Marine Corps Operation in Southern Afghanistan to Drink Tea & Eat Lots of Goat

[nerdgirl 0]

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Everyone acts like this is a new idea or approach.

Everyone? Hope that doesn't include me. Didn't General Petraeus formulate some of his doctrine for the Counterinsurgency field manual from British Counterinsurgency doctrine and experiences in Malaya and NI? Lt Col Nagl, one of the manuals biggest contributors, argues how we got it right in Malaya whilst America got it wrong in Vietnam, attributing this to the British army's organisational culture and ability to learn from unanticipated conditions.

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Who ever remembers that TE Lawrence guy these days? >

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Or “St Carl” Clausewitz, everyone’s favorite dead Prussian General? (Probably the only dead Prussian General most can name, eh? ) Clausewitz on small wars, insurgencies, and asymmetric warfare, including but not limited to the “Arming of the People” chapter in _On War_.

Suspect [LouDiamond]’s comments were partially genuine insight into the perspective that he brings from being entrenched more deeply and for longer than many folks. I’ve heard similar things from other folks who’ve been in the small wars and special operations communities for years or decades. Counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare (UW), and irregular warfare (IW) do seem like the ‘latest-greatest’ in parts of the defense-security community. To stretch an analogy, it's like a 100-jump wonder extolling to the guys with 15 years and 5000 jumps on the wonders of skydiving. Up until just a few years ago, COIN/UW/IW were largely consigned to parts of the special Ops communities and historians/strategic studies scholars shuffling around Carlisle Barracks (uh, maybe I should rephrase that, do retired Colonels 'shuffle'? ) and West Point. COIN is the dominant driving paradigm today, and it’s driving US defense policy, e.g., USD(Policy) Flournoy’s pre-Pentagon think-tank CNAS is the center of defense gravity. Nothing else is even close today.

Before COIN, RMA & Transformation, including network-centric-warfare, were the novel, dominant paradigms. And novelty is a legitimate concern; novelty should not drive foreign policy. Being the best strategic choice to advance US (and allies) interests, should be the primary reason, im-ever-ho. That’s what I’m looking for … aka the “So What? Who Cares?” of why anyone should care about COIN rather than relegating it back to the halls of history.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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The problem with this new "solution" is that traditionally, conventional forces do not do this very well when given this mission.

The “problem” isn’t just conventional forces, imo. Conventional forces aren’t a problem. Figuring out when & where the conventional operations skill set is applicable and how to enable application of those skills sets in a counterinsurgency environment is a challenge at times. And frankly and I don’t mean to dismiss it in any way as a challenge, of all the challenges associated with Af-Pak situation specifically and radical global Salafism in general, that’s not the one which worries me the most. Maybe you can convince me otherwise?

I’d turn it around and say what are you (general, less than specific “you”) doing or what do you see needs to be done by the Special Operations community (or SF community if you want to narrow it further) to enable conventional forces to not be a “problem”? Everyone in the military is not going to be nor can or should they be Army SF. The Special Ops community has been getting larger relative budget and manpower increases (14,000 from FY08 to FY11) than arguably any other community w/in the military over the last 8 years. And continues under the President Obama's Budget Request and the latest defense authorization bill.

The bigger problem/challenge, imo, is the necessity of a “‘whole of government’ approach that complements [special operations and conventional] military efforts with diplomacy, economic aid, and other instruments of state power.” For those interested in hearing more, recommend highly GEN Petraeus’ keynote from the recent CNAS annual conference. Among the very first thing he mentions is the need for “whole of government” capabilities (4:48). At 29 minutes or so in, he addresses the need for “special special ops” and conventional forces along with whole of government capabilities. Also see some PhD historian on “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power.”

I also don’t accept the assertion or implication that this insurgency (radical Salafism) exactly fits any one of the previous models on multiple levels: use of technology (including but not limited to cyber), transnational nature, effective strategic communications, pre-dating the failed state (Afghanistan), flat network structure, lacking clear governance strategy (a, perhaps, significant difference w/Vietnam insurgency, which was largely modeled on Maoist insurgency), and the underlying adversaries emphasis on a “cosmic war.”

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[vortexring 0]

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Suspect [LouDiamond]’s comments were partially genuine insight into the perspective that he brings from being entrenched more deeply and for longer than many folks.

Completely agree. I just decided to point out that not "Everyone acts like this is a new idea or approach." Perhaps that's an issue with US Forces?
It's good to see the 'gung ho' attitude being brought into the equation. Even my Grandad found that to be a deadly serious issue.

