Ralph Peters: ignore COIN theory and pull out of Afghanistan

[nerdgirl 0]

Another perspective w/r/t Afghanistan was put forth by Ralph Peters, LTC USA (ret) in a USA Today Op-Ed Wednesday “The Mendacity of Hope.”

Peters is a very smart man. Think his assessment at its core is generally not too far off. Completely concur that the exact same counterinsurgency tactics and strategy employed in Iraq will not transfer to Afghanistan. It’s his recommendations w/which I disagree.

“The conflict in Afghanistan is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead of concentrating on the critical mission of keeping Islamist terrorists on the defensive, we've mired ourselves by attempting to modernize a society that doesn't want to be — and cannot be — transformed.”

Afghanistan? Regardless of the current outcome, perhaps one might be able to make a better case for “the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time” and Islamist terrorists w/r/t the nation ~1000 miles to the West, eh?

And urban Afghanistan did modernize in the 1970s. The assertion of “the society” not wanting to modernize is problematic. The Taliban and the forces that rose to power in the security vacuum of Soviet withdrawal want to force the society to return to 7th CE (as long as the leaders get to keep their sat phones).

“In the absence of a strategy, we're doubling our troop commitment, hoping to repeat the success we achieved in the profoundly different environment of Iraq. Unable to describe our ultimate goals with any clarity, we're substituting means for ends.

“Expending blood and treasure blindly in Afghanistan, we do our best to shut our eyes to the worsening crisis next door in Pakistan, a radicalizing Muslim state with more than five times the population and a nuclear arsenal. We've turned the hose on the doghouse while letting the mansion burn.”

Concur with the need for a strategy and mission in Afghanistan. There’s been a call for such over the last 3 years or so.

Concur that the exact same strategy will not work.

“Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in the Muslim world. Backward and isolated, Afghanistan is sui generis (only example of its kind).”

To some extent that characterization (sui generis) is true. Just like snowflakes, every insurgency is unique. Otoh, one can look to Al Qa’eda in Maghreb or Abu Sayeff Group or Moro Islamic Liberation Front (the other MILF) in southeast Asia for other unique radical Islamist insurgencies.

“Instead of floundering in search of a strategy, we should consider removing the bulk, if not all, of our forces. The alternative is to hope blindly, waste more lives and resources, and, in the worst case, see our vulnerable supply route through Pakistan cut, forcing upon our troops the most ignominious retreat since Korea in 1950 (a massive air evacuation this time around, leaving a wealth of military gear).

Disagree with Peter’s recommendation. His first recommendation, which he calls "best" is a neutered version of what the US has been doing and what he calls a "good" course of action is "Leave entirely."

“In any event, Pakistan, not Afghanistan, will determine the future of Islamist extremism in the region. And Pakistan is nearly lost to us — a fact we must accept. Our strategic future lies with India.

Considering that the Taliban now controls Pakistan’s Swat Valley, which is 100 miles from Islamabad and a major weekend/vacation destination for Pakistani military/civilian leaders (somewhat akin to Tahoe for SF Bay area, but closer and more topographically impressive among other major differences), Peters is correct in highlighting the extent of radical Islamist presence in Pakistan. Again his implicit recommendation is where he and I differ.

One self-identified conservative military blogger, "The Captain" offered one explanations for Peters recommendations: "I have concluded that Ralph has been smoking pot, or hash. I’m certain of it. Certain. Not any pot, mind you, but some bad, bad weed." Disagree with that ad hominem assessment as well.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[StreetScooby 5]

So, you' re saying you disagree. Do you have an alternative?

We are all engines of karma

[nerdgirl 0]

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Do you have an alternative?

A complete one - no. No, single individual has the solution. And anyone who asserts that he or she does should be met with extreme skepticism, imo. Afghanistan is too complicated. Gen Petraeus has outlined a strategy and there will be a more formal one that he will sign-off on; there were a whole lot of people behind what he's talking about.

I have some pieces. See my other post today on Afghanistan. Support most of LG Barno's recommendations. A few other pieces:

-- Pursue application of COIN theory and smart power (both hard power *and* Joe Nye's soft power ideas).

-- Continue support of and enlarge the Army's Human Terrain System.

-- Invest in and develop *real* capabilities in strategic communications: "Public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America."

-- Develop and implement 21st century Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[StreetScooby 5]

I really like this quote from the Petraeus speech:

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Having said that, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly and tenaciously. True irreconcilables, again, must be killed, captured, or driven out of the area.

IMO, the Pakistani ISI and those funding Wahabi thinking are the true irreconciblables here. Camping out with Afghani's doesn't seem to really address this problem. AQ would never have sustained itself without the ISI or funding from rich Wahabis.

Where/how is this being addressed?

We are all engines of karma

[jerryzflies 0]

Tjhere's tremendous arrogance in believing the US can succeed from 7,000 miles away where both the British at the height of their Empire and coming from next door, and the Soviets also coming from next door, failed ignominiously.

If you can't fix it with a hammer, the problem's electrical.

[nerdgirl 0]

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I really like this quote from the Petraeus speech:

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Having said that, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly and tenaciously. True irreconcilables, again, must be killed, captured, or driven out of the area.

No disagreement with GEN Petreaus. His words are carefully chosen: "True irreconcilables." Estimates of al Qa'eda core range from 200-450 (sources: Marc Sagemann, Egyptian govt, and USG). As I noted, Mullah Omar is in most likely in Pakistan.

Remember, it was GEN Petreaus who suggested negotiating with the Taliban ... something which I am still hesitant to support. It mostly comes down to what he means by "the Taliban."

The danger of focusing in on *only* that line without context is that it misses much and suggests the kind of strategy that the Soviets pursued (how well did that work out?).

The rest of the story, as they say:

“It is, of course not just additional combat forces that are required. ISAF also needs more so-called enablers to support the effort in Afghanistan – more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms and the connectivity to exploit the capabilities they bring; more military police, engineers, and logistics elements; additional special operations forces and civil affairs units;”

“… a surge in civilian capacity is needed to match the increase in military forces in order to field adequate numbers of provincial reconstruction teams and other civilian elements – teams and personnel that are essential to help our Afghan partners expand their capabilities in key governmental areas, to support basic economic development, and to assist in the development of various important aspects of the rule of law, including initiatives to support the development of police and various judicial initiatives.

“It is also essential, of course, that sufficient financial resources be provided for the effort in Afghanistan. It is hugely important that nations deliver on pledges of economic development assistance, that the Afghan National Army and Law and Order Trust Funds be fully financed, that support be maintained for the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and that resources continue to be provided for the projects conducted by our military units and PRTs at local levels.

“Of course, just more troops, civilians, dollars and Euros won’t be enough. As students of history, we’re keenly aware that Afghanistan has, over the years, been known as the graveyard of empires. It is, after all, a country that has never taken kindly to outsiders bent on conquering it. We cannot take that history lightly. And our awareness of it should caution us to recognize that, while additional forces are essential, their effectiveness will depend on how they are employed, as that, in turn, will determine how they are seen by the Afghan population. [one part of that is strategic communications .... but it's much larger really]

“First and foremost, our forces and those of our Afghan partners have to strive to secure and serve the population. We have to recognize that the Afghan people are the decisive ‘terrain.’

“Securing and serving the people requires that our forces be good neighbors. While it may be less culturally acceptable to live among the people in certain parts of Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, it is necessary to locate Afghan and ISAF forces where they can establish a persistent security presence. You can’t commute to work in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Positioning outposts and patrol bases, then, requires careful thought, consultation with local leaders, and the establishment of good local relationships to be effective.” (i.e., directly contradictory to Peters recommendations - nerdgirl)

“Positioning near those we and our Afghan partners are helping to secure also enables us to understand the neighborhood. A nuanced appreciation of the local situation is essential. Leaders and troopers have to understand the tribal structures, the power brokers, the good guys and the bad guys, local cultures and history, and how systems are supposed to work and do work. This requires listening and being respectful of local elders and mullahs, and farmers and shopkeepers – and it also requires, of course, many cups of tea."

Human terrain.

The cups of tea is a direct reference to Greg Mortenson’s book and his efforts to build girl’s school in rural Afghanistan. “When Gen. Petraeus read Three Cups of Tea,” Mortenson says, “he sent me an e-mail with three bullet points of what he'd gleaned from the book: Build relationships, listen more, and have more humility and respect.”

That’s same message GEN Petraeus understood is the strategic component that many others need to hear. All hard power gets you the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[BIGUN 1,488]

But. we MUST listen to Col. Peter's point on, "As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can't be profitably occupied or liberalized. It's inconceivable to us, but many Afghans prefer their lives to the lives we envision for them. The lot of women is hideous, and the lives of nearly all the people are nasty, brutish and short. But the culture is theirs."

I am reminded of a quote by Aristotle, "The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal."

