Security Theater …

[nerdgirl 0]

It’s easy to be a cynic and to complain about “security theater” of commercial air travel; the Atlantic Monthly article -- “The Things He Carried” delicately balances the line between sensationalism of the absurd/exaggerations (e.g., the Pentagon is close but not “approximately 17 feet from National Airport) and highlighting real vulnerabilities created by well-intentioned policy.

For those who travel frequently, much of what security-guru Bruce Schneir observes is almost like an announcement from the “US Dept of Duh”™. As always, Schnei¬er defeats (plays with?) security with style. Thought the interview with the TSA was interesting and insightful (incite-ful ?) The point: vulnerabilities will exist, we need to find a level of acceptable vulnerabilities.

By focusing on “security theater” – requirements that superficially appear to being doing something – have we created new vulnerabilities? Is the $7B invested in TSA better spent somewhere else … like on intelligence, disrupting foreign terrorist cells, strategic communications, or repairing our own domestic infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc).

A few excerpts appended below.

VR/Marg

--- ---- ---

“If I were a terrorist, and I’m not, but if I were a terrorist—a frosty, tough-like-Chuck-Norris terrorist, say a C-title jihadist with Hezbollah or, more likely, a donkey-work operative with the Judean People’s Front—I would not do what I did in the bathroom of the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport, which was to place myself in front of a sink in open view of the male American flying public and ostentatiously rip up a sheaf of counterfeit boarding passes that had been created for me by a frenetic and acerbic security expert named Bruce Schnei¬er. He had made these boarding passes in his sophisticated underground forgery works, which consists of a Sony Vaio laptop and an HP LaserJet printer, in order to prove that the Transportation Security Administration, which is meant to protect American aviation from al-Qaeda, represents an egregious waste of tax dollars, dollars that could otherwise be used to catch terrorists before they arrive at the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport, by which time it is, generally speaking, too late.”

~~~ ~ ~~~

“During one secondary inspection, at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, I was wearing under my shirt a spectacular, only-in-America device called a “Beerbelly,” a neoprene sling that holds a polyurethane bladder and drinking tube. The Beerbelly, designed originally to sneak alcohol—up to 80 ounces—into football games, can quite obviously be used to sneak up to 80 ounces of liquid through airport security. (The company that manufactures the Beerbelly also makes something called a “Winerack,” a bra that holds up to 25 ounces of booze and is recommended, according to the company’s Web site, for PTA meetings.) My Beerbelly, which fit comfortably over my beer belly, contained two cans’ worth of Bud Light at the time of the inspection. It went undetected. The eight-ounce bottle of water in my carry-on bag, however, was seized by the federal government.”

“On another occasion, at LaGuardia, in New York, the transportation-security officer in charge of my secondary screening emptied my carry-on bag of nearly everything it contained, including a yellow, three-foot-by-four-foot Hezbollah flag, purchased at a Hezbollah gift shop in south Lebanon. The flag features, as its charming main image, an upraised fist clutching an AK-47 automatic rifle. Atop the rifle is a line of Arabic writing that reads Then surely the party of God are they who will be triumphant. The officer took the flag and spread it out on the inspection table. She finished her inspection, gave me back my flag, and told me I could go. I said, ‘That’s a Hezbollah flag.’ She said, ‘Uh-huh.’ Not ‘Uh-huh, I’ve been trained to recognize the symbols of anti-American terror groups, but after careful inspection of your physical person, your behavior, and your last name, I’ve come to the conclusion that you are not a Bekaa Valley–trained threat to the United States commercial aviation system,’ but ‘Uh-huh, I’m going on break, why are you talking to me?’”

~~~ ~ ~~~

“To slip through the only check against the no-fly list, the terrorist uses a stolen credit card to buy a ticket under a fake name. ‘Then you print a fake boarding pass with your real name on it and go to the airport. You give your real ID, and the fake boarding pass with your real name on it, to security. They’re checking the documents against each other. They’re not checking your name against the no-fly list—that was done on the airline’s computers. Once you’re through security, you rip up the fake boarding pass, and use the real boarding pass that has the name from the stolen credit card. Then you board the plane, because they’re not checking your name against your ID at boarding.’

“What if you don’t know how to steal a credit card?

“’Then you’re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you,’ he said.

“What if you don’t know how to download a PDF of an actual boarding pass and alter it on a home computer?

“’Then you’re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you.’

"I couldn’t believe that what Schneier was saying was true—in the national debate over the no-fly list, it is seldom, if ever, mentioned that the no-fly list doesn’t work. “It’s true,” he said. ‘The gap blows the whole system out of the water.’”

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Butters 0]

An illusion of safety is often enough safety to appease the masses ...

"That looks dangerous." Leopold Stotch

[DanG 1]

Actually, I think the TSA and DHS have a rather brilliant master plan.

They will make air travel so unbearable that only terrorists will fly. Then just round 'em up!

In serious response to your question, I think a lot of what the TSA does is react to the last (supposed) threat rather that anticipate the next, or most probable, threat. This is completely natural and understandable, but it leads to more and more regulations which in reality have little effect on actual airline safety.

No one wants to be the guy that was too lax, so they take the easy route and keep piling more rules on. Furthermore, there is a disconnect between the negative consequences of overblown security (fewer travellers) and the rules promulgating authority. In other words, the market system fails to correct when the TSA goes too far. When the airlines start charging peeople for water, the get the market bitch slap. When the TSA starts making everyone take off their shoes, the get rewarded with larger budgets.

Everyone with any sense knows that airport seurity is a joke, but the only way that will change is by someone at the top having the balls to call a spade a spade. That will probably never happen.

- Dan G

[Skyrad 0]

Interesting article Marg. As someone who flys internationally upto seven times a week I see glaring stupidity and easy breach points in the security of many airports. I think all of us has at least one TSA story. Freeatlast and myselp once were escorted through all of the security checks at Newark airport because we had a 'Letter' with a TSA stamp on it. What was this letter of power? Simply a printout of the 'Parachutes are safe to take as carry on' page on the TSA website. You'd think we had Presidential letters of recommendation. Each time we got to a security point the guy escorting us said "Its ok they have a letter!" and waved us through...Pure stupidity.

When an author is too meticulous about his style, you may presume that his mind is frivolous and his content flimsy.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca

[nerdgirl 0]

It was reported yesterday that the DHS is taking a small step to reduce the ID-triangle.

DHs Press release: “TSA to Assume Watch List Vetting with Secure Flight Program”:

“The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today announced the issuance of the Secure Flight Final Rule, which shifts pre-departure watch list matching responsibilities from individual aircraft operators to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and carries out a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. By bringing watch list matching responsibilities in-house, TSA can better remedy possible misidentifications when a traveler's name is similar to one found on a watch list.”

Interestingly (to me) this is be discussed in terms of easing the process for commercial travelers rather than as a measure to reduce (altho’ not close) a vulnerability:

“Security officials say the additional personal information [collected by airlines on making reservations, i.e., full name, birth date, sex] -- which will be given to airlines to forward to the federal agency in charge -- will dramatically cut down on cases of mistaken identity, in which people with names similar to those on watch lists are wrongly barred or delayed from flights.

“Over the years, watch-list mismatches have frustrated countless passengers whose names are similar to those on the agency's no-fly list, or on a second list of "selectees" identified for added questioning. The passengers have included infants and toddlers; Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.); and the wife of Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Catherine, whose name is similar to Cat Stevens, the former name of the watch-listed Britain-based pop singer who converted to Islam.

“‘We know that threats to our aviation system persist," he [DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff] said. Secure Flight ‘will increase security and efficiency, it'll protect passengers' privacy, and it will reduce the number of false-positive misidentifications.’”

How about false negatives?

It's still largely 'security theater' focusing on redcuing vulnerabilities rather than reducing motivation or capability (the other two components to threat reduction).

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[warpedskydiver 0]

More time effort and money wasted

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

Freeatlast and myselp once were escorted through all of the security checks at Newark airport because we had a 'Letter' with a TSA stamp on it. What was this letter of power? Simply a printout of the 'Parachutes are safe to take as carry on' page on the TSA website. You'd think we had Presidential letters of recommendation. Each time we got to a security point the guy escorting us said "Its ok they have a letter!" and waved us through...Pure stupidity.

Wonder how many folks are going to try that method?

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying