McCain's strategy is excellent

[rushmc 23]

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That was completely counterproductive. (We've actually already disabused that notion.)


One way of looking at it. You thought it would be a good idea to sit back and do nothing about a blatant attack on US soldiers?

red herring flag>

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"The April 1986 U.S. air strikes on Libya annoyed almost all the parties involved. For the Libyans, they were a shocking humiliation. In the aftermath of the attacks, Qaddafi had to struggle hard against the danger of being overthrown by a military coup or popular unrest. The Soviet Union was angry at its unreliable and presumptuous Arab partner, resistant to reasonable advice and supposedly undeserving of Soviet military technology."
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_libya/intro_schaefer.cfm?navinfo=15709

You're abviously an extremely intelligent person. But I think you're revisionist history is off the mark.

No revisionist history. Just realist. And putting US strategic interests and security first.

What benefit to US strategic interest was Q'addafi accelerating his covert nuclear and chemical weapons programs? Attempting to get an offensive biological program going? Increasing state sponsorship of terrorism: admittedly to the bombing of Pan Flight 103 (Lockerbie), allegedly supporting the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 by Abu Nidal? Increasing illict arms deals (sales to other non-state actors)? Being complicit in the kidnapping and execution of at least half-dozen American and British nationals in the Middle East immediately after the strike? And trying to pay (~$2.5M. iirc) inner city American gangs to commit terror against US citizens?

The air strikes may have annoyed and frustrated Libya -- that's not the point of a US foreign policy that I would advocate. Would you?

Again, the 1986 airstrike did not induce Libya to abandon its nuclear and chemical weaposn programs or to renounce support of international terrorism.

VR/Marg

I will not pretent to even come close to your experstise in this area but a question comes to mind.

It was not too long after some military action against another courntry that Lybia (seemed) to surrender its nuke program volentarily. Do you think that action had (or may have had) something to do with that choice?

"America will never be destroyed from the outside,
if we falter and lose our freedoms,
it will be because we destroyed ourselves."
Abraham Lincoln

[nerdgirl 0]

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I will not pretent to even come close to your experstise in this area but a question comes to mind.

It was not too long after some military action against another courntry that Lybia (seemed) to surrender its nuke program volentarily. Do you think that action had (or may have had) something to do with that choice?

It's a reasonable question ... & policy wonks have speculated on it.

As I responded to Max, negotiations began before January 2001. The role that the terrorist attacks of 9/11. OEF (Afghanistan), and preparations for OIF (Iraq) and start of OIF are speculative. My opinion is that the level of focus and attention that high level political appointees within the State Department were putting toward building, vetting, and making the case against Iraq enabled realist diplomacy to occur in support of the administration's policies.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Gawain 0]

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You are correct that it was through the intelligence community ... and through diplomatic channels (aka State Dept).

Discussions/negotiations began during the 2nd half of the Clinton adminstration, however. There are speculations regarding the role that preparations for OIF in 2002 may have played -- more that preparations and focused interest on Iraq enabled career civil serveants to execute administration policy with limited ideological interference from early political appointees.

Indeed, there were successful negotiations to dismantle a single chemical weapons plant, 1997. That was followed shortly thereafter by an offer to draw a disarmament plan in 1999.

One interesting essay I found from the Army War College Quarterly http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/hochman.htm also cites this among a list of influences:

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Additional security imperatives beyond the Iraq war likely influenced Libya’s decision to disarm. Libya might have believed that closer relations to the United States could mitigate other threats, perhaps threats more dangerous to Libya than the loss of its WMD programs. In particular, even before 11 September 2001, Qadhafi had begun offering to cooperate with US officials in fighting al Qaeda cells in North Africa.13 Libya has been at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates since at least the 1996 assassination attempt against Qadhafi by the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Shortly thereafter, Tripoli insisted that al Qaeda had inspired and financed the LIFG plot.14 Qadhafi perhaps believed that renewed diplomatic ties with the United States would allow Libya to bandwagon onto the US-led Global War on Terrorism, seeking defense from al Qaeda. Alliance-formation with the United States was an enticing security objective that likely motivated Libya’s decision. WMD disarmament became a means to facilitate this alliance.15 Indeed, exactly a year after Qadhafi’s reversal, in December 2004, the United States designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

I didn't know al Qaeda wasn't a fan of Qaddafi...

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[rushmc 23]

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I will not pretent to even come close to your experstise in this area but a question comes to mind.

It was not too long after some military action against another courntry that Lybia (seemed) to surrender its nuke program volentarily. Do you think that action had (or may have had) something to do with that choice?

It's a reasonable question ... & policy wonks have speculated on it.

As I responded to Max, negotiations began before January 2001. The role that the terrorist attacks of 9/11. OEF (Afghanistan), and preparations for OIF (Iraq) and start of OIF are speculative. My opinion is that the level of focus and attention that high level political appointees within the State Department were putting toward building, vetting, and making the case against Iraq enabled realist diplomacy to occur in support of the administration's policies.

VR/Marg

So, if I understant your reply correctly, those military actions may have played a part in Lybia's surender of its nuke program. Correct? (I understatnd it may be years, if ever, that we will know for sure)

"America will never be destroyed from the outside,
if we falter and lose our freedoms,
it will be because we destroyed ourselves."
Abraham Lincoln

[nerdgirl 0]

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As I responded to Max, negotiations began before January 2001. The role that the terrorist attacks of 9/11. OEF (Afghanistan), and preparations for OIF (Iraq) and start of OIF are speculative. My opinion is that the level of focus and attention that high level political appointees within the State Department were putting toward building, vetting, and making the case against Iraq enabled realist diplomacy to occur in support of the administration's policies.

So, if I understant your reply correctly, those military actions may have played a part in Lybia's surender of its nuke program. Correct? (I understatnd it may be years, if ever, that we will know for sure)

[Gawain 0]

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No, it's unlikely that the invasion of Iraq had any significant direct impact on Libya's choices.

That is not definitive. The link I posted indicates otherwise, and that OEF/OIF made it more appealing to Libya, but not solely due to risk of their own regime change, but because they decided no to get in bed with al Qaeda.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[nerdgirl 0]

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One interesting essay I found from the Army War College Quarterly http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/hochman.htm

Thanks for that link. That's a well-written and concise piece. I could have just linked to that piece last night.

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"Nearly four years before the United States toppled Saddam’s regime, therefore, the Libyans expressed willingness to discuss disarmament with the United States. Finally, Bush Administration officials have stated that before March 2003, Libyan officials had approached British and US officials and offered to begin negotiating a disarmament plan. Though US intentions to invade Iraq were clear by March 2003, the outcome—Saddam’s defeat—was not. Thus, this chronology undermines the argument of those who would solely attribute Qadhafi’s decision to the Iraq war’s deterrent effect.



"Moreover, the economic benefits of disarmament offered possible security gains to Libya. Qadhafi likely calculated the potential revenue to be gained from lifting both UN and US sanctions—from the influx of foreign direct investments and capital and from new international loans. This new revenue, when invested in Libya’s vast oil industry, could be used to shore up Libya’s conventional arsenal even as Tripoli comprehensively complied with its nonconventional disarmament. Economic development and growth can contribute to security, as increased state revenues enable new arms purchases. Therefore, even if Qadhafi was primarily motivated by security concerns, eliminating economic sanctions could have been a means of augmenting Libya’s military power. We will soon see whether this prediction comes to fruition, if Libya chooses to spend its new revenue on its military.

"Thus, the US war in Iraq need not have been Libya’s sole security consideration or motivation. Rather, Libya likely conducted a cost-benefit analysis of its security situation and concluded that disarming enabled multiple security gains. On balance, these outweighed the costs of destroying Qadhafi’s WMD arsenal.

...

"Qadhafi’s concern about his succession probably influenced the timing of his decision. By all accounts, Qadhafi is grooming his son, Saif al-Islam, to replace him. Saif al-Islam might have urged his father to issue the disarmament decision as soon as possible, as Saif al-Islam himself has been a strong proponent of dialogue with the United States and the West."

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I didn't know al Qaeda wasn't a fan of Qaddafi...

Yes. Q'addafi is much more of a secularist but moreso a nationalist. Economics are significant drivers. Al Qa'eda is a different very different movement.

The DPRK is a case in which a Libya model has applicability. Iran is more complicated.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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No, it's unlikely that the invasion of Iraq had any significant direct impact on Libya's choices.

That is not definitive. The link I posted indicates otherwise, and that OEF/OIF made it more appealing to Libya, but not solely due to risk of their own regime change, but because they decided no to get in bed with al Qaeda.

Were we looking at the same link?

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"Thus, three causal factors,

[(1) "Libya's Security Interests" which the article notes extended to negotations in the late 1990's;
(2) "The Power of International Opprobrium" i.e., "both UN and US sanctions," traditional arms control treaties and instruments, the PSI, and Q'addafi's economic interests;
(3) "Powerful Domestic “Constraints” on the US, i.e., "The US government must often reconcile obligations to domestic interest groups with the demands of international relations." In this case demands for payment related to bombing of PanAm 103 over Scotland in 1998 (two years after the 1986 air strikes)]

... usually under-acknowledged in assessments of Qadhafi’s decisionmaking, together contributed to Qadhafi’s WMD reversal."

Hochman's article is pretty clear that OIF/OEF was quarternary (at best), probably a quinary or senary factor.


In the recomendations for policymakers, does the author advocate military invasion or other hard power action? (No.)

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"First, a security analysis suggests that Qadhafi conducted cost-benefit security calculations and concluded that destroying his WMD made security sense. Whether or not the US invasion of Iraq played a dominant role in his cost-benefit analysis, Qadhafi conceived of his WMD reversal as an act of realpolitik. Debating the efficacy of the punitive model of the Iraq war is fruitless, as it is highly unlikely that future US foreign policymakers will order military force against one rogue regime simply to threaten or scare another one into disarmament. Nonetheless, rogue regimes choosing to disarm after making serious security calculations might be motivated by multiple causes. [I.e., the author is saying that it's not just OIF, if OIF even had a real impact on Libya's security calculations] Regardless of the specific incentive and the specific cost-benefit analysis of security gains, the bottom line remains: WMD disarmament can be security-enhancing in the eyes of a rogue state leader. Giving rogues security carrots to disarm, therefore, is a useful strategy.

"Moreover, US foreign policy decisionmakers need to take into account that rogues with WMD, such as Iran and North Korea, do actually conceive of their WMD arsenals in defensive security terms, even if their articulation of the threats they feel seem specious to an American audience.

"Second, international institutions and regimes such as economic sanctions can exert nonmaterial as well as material incentives and pressures. Materially, economic sanctions work most effectively when they are truly multilateral. In the case of Libya, for more than 15 years United Nations sanctions received wide international backing. As a result, Libya needed to confront and conduct dialogue with a range of foreign countries in order to eliminate the sanctions. Sanctions and IAEA inspections that are respected by some great powers while halfheartedly regarded by others do little to influence rogue behavior. This lesson regarding the power of international consensus is critical to confronting Iran and North Korea.

"In terms of nonmaterial incentives, the case of Libya suggests that the norms bound up in international institutions are sometimes ignored and at other times effective. ... ...

"On the other hand, international norms regarding WMD are important mechanisms, capable of encouraging rogues to disarm and to cooperate. Norms can both pressure rogue leaders to reform and provide a road map for rehabilitation. US policies aimed at isolating Libya, applied from the 1980s through 2003, successfully exploited Qadhafi’s concern for his international image. Placing Libya on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism effectively constrained Qadhafi’s ambitions—not only due to the material consequences of being placed on this list but also because such overt censure undermined his global standing. Ultimately, US policies that publicly critique the nature of a regime—“naming and shaming” strategies—can be effective, especially if the condemnation is accompanied by international consensus.Attacking a rogue state’s reputation is likely to be less effective without such consensus."

As I wrote last night, the problem is the binary light-switch approach to US foreign policy -- characterizing the choices as either (a) wussy, liberal appeasement, or (b) strong military intervention/use of hard power. That foreign policy approach forces one to a very narrow tool box and discards a whole array of other tools that have been effective, as Hochman detailed in her AWC Parameters article you cited.

To paraphrase my favorite PhD historian, the US needs to learn to put & use more tools in our toolbox. Not to take them away, including hard power options. We invented them and we've got the intellectual capacity. Use them all.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[crwtom 0]

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Obama is a racist. That's my point.

he's half white half black -- so he has to be against purple people?

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Fear causes hesitation, and hesitation will cause your worst fears to come true