DoD report on Nuclear Mission and the USAF Execution Thereof

[nerdgirl 0]

Last Friday, the DoD released the “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. Phase I: The Air Force’s Nuclear Mission” Aka the “Schlesinger Report”

The report sited as problematic the ...

“Atrophy of the Nuclear Mission"

The Task Force found that there has been an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force’s commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it. [emphasis in original]

Senior leadership decisions during the past 15 years have had the cumulative effect of compromising the Air Force’s deterrent capabilities.

The change in bomber mission focus away from a cadre of nuclear experienced personnel to conventional-warfare experienced Airmen was accompanied by a gradual decline in nuclear expertise, including in the senior leadership.

Stewardship of and focus on the policies, procedures, munitions handling processes, security, and operational exercise of nuclear weapons have been dramatically weakened.

The decision that junior officers assigned initially to ICBMs will spend the remainder of their careers in the space mission area devalued the nuclear mission area and had the effect of reducing the depth of Air Force nuclear experience, especially among midcareer and senior officers.

As a result, the readiness of forces assigned the nuclear mission has seriously eroded.”

And recommended (re-)creation of a Strategic Air Command in which oversight and control of nuclear mission is under one command and that the nuclear mission be the primary focus of that command.

“Organization"

The Task Force believes that a significant [emphasis in original] organizational change is required to restore the Air Force’s attention to and readiness for the nuclear mission.

Today no senior leader in the Air Force “owns” the nuclear mission. The current organization is not properly structured to meet requirements.

Assigning a major Air Force command the responsibility for representing all Air Force nuclear-capable forces to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) will create nuclear mission alignment with that globally focused customer.

The Task Force believes that the nuclear deterrence mission demands an uncompromising standard of accountability and responsibility and that consolidation of Air Force nuclear forces in a single major command will set the stage for a revitalized nuclear culture.

The Task Force therefore recommends that the Air Force redesignate Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) as Air Force Strategic Command
(AFSTRAT) and vest it with appropriate authority and accountability. The missions of the new AFSTRAT should be aligned with those of USSTRATCOM." [emphasis in original]

SecDef Gates indicated supported of the report’s findings and recommendations.

Report chair and former SecDef Schlesinger (under Pres Nixon & Ford) noted the strategic international security importance of nuclear deterrence even in the post-Cold War World:

“‘The nuclear deterrent role today is quite different, and it is much more circumscribed than it was in the days of the Cold War. However, it is no less important, despite the fact that the domain of the nuclear mission has shrunk.’

“By treaty, the United States still holds the nuclear umbrella over the NATO countries, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. ‘The confidence that they have in that umbrella will determine whether or not they themselves may seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Some (nations) have expressed increasing misgivings about whether or not they feel comfortable under the umbrella.’

“Part of the Air Force and Defense Department task is to ‘resuscitate their confidence in the credibility of the nuclear umbrella,’ he said.”

Largely concur with the recommendations and findings of the 92-page report … which largely resemble observations, conclusions, and recommendations that I cited & suggested earlier. Dismissing nuclear security incidents – even ones that you think aren’t a big deal – is a problem.

In Athens in August, Gene Habiger (GEN USAF, ret), the last STRATCOM Commander who *really* was in command of the AF nuclear mission, spoke about the decline in nuclear mission -- specifically the Minot AFB incident and more generally the prominence of the nuclear mission w/in the USAF (or lack thereof). He attributed it to 3 factors. First, he cited the application of the business management methodology “TQM” (Total quality management, it’s an early variant of ‘six sigma’) that was introduced in the 1980s. (When, if ever, did the Naval Nuclear Submariners start using TQM or 6-sigma?) Secondly, he cited a shift to a “huggy culture” (his words) where no one person is responsible w/in *the military.* He emphasized the diffusion of responsibility w/in the Air Force and specifically noted that he was *not* talking about 7-yos playing soccer. Lastly, attributed changes to the end of the Cold War – the mission shifted.

Habiger began his career as a 19yo involved in the Nevada tests of the Davy Crocket warheads (smallest US tactical nukes that could be launched from back of a jeep).

He also made a provocative (im-ever-ho) comment that he thought that the only thing that could destroy the Republic was someone (e.g., a state or terrorist) coming after us with a nuclear weapon. While Habiger is very involved with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (largely funded by Ted Turner, Warren Buffet, etc), he’s not a total nuclear disarmament advocate by any means. I get the feeling that he’s not in support of *really* deep nuclear reductions (like the US going down to 50-100 nuclear weapons as part of our arsenal vs the estimated 7500 we have now).

He did assert that his concern (regarding the only way to destroy the Republic) is reason why nuclear weapons talks and agreements *must* be multilateral not bilateral.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[airdvr 210]

Oh Jimmy, where are ye when we need ya?

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-1432305389840677523&ei=Ss_PSNriDqfi-QGtn73JAg&q=jimmy+stewart+and+sac&vt=lf

This reverses previous Air Force decisions in the 1990s that moved
these items to general commodity management.

Changes made by the Air Force after the Cold War were in response to the defense downsizing of the 1990s as well as national leadership priorities.

When reorganized in the 1990s, the Air Force dispersed command authority and responsibility for the nuclear mission

Since the early 1990s, the nuclear enterprise has lacked a four-star general responsible for overseeing and advocating for nuclear mission resources

Far be it from me to politicize, but I'm having just a bit of trouble recalling who was POTUS during most of the 90s

Please don't dent the planet.

Destinations by Roxanne

[nerdgirl 0]

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Far be it from me to politicize, but I'm having just a bit of trouble recalling who was POTUS during most of the 90s

Fabulous - an explanatory counter-hypothesis to test!

As all 5 incidents of concern (6 W-80-1 nuclear warheads unsecured and transferred from Minot to Barksdale AFB, the Hill AFB shipment of nuclear-capable ICBM components to Taiwan [instead of helicopter batteries], and the 3 lesser reported incidents) occurred in 2006 or later, your hypothesis first requires us to make an assumption: we have to assume that the subsequent administration's policy choices (2001-2006) had no impact, either positive or negative. (One may challenge how valid that assumption is … but for the moment, let’s use the assumption.)

[NB: since there was some confusion during the last discussion thread. Neither the Schlesinger Report, ADM Donald's report, nor I are asserting hyperbole. Not even close. (1) Violations of security protocols and procedures are serious. Post-hoc ‘Monday morning quarterbacking’ about whether something was a ‘serious’ or ‘not serious’ violation of security protocols is irrelevant. (2) The nuclear mission is serious, the potential consequences of security violations and potential consequences of incident pose a higher risk. The potential consequences associated with doing something dumb while working at generic Mega-Mart are not equivalent.]


[airdvr]’s hypothesis: the decline in performance excellence in US nuclear mission is due to President Clinton’s administration.

To see if your hypothesis has validity, let’s test it against another related organization with a similar mission that was operational under President Clinton’s administration, i.e. the closest parallel. If your hypothesis is valid it should hold for both, right? We should observe similar trends in both, right?

If the decline in operational excellence in the USAF’s nuclear mission is attributable to President Clinton’s administration, one should observe a similar pattern in other services, yes? President Clinton was CINC for all services, not just the USAF.

The USN has a nuclear mission via the nuclear submarine field as well as submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The US Navy has had zero nuclear-related accidents. Decline in nuclear weapons stewardship; lack of dedicated authority responsible for the nuclear enterprise, who sets and maintains consistent, rigorous standards of operation; gradual erosion of nuclear standards; nor a lack of effective oversight by leadership has not been observed in the US Navy nuclear field. Those were the verbatim problems noted by SecDef Gates in June w/r/t the Minot & Hill AFB incidents.

During the 1990s the USN nuclear field operated under command of the same CINC as the USAF nuclear service elements, which is counter to the hypothesis being tested.

GEN Habiger offered other explanatory hypotheses: (1) “TQM” (Total quality management, it’s an early variant of ‘six sigma’) that was introduced in the 1980s; (2) lack of dedicated authority, or as he described a shift to a “huggy culture” (his words) where no one person is responsible w/in *the military.* (Again Habiger emphasized the diffusion of responsibility w/in the USAF and specifically noted that he was *not* talking about 7-yos playing soccer.) (3) The end of the Cold War – the mission shifted.

Weight of expertise: 4-star GEN, former head of STRATCOM, and last commander of a unified USAF nuclear mission or skydiver on the internet.