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[LouDiamond 1]

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Completely agree. I just decided to point out that not "Everyone acts like this is a new idea or approach." Perhaps that's an issue with US Forces?

Not entirely. The coalition forces pretty much adhere to the "don't get out of the boat" mentality and stick to the roads and run "patrols". Having contact with the locals seems to be the farthest thing they are interested in doing. Not meant as a dig, just my personal observation.

"It's just skydiving..additional drama is not required"
Some people dream about flying, I live my dream
SKYMONKEY PUBLISHING

[vortexring 0]

Well yeah of course. But some aspects of such a strategy are relatively straightforward in their incorporation. British infantry will hold impromptu shuras in just about every village they visit. They'll explain why they're there, and reassure them that they're not there for the poppy. Explain that they understand it's their only means of supporting their family. Explain until an alternative livelihood can be found they can continue this. Setting up clinics where the medics can treat minor aches and pains, and so on.

I think the only members of the ISAF worth being critical with would be the Germans - except I never observed them anywhere.

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[nerdgirl 0]

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I think the only members of the ISAF worth being critical with would be the Germans - except I never observed them anywhere.

Comment overheard w/r/t German ISAF troops:
"If the Germans could be any further north, they'd be in Tajikistan."

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[vortexring 0]

Reckon they'd be on the far side of Polaris if they thought it might be safer. . .

Still, apparently they're always quick enough to point out it's a political decision rather than military one. I'd probably answer something along the lines of: 'Sure, of course, of course. . .' then scream 'ACHTUNG SPITFIRE!' whilst goose stepping away. Then again, maybe not.

(Sorry Christel!)

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[rickjump1 0]

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Everyone acts like this is a new idea or approach.

Everyone? Hope that doesn't include me. Didn't General Petraeus formulate some of his doctrine for the Counterinsurgency field manual from British Counterinsurgency doctrine and experiences in Malaya and NI? Lt Col Nagl, one of the manuals biggest contributors, argues how we got it right in Malaya whilst America got it wrong in Vietnam, attributing this to the British army's organisational culture and ability to learn from unanticipated conditions.

It's my belief that all soldiers should be - to a man - flexible enough to incorporate such strategies within their particular areas of soldiering. Flexibility - the key to all good operations.

Not all your soldiers are SAS, just like all ours are not SF or Rangers. If given the time for certain missions sure, but not at the drop of a hat. Interesting, when I attended ranger school WWVietnam, we were taught the Malaysian extended ambush, and the instructor mentioned some of the dirty tricks the Brits applied which were far from winning the hearts and minds of the locals. Poison food stuffs?

Your enemy was far from being supplied like the North Vietnamese Army straight from China, Russia, and some of our "friends". Even though we walked in the end, it's nice to know we bled the Russians pretty good. Bled them again of course with the use of those little heat seeking missiles and stirring up Islam pride that backfired on us later (the story continues).

Our Delta Force is a concept of your SAS. I understand Charlie Beckweth(sp) spent a lot of time with the SAS trying to convince the US Army of the need, and he got what he wanted in the end.

Do your part for global warming: ban beans and hold all popcorn farts.

[rickjump1 0]

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Completely agree. I just decided to point out that not "Everyone acts like this is a new idea or approach." Perhaps that's an issue with US Forces?

Not entirely. The coalition forces pretty much adhere to the "don't get out of the boat" mentality and stick to the roads and run "patrols". Having contact with the locals seems to be the farthest thing they are interested in doing. Not meant as a dig, just my personal observation.

Isn't this why the Russians lost, plus their punishment of the locals everytime they were ambushed. To keep this from turning into a goat fuck, it better turn into a goat roast at all levels.

Do your part for global warming: ban beans and hold all popcorn farts.

[vortexring 0]

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Not all your soldiers are SAS, just like all ours are not SF or Rangers. If given the time for certain missions sure, but not at the drop of a hat.

Disagree Rick, as I said earlier: "British infantry will hold impromptu shuras in just about every village they visit. They'll explain why they're there, and reassure them that they're not there for the poppy. Explain that they understand it's their only means of supporting their family. Explain until an alternative livelihood can be found they can continue this. Setting up clinics where the medics can treat minor aches and pains, and so on.

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Interesting, when I attended ranger school WWVietnam, we were taught the Malaysian extended ambush, and the instructor mentioned some of the dirty tricks the Brits applied which were far from winning the hearts and minds of the locals. Poison food stuffs?

Sure - the areas where the enemy were growing food was sprayed with poison. We also employed napalm although it wasn't that effective in the damp jungle. Hearts and Minds doesn't apply to the enemy.

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Your enemy was far from being supplied like the North Vietnamese Army straight from China, Russia, and some of our "friends". Even though we walked in the end, it's nice to know we bled the Russians pretty good. Bled them again of course with the use of those little heat seeking missiles and stirring up Islam pride that backfired on us later (the story continues).

Our Delta Force is a concept of your SAS. I understand Charlie Beckweth(sp) spent a lot of time with the SAS trying to convince the US Army of the need, and he got what he wanted in the end.

Correct.

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[LouDiamond 1]

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"British infantry will hold impromptu shuras in just about every village they visit. They'll explain why they're there, and reassure them that they're not there for the poppy. Explain that they understand it's their only means of supporting their family. Explain until an alternative livelihood can be found they can continue this. Setting up clinics where the medics can treat minor aches and pains, and so on.

Even though I know that this is like pulling a thread on a sweater , I'll interject a little bit more of my first hand experiences. Even though this topic focuses on the Middle East, it applies anywhere.

To go back and visit the difficulties conventional forces have in doing this mission a little bit more needs to be explained. As I mentioned earlier, in Army SF, both the Officers and Enlisted go through a lengthy training in scenarios just like this. This also includes real world application just about every time we go somewhere, conflict or not. A SF soldier has to be able to work simultaneously at the tactical and strategic level, often times switching in between them on any given day. A warrior ambassador is a close definition of what the average Army SF guy is.

This skill cannot be taught to people overnight, hence the good intentioned "shake and bake" training the conventional force Officers have been receiving doesn't really give them the tools they need to actually accomplish this mission. Not saying they are incapable of doing it, but that they are at a disadvantage due to circumstances. A typical infantry Officer from a Lt up to the Bn Cdr typically focuses and works on a tactical level within their small realm of the battlespace. Not saying they are ignorant of the bigger picture, just that they have little to no direct in put other than what their assigned mission entails. Where as a Army SF team has "boots on the ground" tactical influence that can reach up to Theatre level and in some cases, even higher. Having an understanding of the strategic picture and the ability to reach back enables the SF team a greater latitude of understanding than is typically found in most conventional units. They also have the ability to leverage resources that are out of reach of most conventional leaders/units in some cases.

In the case of Afghanistan, a country that has endured centuries of invaders and occupiers, the culture has evolved into a populace of survivors. The basic mindset of most of the rural population is "These people will eventually leave and this too shall pass". Which is why the example you gave of infantry holding shuras and clinics would seem like a good thing to the average joe. To the local, they see that infantry company as just another group of occupiers that come in, talk to the leaders, hand out a few things and move on while maintaining no real presence. SF teams typically live in and around the local populace and devote a good deal of time to developing relationships within the surrounding communities with the leaders and the locals. This is not only done by showing up every once in awhile with a free handout to their homes but it includes inviting them back to where we live, into our house so to speak, to address the issues and concerns they have, much like a mayor or a governor would, often times serving as a mediator between neighboring tribes/towns. With this constant presence and concern for the locals, the SF team is usually seen as an ally to help them help themselves improve their lives. Most SF bases have an open door policy for medical aid to the populace and for leaders and their people to seek resolution to their problems. I've seen grown men walk barefoot 20 miles through snow carrying their children in their arms to seek medical attention instead of going to a conventional base that was closer to them. Why? Because they trusted us and felt that they knew us.

While I don't doubt they look at the SF teams as occupiers who will eventually leave, SF teams constant involvement within their everyday lives and the associated bridge building they do enables SF teams to have a greater success at maintaining stability in areas where companies of infantry have had no luck.


Again, this is just one head of a muti headed beast that is unconventional by its nature and requires more than most conventional units can bring to the table and why they often fail at this mission.

"It's just skydiving..additional drama is not required"
Some people dream about flying, I live my dream
SKYMONKEY PUBLISHING

[Nelyubin 0]

Lost labour. Vain victims.
Coalitions has entered into Afghanistan without visible (local population) of the reasons. Without support from local population easily resists to armies of a coalition (today). A conclusion - the coalition was not able and not able to be at war.

[steve1 5]

I'll interject a little bit more of my first hand experiences. Even though this topic focuses on the Middle East, it applies anywhere.
.