The British army suffers from lack of soldiers, lack of money and lack of conviction

[vortexring 0]

Why aren't we spraying the fields with herbicides then?

p.s. When were you over there?

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article2402986.ece

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[Amazon 7]

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So excuse me if I don't cry for Argentina.

OHHHH so thats why Madonna got the part... you didnt want to cry.

[Andy9o8 3]

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So excuse me if I don't cry for Argentina.

OHHHH so thats why Madonna got the part... you didnt want to cry.

Comparing her performance to Patti LuPone's? Sure made me weep.

[DanG 1]

If that article is right it is a 180 degree change from what I saw. I was a civil affairs officer (US) in Helmand Province (poppy capital of the world) on my second tour. My whole job was hearts and minds. Shortly after I left, the Brits took over our base, and from what I heard stopped all the reconstruction and ramped up the conventional operations. Before I left, we'd get British units showing up with no other purpose than poppy eradication and busting drug operations. They really didn't care about the adverse effects of their operations on our CA mission.

My first tour was October 2002-August 2003 in Gardez. I went back for September 2004-June 2005 in Helmand.

- Dan G

[Skyrad 0]

Taxes, death and change, the only thing guarenteed in life.

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[vortexring 0]

Makes some sense. Which gets back to something I said earlier:

'Another was a statement alluding to 'a Generals' opinion that the Americans are at war, whilst we're on operations. That resonates; when you consider conviction; when you consider the number of British servicemen and women questioning the strategic objectives and reasons for why they're in Afghanistan in the first place.'

Here's some articles, most from the same paper:

17/10/05 - Helmand is home to some of the biggest opium barons, and the Paras will be expected to launch operations against them as part of their mission.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article579388.ece


18/06/06 - 'Richards is a victim of Britain’s post-imperial romanticism. He must go back in. His plan is for “Malayan inkspots” across the country, holding isolated villages long enough for local leaders to win support against insurgents. There will be no more American-style bombing of villages and wedding parties. Taliban units will be pursued and destroyed, but anti-Taliban areas will be rewarded with dollops of money.

British troops will not eradicate poppies, which is impossible, but eliminate the occasional shipment or middle-man (thereby making the crop even more valuable). Richards hopes this will bring the “lost” southern provinces over to Kabul’s side. He shrugs at how this can possibly work with just 3,300 British troops and some reluctant Canadians and Dutch. He is the boy on the burning deck'

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article675980.ece


02/07/06 - Back in the 19th century thousands of Englishmen split their blood on fields like this and I didn’t want to join them. I thought about John Reid, the former defence secretary, glibly saying he hoped to complete the three-year British mission to Helmand without a shot being fired. If this wasn’t a fourth Anglo-Afghan war, it felt very much like it.

Why were we there? Why had we thought the Afghans wouldn’t fight — they defeated the Russians after all. And why did everyone in Kabul and London keep insisting that nobody in Helmand really wanted to support the Taliban but were being forced to?

What if they were wrong? After all, almost everyone in the province now depends on growing poppies. Whatever the British commanders might say, villagers must see the presence of British troops as threatening the opium trade...

..Maybe they were coerced by the Taliban,” said Major Blair. The official British line is that 80% of the population of Helmand are “floating voters” stuck between a rock and a hard place of an evil Taliban and a government in Kabul that does nothing for them.

It seemed more likely to me that they feared the British had come to take away their source of income, the poppy...

...I’m going to have to review our approach to villages,” said Major Blair. “We’re going to have to go in with far more security. It’s very annoying to think we were sitting there offering things and having a laugh and a joke with villagers who knew that five minutes later we’d be attacked.”

MORE and more senior military officers are saying it has been an enormous mistake for British troops to move out of the main urban centres of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk and into outlying areas.

They blame the Americans — and some over-enthusiastic British generals — for dragging British forces into Operation Mountain Thrust, a large offensive against the Taliban in which some 500 people have died across the south, creating much local resentment.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article681998.ece?token=null&offset=120&page=11


05/08/06 - "Peace support” is how the Ministry of Defence defines this, anxious not to expose the British public to the reality on the ground. But British officers here routinely refer to the operation as “war fighting”.

'The strategy now is to escalate the military campaign in southern Afghanistan, but at the same time to begin a massive reconstruction programme to win over the locals.

And on top of that, ISAF also hopes to eliminate the poppy cultivation that is at the core of the local economy.'

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article700720.ece


07/09/07 - Disagreement has surfaced already over the US military’s desire to spray opium poppy fields from the air with herbicide, as well as to continue its bombing strikes on Afghan villages, which Britain complains undermines its strategy of “winning hearts and minds”.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article2402986.ece


01/02/09 - Nor can they do it alone, Stirrup says: “Just as in Afghanistan, that kind of insurgency cannot be defeated by conventional military means. It can only be dealt with, in the long term, through politics.”

Here’s the rub: there is a widely held perception in Pakistan that all would be well if only Nato troops were not in Afghanistan, a belief which grows stronger with every US Predator attack that kills innocent civilians.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5626682.ece


Border security, a key component of ISAF’s strategic vision for Afghanistan

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/04-april/pr080420-152.html


The American failure to understand the complexity of the Pakistan problem is perhaps one of the biggest strategic errors of the war in Afghanistan. President Pervaiz Musharraf reluctantly agreed to join the war on terror, and Washington was keen to take him at his word. But as the Taleban fell, the Pakistani security establishment opened an escape hatch for the enemy by removing their troops from the border of the Fata, allowing the Taleban to relocate. The jihadis now have bases, broadcasting stations and the protection of being in a territory that is part of a nuclear-armed state. The West invaded Afghanistan to stop terrorism being given a state home. Yet al-Qa’eda is alive, well and living in Fata.

Just what to do about this is a source of deep division in Washington. Pakistan is deeply nervous about any American incursions into its territory — even if it is territory like Fata where the Pakistan army itself suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Taleban. Britain is pushing hard for a diplomatic solution, saying that no incursion can succeed without the backing of the Pakistani military, which is geared up to fight India, not to track down insurgents. And anyway, after years of failed policy, and being played like a fiddle by President Musharraf, America is losing patience. The Pentagon provided helicopter gunships to Musharraf that were intended for fighting the Taleban — only to see them used to mow down separatists in the Baluchistan province.

(Couldn't find the link - soz...)

Poppy eradication, whilst always being an objective of varying necessity, has never quite been the strategic objective. I'm not entirely sure what it is. Something like that Al Qaida does not return to Afghanistan, that Afghanistan remains a legitimate and increasingly effective state, able over time to handle its own security, to prevent the insurgency posing a threat to Afghan peace and prosperity. I'd imagine the ultimate strategic goal to be to enable stabiltity to prevail in the country in order to build gas pipelines?
Maybe, taking into account the need for flexibility on operations, all that could be put into some kind of all-encompassing mission statement?

The last time I was there, it wasn't poppy eradication - absolutely not. And never was as far as I've always been led to believe.

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[vortexring 0]

Here's another interesting piece, from 2002, interesting in more ways than one:

'At that time, we set out a number of specific short- and longer-term campaign aims. These included preventing Usama bin Laden and Al Qaida from posing a continuing terrorist threat; breaking the links between Afghanistan and international terrorism; and reintegrating Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community.

Five months later, it is clear that this action has been remarkably successful.

Afghanistan is now a very different country. The Taliban government, which harboured the Al Qaida terrorists, is no more. Terrorist training camps have been put out of action. The first steps towards recreating a functioning state have been taken. Aid agencies operate with increasing freedom. Refugees are beginning to return to their homes

http://www.operations.mod.uk/veritas/statements/statement_18mar.htm

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'

[nerdgirl 0]

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Here's another interesting piece, from 2002, interesting in more ways than one:

'Five months later, it is clear that this action has been remarkably successful.

Afghanistan is now a very different country. The Taliban government, which harboured the Al Qaida terrorists, is no more. Terrorist training camps have been put out of action. The first steps towards recreating a functioning state have been taken. Aid agencies operate with increasing freedom. Refugees are beginning to return to their homes

http://www.operations.mod.uk/veritas/statements/statement_18mar.htm

Thanks for all the links. To bring one up to current day, at least from the US perspective, one can look to the latest “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” report that was delivered to Congress Monday by the DoD.

What does it say: security has further decreased & insurgency has increased:

“The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in several areas of the country since the last report [June 2008 – nerdgirl]. The spring and summer of 2008 saw the highest levels of violence since the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began their involvement in Afghanistan. Violence is concentrated in the south of the country (the historic heartland of the Taliban) and the east of the country, the area most vulnerable to cross-border activity from neighboring Pakistan.

"The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency. The insurgents are challenging the control of the GIRoA in areas of the south and the east, and increasingly in the west. Between January and December 10 2008, 132 U.S. personnel died as the result of hostile action, up from 82 in 2007. In 2007, 199 international personnel were killed. Between January and October of 2008 insurgent action resulted in the deaths of 265 coalition forces. Insurgent violence increased in the spring and summer of 2008 by 40 percent, most visibly in the form of asymmetric attacks as Afghan and international forces’ pressure forced the insurgents to shift the majority of their effort to targeting police and civilians, resulting in an increasing sense of personal insecurity among the populace. According to ISAF, insurgent-initiated attacks increased 33 percent for the whole of 2008. The 2008 ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) military campaign has caused setbacks to the Afghan insurgency, including leadership losses and the loss of some key safe havens in Afghanistan. Despite these setbacks, the insurgency has maintained and in some areas increased the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and bombings. The increase in insurgent-initiated violence in Afghanistan relates directly to the perceived ineffectiveness of the government, the availability of safe havens in western Pakistan, and increased ISAF presence in former insurgent-controlled areas.”

On poppy cultivation * trade:

“Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the international community. The flourishing narcotics trade erodes the legitimacy of the GIRoA and provides financial means to the insurgency. Widespread poppy cultivation in the country calls into question the GIRoA’s resolve in tackling this criminal behavior. Afghanistan supplied 93 percent of the world’s opium in 2007, but uneven progress in reducing the amount of opium produced has been made in 2008. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), the total area under poppy cultivation fell by 19 percent compared to 2007, though some of this decrease may be attributable to drought conditions in much of the country. Eighteen out of 34 provinces are poppy-free, with 98 percent of the cultivation occurring in seven provinces in the south and west of the country. The province of Helmand alone accounts for 66 percent of cultivation.”

Poppy cultivation underlies insurgency financing. How does one eradicate poppy cultivation? Herbicide spraying is one option. Effectiveness has varied highly, e.g., see Plan Colombia.

*But* there have been successes in reducing poppy cultivation. From worst to zero poppy cultivation. How? “In 2007 Nangarhar [on the Afghan-Pakistan border – nerdgirl] was one of the worst provinces in regards to poppy production. In August 2008 the province was declared poppy free. This radical turn around is credited to an array of factors, but the aggressive development and reconstruction of the province can not be overlooked in addition to the strong governance of Governor Agha Gul Sherzai. Nangarhar's incredible performance in eradicating poppy resulted in fiscal incentives from Afghan and D[ept] o[f] S[tate] programs.

“‘In my 14 years as civil affairs, both here and in Iraq, this has been the most ambitious reconstruction mission thus far,’ Army Maj. Robert Minton, civil affairs, said. ‘The level of development here is creating an epicenter for trade and commerce that will take this region beyond merely a level of sustainment.’”

How? Establishment of security, establishment and support of governance and civil institutions (such that Taliban doesn’t fill the void), paving roads (which has been one of the best tactics for decreasing IED effectiveness in Afghanistan), and one more piece that doesn’t get mentioned in many of those stories: figuring out what’s driving the locals to poppy cultivation.

If one looks at Afghan poppy cultivation through a South American cultural-economic lens or through a macroscopic lens, one misses critical causal features. In Nangarhar a critical factor was recognizing that cultural dependency to poppy production, understanding the complicated interdependencies, and substituting something else, i.e., what is noted as “commerce” in the af.mil article above. It’s not just money but what that money was used for – bride prices. Or what are called “The Opium Brides of Afghanistan.” While the concept of selling 9- & 10-year old girls to 50-yo men as repayment for debts or as a cultural artifact is repulsive to me and most civilized humans, poppy cultivation serves to fill that economic niche and has another consequence of providing money to support the Taliban insurgency and al Qa’eda terrorists. Deal with the basic economic and cultural issue first ($ for bride price). That’s largely what was done in Nangarhar.

Alternatively, a strategy solely based on traditional/conventional military-based kinetic means (bombs & bullets) ain’t going to work any better for US than it did for the Soviets. [Edit to add: albeit, the only place that I hear that being suggested is a few voices here.]

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[vortexring 0]

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Alternatively, a strategy solely based on traditional/conventional military-based kinetic means (bombs & bullets) ain’t going to work any better for US than it did for the Soviets.

I wonder how the situation would be if they'd the MANPAD capability(i.e. STINGER) that was used against Ivan aviation. . . Still, lucky the strategy isn't solely based on such methods as you mention. . .

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[Edit to add: albeit, the only place that I hear that being suggested is a few voices here.]

/Marg

That we're making similiar mistakes as the Soviets?

Well, for starters, they didn't pay enough attention to the Pakistan border either.

'for it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "chuck 'im out, the brute!" But it's "saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.'