But going back to the test case: Does the USN nuclear field use TQM? I don’t know. My imagination is that ADM Rickover would proverbially roll over in his grave at the notion. (Ironically, SecDef Gates appointed a Rickover-trained admiral (ADM Kirkland Donald) to lead the investigation into the Minot and Hill AFB incidents.) ADM Rickover did share at least one behavior with former Sec of the Air Force Mike Wynne – both lobbied Congress interacted directly with Congress in support of funding for their programs. Rickover was notoriously effective at it; it caused Wynne problems.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[airdvr 210]

but for the moment, let’s use the assumption

I can just see Marg's paddle coming out of the drawer, can't you?

Weight of expertise: 4-star GEN, former head of STRATCOM, and last commander of a unified USAF nuclear mission or skydiver on the internet.

...and there it is {WHACK!} May I have another?

Please don't dent the planet.

Destinations by Roxanne

[Icon134 0]

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(1) “TQM” (Total quality management, it’s an early variant of ‘six sigma’) that was introduced in the 1980s;

I recall a discussion among several of my peers early last week and the topic of 6-sigma and other similar initiatives (AFSO21) and one of my peers pointed out that this sort of thing was difficult to apply to Govt/military programs because there are fundimental differences between product development in a company and the same in the government.

for example whereas a company (one entity) is developing a product to sell to many customers (and more customers are better)... the government/miliary is one customer trying to aquire/develop products using many suppliers... which is fundimentally reversed from corporate structures...

Livin' on the Edge... sleeping with my rigger's wife...

[TheAnvil 0]

The submarine USS NEW HAMPSHIRE was delivered ahead of schedule and under budget thanks in large part to Lean and Six Sigma practices.

The nuclear Navy is quite different than the nuclear Air Force in many regards. The Navy has reactors critical for daily operations on submarine and carriers. It's a routing - and VERY regulated thing with so much oversight it's incredible. Weapons, on the other hand, are rarely used and/or tested in comparison.

AF generally does a good job on many things. Hopefully they learn from this and correct it. They've had a lot of bad press lately.

Vinny the Anvil
Post Traumatic Didn't Make The Lakers Syndrome is REAL
JACKASS POWER!!!!!!

[nerdgirl 0]

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Quote

(1) “TQM” (Total quality management, it’s an early variant of ‘six sigma’) that was introduced in the 1980s;

I recall a discussion among several of my peers early last week and the topic of 6-sigma and other similar initiatives (AFSO21) and one of my peers pointed out that this sort of thing was difficult to apply to Govt/military programs because there are fundimental differences between product development in a company and the same in the government.

for example whereas a company (one entity) is developing a product to sell to many customers (and more customers are better)... the government/miliary is one customer trying to aquire/develop products using many suppliers... which is fundimentally reversed from corporate structures...

Concur.

TQM, six sigma, etc can be efficient and useful for things like delivery of very large ($$$, size, & multiple components) like submarines (e.g., Vinny's example of the USS NEW HAMPSHIRE) or repeatedly delivering items like helicopters or cell phones. Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, (Robbins AFB) Depot Maintenance Program has instituted a specifically-designed (& tweaked) variant for scheduled maintance of C130s that is saving costs and getting aircraft returned to operations quicker.

Concur very strongly that imposition of those business production model practices on RDT&E (i.e., Basic Research through Demonstration/Validation; 6.1 - 6.4) is less than optimal, to put it diplomatically. It was a neat idea, but it's somewhat akin to using a hammer on something that needs a screwdriver ... or that needs something not found in a toolbox. As an example from the private sector, 3M abandoned Six Sigma for its R&D enterprise last December .

Concur also that imposition of those models on management of people is less than optimal.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Gawain 0]

I wonder if the commands were split in the manner of their cold war structure: SAC, TAC, MAC. There was singleness of purpose within, yet assets could be reassigned between them.

I'm surprised to read in your post that the reports sites no major command over the nuclear mission. That's a three-star minimum in my book.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[nerdgirl 0]

The Schlesinger report recommends Air Force Space Command (AFSC) be re-org'd & renamed Air Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT).

AFSC is currently a 4-star command.

Unadressed is relation of OSD policy/strategy to overall nuclear complex. (Albeit outside the Schlesinger committee TOR.) How a AFSTRAT will intersect w/AF Cyber Command also TBD.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying