITA in Angola (where there were a lot of Cuban troops) and Rhodesia and South Africa against the Mozambique-supported insurgents.

They completely missed the coming fall of the Soviet Union (so did everyone else), but correctly felt that the bear wouldn't change it's spots (mixed metaphor, but I couldn't resist).

They falsely felt that Mexico and China would be military threats.
Although China is more of an economic adversary, the steps they are taking in Africa and Asia are a little disurbing.
And the violence from the Mexican drug dealers is clearly a parallel (who really runs some parts of Mexico??)
But they recognized from the minute that Hugo Chavez took over what he really represented.

"There are NO situations which do not call for a French Maid outfit." Lucky McSwervy

"~ya don't GET old by being weak & stupid!" - Airtwardo

[nerdgirl 0]

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Remind me...isn't McChrystal a former SF commander and current COIN guru?

Yes, he's Special Forces. More specifically Army Ranger. (Others can debate/disagree with me whether or not or too what extent that qualifies as SF.) One of the best, imo, ....oh, what's the word I'm looking for (brain-farting at the moment ) ... narrative biographical sketches by another SF officer: The Pope.

I wouldn’t necessarily call him a COIN guru. He’s a definite convert and viewed widely as an operator who can execute and implement COIN-based strategic objectives. Dave Kilcullen is a COIN guru.

Thanks Marg. I remember the pope article now. Weren't you pleased with his promotion to his current position due to his knowledge in COIN theory?

Yes, I am/was pleased with the choice … as if my opinion on it, matters Imo, it signaled endorsement/support of a counterinsurgency-based strategy and a strategic decision to put someone in command who comes from the irregular warfare and COIN-friendly side, i.e., special operations, rather than someone who —perhaps rightly, or perhaps wrongly— represented (or was perceived as representing) the conventional military approach and resistant/hesitant to adopt COIN-based operational practices, e.g., GEN McKiernan, who is cavalry/heavy armor. McChrystal gets it (‘it’ being COIN) … even if he isn’t a guru.

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I'm not aware of McChrystal's reasoning for wanting more troops (I may have missed it in the article and admittedly I'm not as knowledgable about the region as I should be)

The best reference of which I am aware, at this point, and one that is highly readable is the leaked COMISAF initial assessment. It’s a scanned pdf, therefore difficult for me to copy-n-paste.

That document doesn’t specify wanting more troops; that came from a speech GEN McChrystal gave last week at IISS in London. As I've cited, others have indicated as much, e.g., the USMC Commandant's call for 11,000 troops in my OP. GEN McChrystal was asked by the SecDef last spring to make recommendations. He did. In the initial assessment, he writes about needing “resources.” The specific decisions are ‘above [even] his pay grade.’

From a COIN-perspective, one in his position wants more troops because more troops are necessary to do population-centric COIN operations. Effectively resourced counterinsurgencies have a very good track record historically. FM 3-24 recommends a 10:1000 ratio of counterinsurgents to population in insurgent areas (not the entire population). Some, e.g., MG Bob Livingston, USCENTCOM, have recommended a 20:1000 ratio. To reach those numbers would require more troops than even GEN McChrystal mentioned in his IISS speech.

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but Kilcullen himself says,"We need to get into the business of making people feel safe and making them feel willing to participate in a political process that doesn't involve violence." In light of this, I don't necessarily see a request for more troops to be synonomous with a departure from COIN theory. More boots on the ground doesn't necessarily mean more boots kicking in doors unless they are deployed to do so. It could very well mean increased security and a more focused humanitarian mission.

Agree. And your synopsis reflects, imo, McChrystal’s initial assessment.

The speculation regarding possible need for additional ‘doorkickers’ is my mine. (Btw: most of the folks with whom I have been speaking employ a more ‘colorful metaphor.’) It’s based on my looking at what are probably more operational-level factors, and it’s more complicated and speculative than I’m inclined to go into at the moment. I.e., still working out my thoughts. That ‘said,’ the numbers of folks needed to do effective population-based counterinsurgency and reconstruction is larger, imo.

To further on your synopsis: from a counterinsurgency perspective, more troops are needed for securing and stabilizing. More civil affairs. More police trainers. Yesterday I spoke with one of the prior commanders of Task Force Phoenix. During his time in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police Force (ANPF) went from losing 300 officers a month to losing ~20 month. The ANPF is still largely perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is perceived as non-corrupt (by Afghan standards, which are very different than the average westerner … even one in DC.) The biggest challenge he cited was getting the Afghans to recognize the importance of protecting the population.

Need more – a lot more – civilians for reconstruction and development. I’ve been writing for at least 18 months here on the decline of US institutions, e.g., USAID, whose mission that was and it *should* be. The DoD and military has been the ‘stuckee,’ imo, because of budget factors (budget = resources = capacity). One of the benefits of the use/reliance on soldiers from the National Guard and Reserves by the Army, imo, has been some very effective & innovative programs from the ground-up by soldiers, e.g., a group of Nebraska National Guard soldiers who built an agricultural experimental station in an insurgent area (not Helmand) and engaged the population. Eventually the local population in at least one situation saw more value in the Nebraska National Guardsmen than in fear of insurgent violence ... and reportedly, drove the insurgents out. The critical element is the population ... or what I more often call "tacit supporters." And increased efforts to legitimize the Afghanistan government and build institutions.

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One thing I fear in implimenting COIN theory is as our focus turns more toward the Afghan people, so will our enemies' and we could very well unintentionally make the Afghan people targets.

It’s my understanding that this has already happened since 2004. So your concern is justified and accurate. “Death spiral” is a description I’ve heard. We, the US & NATO, missed the opportunity to do traditional counterinsurgency by pursuing a counterterrorism approach. As US troops secure one area and remove insurgents (or the insurgents move on, disperse, or blend into the countryside), the insurgents return and kill Afghans who cooperate when the US troops move on. Less and less people are willing cooperate because they’ve already observed what happens when the US troops move. There haven’t been enough US troops to stay and secure-stabilize areas. This is a significant part of the impetus for a 20:1000 ratio. This was also why I found the reported low-level of carry-through on threats of voter intimidation in the August Afghan elections to be “more interesting” and perhaps important.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[redlegphi 0]

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To further on your synopsis: from a counterinsurgency perspective, more troops are needed for securing and stabilizing. More civil affairs. More police trainers. Yesterday I spoke with one of the prior commanders of Task Force Phoenix. During his time in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police Force (ANPF) went from losing 300 officers a month to losing ~20 month. The ANPF is still largely perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is perceived as non-corrupt (by Afghan standards, which are very different than the average westerner … even one in DC.) The biggest challenge he cited was getting the Afghans to recognize the importance of protecting the population.

Need more – a lot more – civilians for reconstruction and development. I’ve been writing for at least 18 months here on the decline of US institutions, e.g., USAID, whose mission that was and it *should* be. The DoD and military has been the ‘stuckee,’ imo, because of budget factors (budget = resources = capacity). One of the benefits of the use/reliance on soldiers from the National Guard and Reserves by the Army, imo, has been some very effective & innovative programs from the ground-up by soldiers, e.g., a group of Nebraska National Guard soldiers who built an agricultural experimental station in an insurgent area (not Helmand) and engaged the population. Eventually the local population in at least one situation saw more value in the Nebraska National Guardsmen than in fear of insurgent violence ... and reportedly, drove the insurgents out. The critical element is the population ... or what I more often call "tacit supporters." And increased efforts to legitimize the Afghanistan government and build institutions.

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One thing I fear in implimenting COIN theory is as our focus turns more toward the Afghan people, so will our enemies' and we could very well unintentionally make the Afghan people targets.

It’s my understanding that this has already happened since 2004. So your concern is justified and accurate. “Death spiral” is a description I’ve heard. We, the US & NATO, missed the opportunity to do traditional counterinsurgency by pursuing a counterterrorism approach. As US troops secure one area and remove insurgents (or the insurgents move on, disperse, or blend into the countryside), the insurgents return and kill Afghans who cooperate when the US troops move on. Less and less people are willing cooperate because they’ve already observed what happens when the US troops move. There haven’t been enough US troops to stay and secure-stabilize areas. This is a significant part of the impetus for a 20:1000 ratio. This was also why I found the reported low-level of carry-through on threats of voter intimidation in the August Afghan elections to be “more interesting” and perhaps important.

/Marg

While the ANP certainly do have a problem with corruption, I don't think that's their only problem or even their largest problem. What I'd say is possibly their biggest problem is that a huge portion of them aren't cops, they're paramilitary. They don't provide the government service to the Afghan people that we expect cops to provide to us (keep us safe, maintain rule of law, etc.). Instead, they're often used to keep the Taliban at bay since the ANA can't be everywhere. While Afghanistan certainly does need some kind of force to do that, they also need a national and local police force that can do that job of police. The only way they're going to get that done is through a lot more training and a lot more recruiting.
As far as targeting the Afghan people goes, that is the Taliban's target. I don't think they could target them more. That's their number one priority, because they understand insurgency operations in a way that we are only starting to understand COIN. The answer to the problem of the Taliban attacking when US forces move out isn't to have less US forces, it's to have more Afghan forces trained and prepared to take over for us as we pull out of an area so that the Afghan government can reach into those areas and provide services in exchange for the loyalty of the locals.

[redlegphi 0]

And to go back to the original post, I do think we need more troops in Afghanistan because security needs to get reestablished before we can get back to getting things done. However, I think it's more important that those troops are escorted by a large number of civilians (like those nice folks from USAID) who can get the Afghan government further along the road to providing services to the Afghan people. The troop surge for security, however big it is, is the supporting effort. The main effort is training, both of Afghan Security Forces and of the Afghan government.

[nerdgirl 0]

Bumping this as President Obama is going to make an announcement regarding strategy and force structure (i.e., troop authorizations) tomorrow.

As I type the votes here were 20 (54%) in favor of deploying more troops to Afghanistan and 17 votes (46%) opposed.

A Gallup poll from last week, found that

“47% of Americans would advise President Obama to increase the number of U.S. troops -- either by the roughly 40,000 recommended by the commanding general in Afghanistan or by a smaller amount -- while 39% would advise Obama to reduce the number of troops. Another 9% would opt to leave troop levels as they are, while 5% have no opinion.”

Have you changed your opinion?

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[SpeedRacer 1]

I'm conflicted about it. On the one hand, I don't want to "Rumsfeld" Afghanistan, and I'd like to see the leading members of Al Quaeda wiped out.

On the other hand, they are probably within Pakistan's borders where we are not allowed to fight.

And as for Afghanistan, I sometimes have this nagging feeling that we're trying to "polish a turd" over there.

Speed Racer
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[jcd11235 0]

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Have you changed your opinion?

Nope. I thought it was a bad idea (both strategically and ideologically) to send troops to Afghanistan in 2001, and I think it's a bad idea to have them there now, as we're losing the longest war in our country's history.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[TrophyHusband 0]

i really don't know. what are we doing there, stabilizing the region, or rooting out terrorists?

whatever it is that we're doing, we need to determine if its even possible. i've heard differing opinions on whether we can even accomplish anything in that region. i've even heard one "analyst" say that we could put 250,000 troops over there and the mountains would swallow them up and still nothing would get accomplished.

i don't know how true that may be, but if it is true, then we might as well get out.

whatever the mission is though, we need to give the generals what they need to accomplish it.

"Your scrotum is quite nice" - Skymama
www.kjandmegan.com