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[StreetScooby 5]

I don't believe the US goals are remotely similar to what either Britain or Russia was trying to achieve.

We are all engines of karma

[jerryzflies 0]

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I don't believe the US goals are remotely similar to what either Britain or Russia was trying to achieve.

I believe they are strategically comparable. Regardless, it makes little difference.

If you can't fix it with a hammer, the problem's electrical.

[StreetScooby 5]

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We have to recognize that the Afghan people are the decisive ‘terrain.’

And that's what I really don't get. Bottom line, who cares about the Afghan people? The Afghan people have nothing to do with AQ's capabilities. All this energy seems completely misdirected to me. Are we looking to establish a salient for in case Pakistan collapses?

We are all engines of karma

[nerdgirl 0]

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But. we MUST listen to Col. Peter's point on, "As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can't be profitably occupied or liberalized. It's inconceivable to us, but many Afghans prefer their lives to the lives we envision for them. The lot of women is hideous, and the lives of nearly all the people are nasty, brutish and short. But the culture is theirs."

To some extent yes, hence the emphasis on the human terrain, by me and that guy with the PhD in international affairs from Princeton.

And at the same times, LTC Peters selectively (?) ignores the 1960s and 1970s in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and other areas, and he does not acknowledge domestic anti-fundamentalist groups within Afghanistan that have persevered for over 30 years against the Soviets and against the Taliban, e.g., RAWA and others.

Concur with LTC Peters' recognition/acknowledgement that efforts to force their culture to mimic ours will be futile. At the same time, LTC Peters' description is of the Taliban "culture" (I'm hesistant to call that culture) forced on the population.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[downwardspiral 0]

Are we using the same strategy in Afghanistan as we did in Iraq when it comes to the surge? Maybe I'm just an idealist but I have a hard time believing the strategy is the same and so am confused by the criticism because I haven't seen anything that specifically details the strategy in Afghanistan. Are we criticizing the strategy or are we just criticizing moving 30k troops into the area?

Also lets consider what "the surge" looks like politically. 99.999999% of American people do not have the level of knowledge on the subject that you do Marg. If Obama DID NOT send the surge in then he would appear to be doing nothing about Afghanistan.

Edited to -e

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[nerdgirl 0]

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We have to recognize that the Afghan people are the decisive ‘terrain.’

And that's what I really don't get. Bottom line, who cares about the Afghan people? The Afghan people have nothing to do with AQ's capabilities.

To some extent, that's true. As al Qa'eda's core (when you wrote "AQ", I think "AQ Khan") is likely in Pakistan. The explicit and tacit support of the population enables al Qa'eda to hide, to conduct operations, to exist.

Decline in security outside of Kabul allows the Taliban to re-assert authority/control over 72% of Afghanistan.

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All this energy seems completely misdirected to me.

It's the core of counterinsurgency theory -- what was employed in Iraq starting in 2006. Some argue then-MG or LG Odierno (I forget which) employed COIN tactics prior to the official 'surge'.

Implementing and executing US strategic objectives is a lot easier when they’re not shooting at you, (marg’s 16-word distilled synopsis of COIN theory ). "Clear, hold, and build" + other factors I described here previously.

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Are we looking to establish a salient for in case Pakistan collapses?

I don't understand the question.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[BIGUN 1,488]

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Concur with LTC Peters' recognition/acknowledgement that efforts to force their culture to mimic ours will be futile. At the same time, LTC Peters' description is of the Taliban "culture" (I'm hesistant to call that culture) forced on the population.

Which of course; takes us full circle back to a previous poll post of yours...

"...from the point of view of the Taliban, there is no "crisis" in Afghanistan to be resolved. The only action needed is for the rest of the international community to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and to deal with them as such. Clearly they are the de facto rulers and they would like recognition of their legitimacy. It is the responsibility of the international community to help Afghanistan peacefully rebuild under the Taliban."

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[nerdgirl 0]

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Are we using the same strategy in Afghanistan as we did in Iraq when it comes to the surge?

Exactly the same, no. GEN Petraeus has given an outline of the strategy he plans to pursue. The increase in troops has been authorized by President Obama. Ideas under discussion are FOUO. The official ISAF new strategy document has yet to be delivered, afaik.

There will be similarities, yes. But the execution of tactics will be different if only because the countries are very different w/r/t infrastructure, population, population distribution, information & communications technology, GDP.

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Maybe I'm just an idealist but I have a hard time believing the strategy is the same and so am confused by the criticism because I haven't seen anything that specifically details the strategy in Afghanistan. Are we criticising the strategy or are we just criticising moving 30k troops into the area?

I'm not; LTC Peters, as smart as he is, is criticizing the authorization of 17k more troops and application of COIN. Which illustrates that smart people can disagree.

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Also lets consider what "the surge" looks like politically. If Obama DID NOT send the surge in then he would appear to be doing nothing about Afghanistan.

Agree. I also strongly suspect that if the military and civilian leadership had not requested the authorization of additional forces, that he would not have done so.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[StreetScooby 5]

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In Reply To
Are we looking to establish a salient for in case Pakistan collapses?

I don't understand the question.

What's the worst case for us if we simple skip Afghanistan, and leave it to the Taliban? Instead, focus our efforts on ISI and Wahabi funders?

We are all engines of karma

[nerdgirl 0]

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What's the worst case for us if we simple skip Afghanistan, and leave it to the Taliban? Instead, focus our efforts on ISI and Wahabi funders?

One needs to pull apart the ISI and Wahabi funders concept. Different aspects.

Worst case if the US decided to overtly challenge the ISI or invade Pakistan: al Qa'eda returns to a Taliban-controlled (100%) Afghanistan. Re-establishes base of operations. Civilian-controlled government in Pakistan is taken over by radical Islamists. Radical Islamists give al Qa'eda one of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and the codes for the PALs or PAL-like devices. The few ISI checks on Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) are removed. LeT antagonizes India into a nuclear exchange over Kashmir.

That's a *very* worst case scenario. I'd need to think about it more before I suggest probability or recommendations.

I would not recommend the US pursue such action, however.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[downwardspiral 0]

hmmm

http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_11735005

McKiernan said the extra Army and Marine forces will have counterinsurgency capability but also be ready to conduct training with Afghan police forces. He said they will be sent to southern Afghanistan, where he said there have been insufficient security forces to confront the insurgents.

McKiernan said the extra troops would be sufficient for what he believes needs to be done through summer, when the fighting tends to be heaviest. He described the Obama decision as meeting about two-thirds of his overall needs in combat capability over the coming three to five years.

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[downwardspiral 0]

I keep forgetting to mention how absolutely amusing it is for me being a former Marine to see a retired Army officer suggest retreat while referencing the Chosin Resevior.

Brilliant!

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[Amazon 7]

This is something that reallly prickles me.. A comprehensive plan for Afghanistan.... is just about 7 years too fucking late.

When W took his eyes off the real prize of smashing Al Q and the Taliban.. no matter where the fuck they ran to..or what cave they want to hide in.... we lost the collaboration of the nations of the world to actually have a chance of winning for the long term.

Secure the area's we can and make the rest of the country a free fire zone... and let them KNOW we are watching.

What we need now is a freaking FLEET of remotely piloted drones with shiny metal death raining down from the sky day and night 24x7x365.... if you even LOOK like have a weapon in your hands and you are going someplace with 2 or 3 other guys with weapons in their hands.... you erupt into a pink cloud.
Coupled with that I think small SF units could do far more to get the right people who need getting got.
Conventional forces in Afghanistan are a waste of American lives...the idea that will win this thing is simple.. make as many of our enemy die as we possibly can.. period.

[cliffwhite 0]

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This is something that reallly prickles me.. A comprehensive plan for Afghanistan.... is just about 7 years too fucking late.

When W took his eyes off the real prize of smashing Al Q and the Taliban.. no matter where the fuck they ran to..or what cave they want to hide in.... we lost the collaboration of the nations of the world to actually have a chance of winning for the long term.

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Of course if Bush knew 9-11 didn't originate from Afghanistan it might make sense to let that area simmer while he went after the neocons' real objective.

Secure the area's we can and make the rest of the country a free fire zone... and let them KNOW we are watching.

What we need now is a freaking FLEET of remotely piloted drones with shiny metal death raining down from the sky day and night 24x7x365.... if you even LOOK like have a weapon in your hands and you are going someplace with 2 or 3 other guys with weapons in their hands.... you erupt into a pink cloud.***

Yeah , that's great. That's what we need!

Blues,
Cliff

2muchTruth

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[downwardspiral 0]

Unfortunately, the situation in Afghanistan is far more complicated for shiny metal death to be even remotely close to a viable solution, as Marg has been saying for at least 6 months.

Thanks to her guidance and my interest in trying to understand what the hell she's talking about , I was able to find a article which illustrates many of the cultural issues we're dealing with in the aformentioned country.

