If Iraq were the ONLY issue...

[BIGUN 1,482]

1. Just as an average American voter who would take the time to review each candidate's website regarding their plan for Iraq; which candidate would you pick if the ONLY issue and platform were Iraq?

2. Why does that candidate's position appeal to you?

Clinton's Position

McCain's Position

Obama's Position


The poll was created using last names in alphabetical order.

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[rehmwa 2]

Quote

which candidate would you pick if the ONLY issue and platform were Iraq?

don't we already have a bunch of posters that fit that description - but not as a hypothetical?

...
Driving is a one dimensional activity - a monkey can do it - being proud of your driving abilities is like being proud of being able to put on pants

[jcd11235 0]

I think Obama has the best plan, with Clinton's being a very close second, and McCain's a distant third. All three have significant problems.

Obama and Clinton place too much emphasis on immediately redeploying troops back home. McCain's plan places too much emphasis on use of hard power.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[Gawain 0]

Reality check for everyone:

---

Sen. Obama's plan: "He will remove one to two combat brigades each month, and have all of our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months."
Reality: It would take over three years to draw down all combat forces out of Iraq, unless he plans on leaving a ton of equipment over there.

"if al Qaeda attempts to build a base within Iraq, he will keep troops in Iraq or elsewhere in the region to carry out targeted strikes on al Qaeda."
Reality: If you don't have boots or assets on the ground, you can't assess what al Qaeda is doing.

---

---

Sen. Clinton's plan: "She would direct them to draw up a clear, viable plan to bring our troops home starting with the first 60 days of her Administration."
Reality: That's not a plan. That's a target, one that she would move. It also does nothing to address al Qaeda.

---

---

Sen. McCain's plan: "More troops...to clear and hold insurgent strongholds; to provide security for rebuilding local institutions and economies; to halt sectarian violence in Baghdad and disarm Sunni and Shia militias; to dismantle al Qaeda; to train the Iraqi Army; and to embed American personnel in Iraqi police units. Accomplishing each of these goals will require more troops and is a crucial prerequisite for needed economic and political development in the country."
Reality: That looks like a plan to me. It's also comprehensive and not vague in any way.

---

Of the three, which one actually resembles the responsibility of finishing what we start?

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[billvon 3,107]

>which one actually resembles the responsibility of finishing what we start?

Obama's is the only one that discusses finishing the war we started against the enemies that attacked us on September 11, 2001. McCain's position paper doesn't even _mention_ Afghanistan. With his confusion over whether the USSR still exists, and over whether Iran is primarily Sunni or Shi'a, that doesn't surprise me too much.

[JohnnyD 0]

Quote

Of the three, which one actually resembles the responsibility of finishing what we start?

What we started was an attack to topple the SH regime to prevent the imminent attack on the US by wmds.
-Done- There is one plan that addresses leaving.

[downwardspiral 0]

I agree. As much as I want to believe in Obama's and Clinton's good intentions, they apear to be nothing more than pipe dreams.

www.FourWheelerHB.com

[kallend 2,146]

Quote

Quote

Of the three, which one actually resembles the responsibility of finishing what we start?

What we started was an attack to topple the SH regime to prevent the imminent attack on the US by NON EXISTENT wmds.
-Done- There is one plan that addresses leaving.

Indeed. 100 years in Iraq (McCain thinks this is OK) is a bit too long.

The US IS an occupying power, and should get the hell out ASAP.

...

The only sure way to survive a canopy collision is not to have one.

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

1. Just as an average American voter who would take the time to review each candidate's website regarding their plan for Iraq; which candidate would you pick if the ONLY issue and platform were Iraq?

2. Why does that candidate's position appeal to you?

Oooh, tough & good question!

Based on the linked websites & the constraints in this SC notional scenario, I’d have to go with the only one that mentioned counterinsurgency strategy & reconstruction.

In reading Sen McCain’s platform and actively looking for the “why” as to the US should remaining militarily engaged in Iraq – just because they are there is not sufficient reason to maintain or to deploy additional US troops, imo – what I found was this:

“Success is essential to creating peace in the region, and failure would expose the United States to national security threats for generations. Defeat in the war would lead to much more violence in Iraq, greatly embolden Iran, undermine U.S. allies such as Israel, likely lead to wider conflict, result in a terrorist safe haven in the heart of the Middle East, and gravely damage U.S. credibility throughout the world.”

And this:

“Iraq's transformation into a secure democracy and a force for freedom in the greater Middle East is the calling of our age. We can succeed.”

That’s a passionate rhetorical mix of normative and non-specific realist security issues for being pro-interventionism. Heartened to note that Sen McCain considers what the rest of the world thinks to be important, i.e., maintaining US credibility.

I’m still very much wrestling with what I consider to be appropriate use of armed forces for interventionism, nation building, and international development, across the full spectrum of Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. Since when did the interventionism, nation-building, and international development become a Republican principle?

Your thoughts? & why?

Bon mot
LTC John Nagl, USA – soon to be just Dr. Nagl, who (as I’m confident you know) was hand-chosen by GEN David Petraeus, USA and LTG Jim "Warrior Monk" & "Mad Dog" Mattis, USMC to lead writing of FM 3-24 – is taking a senior fellowship at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a liberal-centrist think tank with a number of Sen Clinton’s advisors (i.e., likely deputy and assistant secretaries), as well as former appointees from Pres. Bill Clinton’s administration). Nagl’s said some things that suggest he might support Sen Obama as well; and former SecNav Richard Danzig is also a CNAS senior fellow (likely SecDef nominee if Sen Obama is elected). I know General officers have to wait some “X” number of years before cabinet level appointeeships; I don’t know what the rules are w/r/t field officers and other Senate-confirmation-level appointee positions. My speculation is that Nagl is waiting for a clear Democratic nominee.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[BIGUN 1,482]

You've been waiting to throw DoDD 3000.05 back at me, haven't you? OK, so on the flip-side, what do you think of Clinton's position on |R|

Quote

A New Intensive Diplomatic Initiative in the Region. In her first days in office, Hillary would convene a regional stabilization group composed of key allies, other global powers, and all of the states bordering Iraq. The- mission of this group would be to develop and implement a strategy to create a stable Iraq. It would have three specific goals:

Non-interference. Working with the U.N. representative, the group would work to convince Iraq's neighbors to refrain from getting involved in the civil war.

Mediation. The group would attempt to mediate among the different sectarian groups in Iraq with the goal of attaining compromises on fundamental points of disputes.

Reconstruction funding. The members of the group would hold themselves and other countries to their past pledges to provide funding to Iraq and will encourage additional contributions to meet Iraq's extensive needs.

As our forces redeploy out of Iraq, Hillary would also organize a multi-billion dollar international effort -- funded by a wide range of donor states -- under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to address the needs of Iraqi refugees...

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

Reality: If you don't have boots or assets on the ground, you can't assess what al Qaeda is doing.

Concur.

Quote

Reality: That's not a plan. That's a target, one that she would move. It also does nothing to address al Qaeda.

Concur.

Quote

Sen. McCain's plan: "More troops...to clear and hold insurgent strongholds; to provide security for rebuilding local institutions and economies; to halt sectarian violence in Baghdad and disarm Sunni and Shia militias; to dismantle al Qaeda; to train the Iraqi Army; and to embed American personnel in Iraqi police units. Accomplishing each of these goals will require more troops and is a crucial prerequisite for needed economic and political development in the country."
Reality: That looks like a plan to me. It's also comprehensive and not vague in any way.

Concur it's the most explicit vision (not a plan) to address Iraqi security/stabillization and counterinsurgency.
Unfortunately, that also "does nothing to address al Qa'eda."


Bringing up (big) al Qa’eda and global radical Salafist movement w/in the constraints of the thread, which I tried to abide by, is something of a false and limiting premise. To consider strategy against al Qa’eda, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northwest territories must be included. (Or maybe that’s the crux ….)

Per the US State Dept 2007 Report on Terrorism released less than 10 days ago:

“Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and associated networks remained the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners in 2007. It has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although Usama bin Ladin remained the group’s ideological figurehead, Zawahiri has emerged as AQ’s strategic and operational planner.”

Insurgent militias in Iraq are organized by religious identities; their religious extremism is not directed at the American homeland but against the US-led occupation and each other. The goals of Al Qa’eda in Iraq (AQI) are: “expelling U.S. forces, establishing an Islamic authority, spreading the conflict to Iraq’s secular neighbors, and engaging in battle with Israel.” Similar goals for Ansar al-Sunna (AS) (nee Ansar al-Islam).

What about Africa? al Qa’eda Organisation in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria; Tanzania; al Shabab & Al-Ittihad al-Islami in Somalia, where COIN and traditional military operations are having success; and Uganda.

Sen McCain’s foreign policy team, lead by former PNAC director Randy Scheunemann, asserts that the main front against al Qa’eda is Iraq, (e.g., see Brookings Institute hosted discussion from March featuring all 3 candidates foreign policy advisors. Sen McCain’s foreign policy team looks a lot like Pres. Bush’s in 1999: William Kristol, Robert Kagan, John Bolton, Max Boot. Where are the Reagan-era realists? What happened to the realpolitik of former SecState Henry Kissinger?

The Democratic candidates assert that it is in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northwest territories where a resurgent al Qa’eda and the radical Islamist threat to the US is located.

It’s not about politics – at least not to me – it’s about where the organized global Salafist strategic and operational leadership is and to where are they spreading. And stopping that.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

You've been waiting to throw DoDD 3000.05 back at me, haven't you?

Just wait til I've got DoDD 3000.08.

Quote

OK, so on the flip-side, what do you think of Clinton's position on |R|

W/r/t |R|, it's the most comprehensive & detailed of the three on the websites. I give Sen Clinton and her foreign policy advisory team credit for treating it as more than just an after-thought.

Before |R| need the |SST| against an overwhelmingly domestic insurgency in Iraq ... COIN.

The most comprehensive approach to reconstruction that I've encountered is the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project, which has many publications exceeding 180 words. |R| is tough.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

Quote

Before |R| need the |SST| against an overwhelmingly domestic insurgency in Iraq ... COIN.

Can they be treated linearly (i.e. sequentially)? IIRC, that was one of Gen. Anthony Zinni's (USMC Ret.) criticisms when he appeared as a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Comment begins at about 53:45)

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

Quote

Before |R| need the |SST| against an overwhelmingly domestic insurgency in Iraq ... COIN.

Can they be treated linearly?

Thanks for the SFRC link!

Purely linearly, no. And there are not strict demarcations between S | S | T | R.

Although if at the conclusion of traditional military operations (e.g., defeat/overthrow of the ruling govt) security is not established, then basic security has to be established first. So there is some linearity there, imo.

My understanding of GEN Zinni’s comments is that he was emphasizing the need for coordinated planning of traditional military (offensive) operations and post-conflict operations (from the uniformed services through whoever is responsible for reconstruction) *at the time* the initial conflict (invasion) is being planned.

Have to admit that my favorite comments from the Senate hearing came from the ADM Leighton Smith, (ret):

“We need Smart power to keep America safe & to demonstrate our moral leadership. For the United States to be an effective world leader, we have to balance all three tools of our nation’s statecraft defense, diplomacy, and development. This is what we refer to as ‘smart power.’

“The next Congress & President must project the strength of our values in the world: our actions & programs that [can] impact and inspire the world’s most vulnerable groups.

“My own military experience leads me to support programs that improve the way developing countries govern. Programs that train teachers and doctors, create infrastructure for health care, strengthen international alliances, promote global development, these & other actions that meet humanitarian needs express the values of our nation, and that’s what’s important.”

And his comment that “the worse news we could get was that we’ve got some more civilians coming in to deal with …” because they didn’t/don’t listen made me chuckle! (The latter is my translation of what he said much more diplomatically.)

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

Quote

Thanks for the SFRC link!

I can hardly believe that you haven't seen it before now. The link was sent to me from a good friend who stays very informed on foreign relations, especially that which is military related.

Quote

Although if at the conclusion of traditional military operations (e.g., defeat/overthrow of the ruling govt) security is not established, then basic security has to be established first. So there is some linearity there, imo.

I agree.

I can't help but wonder how many of the insurgents are motivated simply by our presence. I certainly don't believe that's the motivation of all of them, but for some I think that's the main issue. With that in mind, given the limitations of each candidates position, I think that troop withdraw coupled with a focus on |R| would be more effective than troop increases with a focus on COIN without sufficient focus on |R|.

Better than either approach would be sufficient attention to all four areas, |S|,|S|,|T|, & |R|.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[idrankwhat 0]

Quote

Sen McCain’s foreign policy team, lead by former PNAC director Randy Scheunemann, asserts that the main front against al Qa’eda is Iraq, (e.g., see Brookings Institute hosted discussion from March featuring all 3 candidates foreign policy advisors. Sen McCain’s foreign policy team looks a lot like Pres. Bush’s in 1999: William Kristol, Robert Kagan, John Bolton, Max Boot. Where are the Reagan-era realists? What happened to the realpolitik of former SecState Henry Kissinger?

I hate to reduce a well thought out and delivered post but thank you. I didn't know this. If that's McCain's foreign policy advisory team then I want him to have nothing to do with running our country. We've had a chance to see how their ideas pan out and nearly the entire country is calling for "change". Even McCain uses the term. To let these guys into the inner circle is not only a slap in the face but it brings into question his sanity.

[BIGUN 1,482]

Quote

I give Sen Clinton and her foreign policy advisory team credit for treating it as more than just an after-thought.

I agree.

w/r/t S|S|T|R being linear or concurrent.

IMHO - S|S|T|R must be planned linearly, components can be executed slightly concurrent and should be based on advisement from field officers.

For example,

S|
_S|
___T|R|

or

S|
S|
___T|
___R|

But, I do not see where |T|R| can be mutually concurrent with S|S|
Whereas, I can see |T| having a "slight before" finish relationship before the completion of |Stabilization

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[nerdgirl 0]

There are at least 3 different concepts – that I can see, likely to be others – that are all important but getting slightly convoluted.

(1) Gen Zinni’s comments that initial planning for SSTR should occur concurrently with planning for initial combat operations (traditional military), rather that SSTR following linearly after combat operations have been initiated or have concluded.


(2)

(a) Linearity between execution of traditional combats operations and SSTR operations. With traditional Westphalian-based military operations, combat operations ended (signed armistice, treaty of surrender, etc) and then SSTR began, e.g., Japan WWII. With counterinsurgency operations, there is no formal end of combat operations, i.e., no linear transition.

(See attached very rough & simplified graphics intended only to help better illustrate what I mean not as prescriptive. Also serve as a strawman to start 'ripping apart.' )

I think a lot about this in terms of nuclear, chemical & biological defense. Are the defensive RDT&E programs adequately addressing the requirements (whether officially produced through the J8 requirements process or not) of the warfighter in SSTR operations? Or are the defensive RDT&E programs still giving ("transitioning" is the precise term but don't want to confuse w/the "T" of SSTR) the services products that are only adequate for traditional combat operations, or even worse, traditional combat operations in a Cold War setting? What is the role for the S&T portion?

(b) Linearity with SSTR. I don’t think anyone is going to argue that transition or reconstruction can occur without some basic level of security. (How stable that level of security is something else -- the Green Zone is quite secure; if US forces depart, how stable is that security?) Is it purely linear – no. “Three steps forward, two steps back” might be a better – altho’ still imperfect – metaphor. Particularly not in a counterinsurgency like Iraq in which while the overall trend is to greater security and stability, incidents of insecurity and destabilization spike with seasons (seasonal pattern of violence also observed in Afghanistan).

As institutions (banking, police, education, health) are rebuilt and strengthened and corruption decreases as part of reconstruction that has a positive feedback on security and stability of a fragile state. That’s been observed repeatedly in Africa.


(3) Extent of involvement of military versus civilian in SSTR operations. As a nation is rebuilt, through time the extent of involvement (proportion) of uniformed services should linearly decrease and civilians (both foreign and domestic) should increase roughly linearly.
(See attached very rough, simplified graphics intended only to help better illustrate what I mean not as prescriptive.)


There’s a reasonable question to ask: did transition occur too quickly in Iraq (30 June 2004) before there was adequate security, stabilization, *and* reconstruction?

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[BIGUN 1,482]

Am I to read between the lines that "Bigun" still has a traditionalist heritage?

I'm working on it.

Quote

There’s a reasonable question to ask: did transition occur too quickly in Iraq (30 June 2004) before there was adequate security, stabilization, *and* reconstruction?

I don't think there's a question at all.

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[nerdgirl 0]

Quote

Am I to read between the lines that "Bigun" still has a traditionalist heritage?

Hmmm … when your operational perspective becomes “conventional” what does that mean for unconventional warfare?

Between LTC Gian Gentile as eloquent & effective spokesman for the "traditionalists" and a significant part of Army staff seeming to be in concurrence, you’re in fine company.

On the other end of the spectrum, there are folks talking about 7th, 8th, & 9th Generation Warfare. I’d like to see more recognition for emergence of 5GW at the strategic & operational level … altho’ I have to acknowledge that there still seem to be folks who haven’t recognized 4GW.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

Quote

(2)

(b) Linearity with SSTR. I don’t think anyone is going to argue that transition or reconstruction can occur without some basic level of security. (emphasis mine -jcd11235) (How stable that level of security is something else -- the Green Zone is quite secure; if US forces depart, how stable is that security?) Is it purely linear – no. “Three steps forward, two steps back” might be a better – altho’ still imperfect – metaphor. Particularly not in a counterinsurgency like Iraq in which while the overall trend is to greater security and stability, incidents of insecurity and destabilization spike with seasons (seasonal pattern of violence also observed in Afghanistan).

As institutions (banking, police, education, health) are rebuilt and strengthened and corruption decreases as part of reconstruction that has a positive feedback on security and stability of a fragile state. That’s been observed repeatedly in Africa.

I would argue that attention to (not just to the extent of coordinated planning) |R| from the very beginning can indeed contribute to increased security, or, perhaps more accurately, a reduced need for security based missions.

What if we had initially, instead of forcefully toppling Saddam's government, attempted to set up alternate infrastructure over which Saddam had no control. For example, built civilian hospitals where there were none nearby. Or distributed food among the poor.

In such a scenario, our combat troops would have to support the support troops, protecting the troops and the buildings, supplies, etc. from violence. Such would be a reversal of their traditional roles relative to one another.

By not eliminating the Iraqi military initially, it is also likely that our military would have been able to fight that military, defensively, in a more traditional manner instead of fighting insurgents, for which we were far less prepared to confront. By fighting that military only defensively, the Iraqi people would have been able to witness Saddam trying to stop humanitarian efforts, rather than American and coalition forces destroying infrastructure and killing civilians collaterally. Fighting the Iraqi military slowly and defensively would also weaken it so when Iraqis decided to rise against Saddam, their victory could come more easily, yet still come by their own hands, giving them a sense of ownership in the process. By not killing civilian husbands, brothers, fathers and sons, it is possible that the coalition would have not made as many enemies of the people, making it far more difficult for an insurgency to take place to begin with.

Would the insurgency have risen up as it did had our troops sought to help the Iraqi people prior to ever firing a shot? Could we have garnered real public support for our presence by taking obvious, visible humanitarian actions as our first steps? Could we have rendered Saddam's authoritative rule ineffective and inconsequential by showing the people an alternative? Could we have used goodwill to motivate the people to rise against Saddam themselves, in favor of democratic rule, easing the transition by minimizing or eliminating the detrimental effects of the ensuing power vacuum from his removal?

Democracies cannot be installed. They must be sought by the people. If we are going to send our troops on nation building missions, we must keep this fact in mind. It is ineffective to create enemies of many locals, knowing that their support will be needed later.

Without the support of the local population, the best an invading force can hope for is a stalemate. For victory, the hearts and minds of the locals must be won. On the other hand, In order for the defending forces to be victorious, often all that is needed is the withdraw of the invading troops.

Of course, we would have had to forego the claims of a WMD threat, but I seriously doubt that those with access to the intelligence actually believed such claims were more than propaganda to be used to convince US, British, et al, citizens, as well as the UN, that there was justification to invade.

* * * * *

From the testimony of Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.):

Question from Sen. Feingold: How do we make sure that we don't convey the message that when the United States acts, it acts first and foremost as a military as opposed to a more coordinated message, that I think is part of the issue. It's not just the reality of what we do, it's also the message of what is America that they receive?

Well that's a very hard question because I don't think a structure exists to support that kind of an effort except the military. But, the good side of that, sir, is that the Africans who are the beneficiaries of these activities, people who the victims of the tsunami, they see the American military in a different light. We're not a guys that runs around with a big stick and beats the living daylights out of folks, we are there and can and do help people. And that in and of itself is a pretty powerful thing.

Question from Sen. Feingold: What happens if that's the only impression they have of America?

That's where a very difficult problem comes in of understanding that situational awareness that I talked about in my statement, that [General Zinni] and I have talked about, where we do smart targeting. We go in areas where there are potential problems, and we try to employ these civilian force, if you will, before we are required to use the military. In my understanding we don't have that capacity or capability right now, and if we are going to develop and really take advantage of this concept of smart power, we are going to have to develop some sort of a civilian corps that can do exactly as you said.

From the testimony of General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), responding to the same questions:

I remember when we landed in Somalia, and we began to provide the security network for the distribution of food, and actually we had our first meeting with General Aideed, and Aideed's advice, strangely enough, a strange source, said, "All these people see are armed gangs and militias. If you want to be different, show up with food. Show up with hope and promise."

When we went out to the regions and began to stretch our security blanket, it was led by Ambassador Bob Oakley. With him was Phil Johnson, the president of CARE that was running the humanitarian mission. We brought NGO's with us. So, when they saw the American soldier or the American Marine, they saw something different, not just his weapons, and not just the security, but mixed in with him was the humanitarian need, was the connection to the leadership that wanted to work with their tribal leaders, their clan leaders.

I negotiated with the Acehnese in Banda Aceh and also in Mindanao with the Moral Islamic Liberation Front in an attempt at conflict resolution. In Mindanao, for example, Pacific Command's there training Philippine forces on counter-terrorism actions. USAID's there with remarkable programs of Arms to Farms, you turn in your weapons; we give you the equipment, the farming, the tools, the training on farming practices they've never used before. It's highly successful. The recidivism rate is very low. You see also our government involved in trying to mediate it, working with President Arroyo and her government, the US Institute of Peace funded by this body, but a non-governmental organization.

The thing that struck me is none of this was coordinated, unfortunately, and that's, I think, one of the issues here, but the fact that we have pieces out there that, if we weave them together, then the military and its provision of security and interaction is also viewed in the larger frame of these other efforts that are going on, and that would separate us from others.

* * * * *

I found a fascinating article on the War on Terror's Philippine front in the February 2007 issue of Outdoor Magazine, titled This Is the War on Terror. Wish You Were Here!.

Welcome to the tropical Philippine island of Jolo, where life is like a Corona ad—coconut trees, white-sand beaches, bathtub-warm seas. Except those guys in the water are U.S. Green Berets, and those kids on dirt bikes are jihadists known for kidnapping Western tourists. Even stranger? On this front, at least, America seems to be winning.

Some excerpts:

Even before the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001, the lawless jungles of the southern Philippines had emerged as the biggest terrorist base outside Central Asia. The ultimate goal was to prevent another Afghanistan—to deny that sanctuary to fleeing Al Qaeda operatives and regional groups like Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya, the outfit later believed to be responsible for the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and those of the J.W. Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2003 and 2004.

By 2006, after four straight years of operations, the joint troops had sustained an estimated 100 Filipino and 11 American dead. And they'd contained Abu Sayyaf predominantly to a single island, its historical stronghold of Jolo. Geographically isolated, blanketed by jungle, and run by an obscenely corrupt government, Jolo (pronounced HO-lo) is a terrorist sanctuary par excellence. Its half-million inhabitants are—like many Abu Sayyaf—members of the Tausug tribe: desperately poor, Muslim in a country of Roman Catholics, and linguistically separated from the rest of the Philippines. But ever since a charismatic Filipino brigadier general named Juancho Sabban took command in April 2005, the joint forces were actually succeeding in winning over the Islamic people of Jolo. Using a classic "hearts and minds" strategy of about 85 percent civil-affairs projects and 15 percent combat operations, they'd turned this 345-square-mile island into the one theater in the war on terrorism where the momentum seemed to be moving in America's direction. (emphasis mine -jcd11235)

"We think there is a model here that's worth showcasing," Major General David Fridovich, the Hawaii-based U.S. Special Operations commander in the Pacific, told reporters last spring. "There's another way of doing business."
…

When it was first formed, in 1990 by Abdurajak Janjalani, a Filipino mujahedeen veteran who'd fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, Abu Sayyaf (Arabic for "Father of the Sword") was dedicated to fighting for a strict Islamic state in the southern Philippines. It was reportedly funded by Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa and trained by such veteran Al Qaeda leaders as Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
…

In November 2001, President Bush announced that the U.S. would send troops and aid to the Philippines, opening what the media came to call the "second front" in his war on terrorism. By spring 2002, Exercise Balikatan was in full force, with 660 U.S. Marines, Green Berets, and Navy SEALs—acting in an advisory role, as the Philippine constitution forbids foreign combat operations on its soil—joining the CIA and FBI personnel already in the southern islands.
…

A stronghold of Abu Sayyaf, Tanum had once been home to Ramzi Yousef, and, as recently as five months earlier, a 40-man marine detachment stationed here was harassed nearly every evening by snipers. Now Tanum's leadership, many onetime collaborators themselves, had volunteered to lead the task force into the heart of Abu Sayyaf's regional base camp.

Our convoy halted long enough to pick up ten local guides. The oldest, a fifty-something man wearing a 1963 Vermont Lacrosse Lions T-shirt and carrying a 12-inch blade, climbed into the jeep next to me. Sinewy as a suspension cable, he introduced himself in remarkably good English as the chief of the village of Tanum. His constituents, he said, had petitioned him to ask the marines for a water system after seeing the benefits accruing to other villages cooperating with Sabban's men.

"But why is the Abu Sayyaf letting us do this?" I asked.

"I send one person up there other day to go find Abu Sayyaf," he said. "Tell them the military is helping us with water project. I ask, 'Please no problem?' Then I receive message from them. It said, 'We will go away from your municipal.' "

"But why do they go away?"

"What can they do?"

"Attack us? Destroy the water system?"

"No," he said, with a sly grin. "They know if they destroy water project, the people will hate them."
…

There were signs of Abu Sayyaf everywhere: a camouflaged observation post, empty packs of Astro cigarettes and Cloud Nine candy bars (both Abu Sayyaf favorites), a flip-flop, and fresh footprints. "Shit, they were just here," a Green Beret whispered, as he fingered newly cut banana leaves on the observation post.

We had liberated the cistern. There it was, built into a sheer hillside: two cast-iron spigots sticking out of a cement box a little bigger than a VW bus. The guides rushed over. One said something to a marine. He shrugged. Another laughed. A Green Beret guesstimated flow rates, while another eyeballed the gradient of the slope and two more filmed the scene for the intel guys back at the Beach Resort. Despite any historical, religious, or cultural differences, it was pretty clear that the Green Berets, Filipino marines, and Tausug villagers all agreed that this was one damn good water source.

An odd war here, I thought. The allies just ran a major military operation deep into enemy-held jungle and without a shot took a lousy piece of concrete that anywhere else wouldn't even garner graffiti. It wasn't exactly like storming the Normandy beaches, but then again that was the whole point. It wasn't just that the Green Berets and marines were winning the civilians' loyalty; it was that they were forcing the enemy to collaborate in its own defeat. (emphasis mine -jcd11235)

Winning the "hearts and minds" of a civilian populace is an age-old strategy: Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu preached it in the fifth century b.c.; Mao mastered it; the U.S. tried it in Vietnam and is once again returning to it in Iraq and Afghanistan. But for an occupying force, as the Americans and Filipinos arguably are on Jolo, this strategy is especially tricky.
…

Filipino General Juancho Sabban first employed his version of hearts-and-minds against Islamic separatists on Palawan in 1983 and honed it fighting Abu Sayyaf on the island of Basilan in the late 1990s and again in 2002 as part of a similar U.S.-Philippine initiative. The day he took over on Jolo, he ordered his men into a hut for a PowerPoint presentation. The first slide quoted Sun Tzu: "The acme of skill of the true warrior is to be victorious without fighting."
…

One of the Green Berets summed up the efforts: "They were small projects in resources but ones with a big impact on the people's lives. That's the key to this counterinsurgency—not for us to keep going to them with solutions but to somehow get these people to come to the marines for help."
…

"As a young lieutenant," Sabban told me, "I discovered you get better intelligence when you are with the people. And when I was a rebel and on the run in 1990, the authorities can't catch me if I have supporters. Who else will get the best intelligence but the civilians themselves? If they don't want to tell on the enemy, even if area is size of basketball court, you will not find the enemy."

Sabban pursued graduate studies at the Naval War College, in Rhode Island, so he's thought about this a lot. "People know you are more powerful than them," he said. "You don't have to rub it in, but when you go down to their level, adopt their ways, they will take you in. The more you hurt them, the more they fight back. Even if they are inferior, they will find a way to get you."

I believe that, in order to maximize the probability of success, efforts to implement |R| need to be made from the very beginning of operations. It is those efforts that often have the best chance of winning support from the local population. Without such support, any security is temporary at best.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[BIGUN 1,482]

Quote

I believe that, in order to maximize the probability of success, efforts to implement |R| need to be made from the very beginning of operations. It is those efforts that often have the best chance of winning support from the local population. Without such support, any security is temporary at best.

I'm short on time, but wanted you to know that I've read this several times and you've made a great case regarding |R|. I need to think on this some more.

Nobody has time to listen; because they're desperately chasing the need of being heard.

[shropshire 0]

Quote

100 years in Iraq (McCain thinks this is OK) is a bit too long....

or for as long as the Oil lasts?

(.)Y(.)
Chivalry is not dead; it only sleeps for want of work to do. - Jerome K Jerome