"The young people don't come. They are all Al Qaeda; they're up in the mountains," says Lieutenant Mohammed. "All young people have no jobs, so they join the Taliban ... to get clothes and hashish."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0907/p01s08-wosc.html?page=2

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[Amazon 7]

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Unfortunately, the situation in Afghanistan is far more complicated for shiny metal death to be even remotely close to a viable solution, as Marg has been saying for at least 6 months.

Thanks to her guidance and my interest in trying to understand what the hell she's talking about , I was able to find a article which illustrates many of the cultural issues we're dealing with in the aformentioned country.

"The young people don't come. They are all Al Qaeda; they're up in the mountains," says Lieutenant Mohammed. "All young people have no jobs, so they join the Taliban ... to get clothes and hashish."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0907/p01s08-wosc.html?page=2

I know what Marg is referring to.. but not all things shiny need to make a geiger counter go nuts.

There are plenty of cost effective alternatives that can make a bad guy go poof. With the surveillance capabilities they have on the predator and some other platforms.. I think its pretty easy to determine who the enemy is... and to kill him.

[StreetScooby 5]

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"All young people have no jobs, so they join the Taliban ... to get clothes and hashish."

I've always thought you could be closer to God under the influence of hash, also. And I've never even come close to thinking about anything remotely like a strategic operation during those times . Let them stay stoned. I don't think the Taliban have any chance of doing anything international in nature.

al Qa'eda, Pakistan's ISI, and Wahabi funders strike me as the real problems here.

We are all engines of karma

[nerdgirl 0]

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But. we MUST listen to Col. Peter's point on, "As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can't be profitably occupied or liberalized. It's inconceivable to us, but many Afghans prefer their lives to the lives we envision for them. The lot of women is hideous, and the lives of nearly all the people are nasty, brutish and short. But the culture is theirs."

To some extent yes, hence the emphasis on the human terrain, by me and that guy with the PhD in international affairs from Princeton.

And at the same times, LTC Peters selectively (?) ignores the 1960s and 1970s in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and other areas, and he does not acknowledge domestic anti-fundamentalist groups within Afghanistan that have persevered for over 30 years against the Soviets and against the Taliban, e.g., RAWA and others.

Concur with LTC Peters' recognition/acknowledgement that efforts to force their culture to mimic ours will be futile. At the same time, LTC Peters' description is of the Taliban "culture" (I'm hesistant to call that culture) forced on the population.

Following up with some empirical data ...

Further pulling apart some of the cultural assertions -- & I do suspect that Peters has a more sophisticated and historically-informed view than the USA Today Op-Ed suggests but speculate it was truncated for length and at the editor’s discretion -- there is no apparent cultural (or whatever) Afghan population preference for Taliban/Taliban-like rule. To the contrary, the fourth iteration of a BBC-ABC news poll finds that only 4% support a Taliban-based government. 82% favor the current government.

“Who would you rather have ruling Afghanistan today: the current government, or the Taliban?” (Question #10, page 20)

Date of survey: 1/12/09. Response: 82% current government; 4% Taliban, 10% Other, 4% No opinion
11/7/07: 84%, 4%, 6%, 6%
10/19/06: 88%, 3%, 4%, 5%
10/18/05: 91%, 1%, 2%, 6%

Better polls numbers than perhaps any US President in recent history and I’d speculate similar to a support for current US government system (representative republic) … altho’ that would be an interesting query, imo. That data does not support the contention that the Afghans want an oppressive government. It doesn’t suggest that they want to replicate early 21st Century USA either … but there’s a lot between the two; it’s not a binary either/or.


More on that :

“From today’s perspective, do you think it was very good, mostly good, mostly bad or very bad that U.S. military forces came into our country to bring down the Taliban government in 2001?” (p 22)
1/12/09 Good: 69%, Bad: 24%, No opinion 7%;
11/7/07 76%, 20%, 4%;
10/19/06 88%, 11%, 1%;
10/18/05 87%, 9%, 4%;

Asked in January 2009, “Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the presence of the following groups in Afghanistan today?” (p. 22)
“Jihadi fighters from other countries” 86% oppose
“Fighters from the Taliban” 90% oppose

92 % of Afghans surveyed support girls’ education, 91% support enfranchisement of women, 77% support women working outside the home, and 69% support women holding government office … although 77% support women wearing the burka (p. 34 data tables).

Source: Primary data tables. ABC’s analysis; I looked at the primary data.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying