Adm William Fallon -- the next Gen Eric Shinseki?

[Zenister 0]

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Before you get too far into the support of the General ranks, which is admirable, please take a moment to read this magnificent piece by the commander of my sister regiment.

I read LTC Yinglings article. IMO, he lacks understanding necessary to successfully lead an army into combat...

Willful ignorance?

there is a distinct difference between making hard decisions out of military necessity and accepting bad decisions for political appeasement.

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Or, more likely, he's sucking up to the political powers that be, perhaps looking for a promotion.

I'm not sure if speaking the truth as you see it qualifies as 'sucking up' and there are few in the military who are NOT looking to be promoted. One can only hope he avoids the lobotomy.

Here is an
interview click on access this item (pdf) that illustrates some of his points. Many thing ARE working in Iraq, however the man power required to do them on a large scale has never been present, and it has taken years of the 'wrong approach' (war fighting what the army is trained for) to get to the point where 'more humane' (cultural understanding) approach was applied. Years we created as many new enemies by our methods as the existing ones we captured/removed.

____________________________________
Those who fail to learn from the past are simply Doomed.

[mnealtx 0]

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The millitary phrase that applies in such situations is 'being set up for failure' and has been happening far to often under this administration.

Not just under this administration, although it certainly gets a lot more 'air time' than prior administrations.

Not really, mike. The last time we had a situation like this was Vietnam - where the politicians ran the war. And we saw what happened there.

Not really - I was thinking more on the lines of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. As I said, it's not just *THIS* administration.

Mike
I love you, Shannon and Jim.
POPS 9708 , SCR 14706

[nerdgirl 0]

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The millitary phrase that applies in such situations is 'being set up for failure' and has been happening far to often under this administration.

Not just under this administration, although it certainly gets a lot more 'air time' than prior administrations.

Not really, mike. The last time we had a situation like this was Vietnam - where the politicians ran the war. And we saw what happened there.

Not really - I was thinking more on the lines of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. As I said, it's not just *THIS* administration.

You’re both right – history may not be predictive but it should not be forgotten either.

One can find lots of examples from Vietnam era, e.g., HR McMaster’s neo-classic Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam comes to mind immediately. For the hardcore wonk: the declassified Army War College Study on Leadership from the early 1970's compared what the junior officers were saying about the conduct of the Viet Nam War to the General Officers. Not surprisingly they were not the same (to put it diplomatically).

In 1970, GEN Westmoreland commissioned a study on professionalism in the service that revealed many of the same problems cited by LTC Yingling. The subject has hardly been ignored. What is different is the LTC Yingling asserts that responsibility lies with the General Officer Corps rather than “general Army culture” or nebulous characteristics of training, military education, and promotion.

One can build an argument that the instances of Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo further support LTC Yingling’s core hypotheses/criticisms that General Officers (& implicitly civilian leadership) have (a) concentrated on conventional military operations and high-tech weaponry; (b) failed to train and equip the forces for the challenge of counterinsurgency operations (as you know, until FM 3-24 the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency had not been updated in 20 years; 25 years for the USMC), and (c) refused to adjust tactics to meet changing conditions in Iraq until >3 years into OIF.

LTC Yingling notes: “Despite paying lip service to ‘transformation’ throughout the 1990s, America’s armed forces failed to change in significant ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In ‘The Sling and the Stone,’ T.X. Hammes [COL, USMC (ret) & former Commander of CBIRF … or see his 4GW+ article in Military Review from last year] argues that the Defense Department’s transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars. [i.e., what I call the “Dark Empires” scenarios or "stuck in Fulda Gap mentality" when I'm feeling frustrated w/Soviet specialists - nerdgirl] The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.”

There’s a tactic in LTC Yingling’s article: while publicly criticizing the Army and its officers is risky, publicly criticizing the civilian leadership as a field grade officer is verboten. And I concur w/the jcd11235's rationale above.

The farthest LTC Yingling pushes in his AFJ article is near the conclusion: “While the physical courage of America’s generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters [Read: SecDef Rumsfeld, DepSecDef Wolfowitz, & USD-P Feith & the increased politicization of the promotion to General Officer that occurred during their tenure - nerdgirl]. Now that the public is immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.”

LTC Yingling’s article recommends increased Congressional oversight. The situation has to be dire for any member of the Executive Branch to *call for* increased Congressional involvement (!)

This has been a fantastic thread with intense dialogue – let’s keep it that way! Please …

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[mnealtx 0]

"You always train for the last war"

Mike
I love you, Shannon and Jim.
POPS 9708 , SCR 14706

[freakyrat 1]

There was a troop at Ft. Hood this past week that was going to get deployed for the third time to Iraq after only a short stint back home. He actually started cracking up and told his CO to F..ck Off.

A counselor told his CO that he is either going to go back and commit some atrocity on the Iraqis, get himself or someone in his unit killed or kill someone when he comes back home.

[nerdgirl 0]

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If the Pentagon or the CINC disregards the counsel of their generals (and admirals), it had better come after much deliberation, and there had better be a damn good reason for it. If there is a discrepancy between the opinions of the generals and the opinions of their leaders, the generals have two responsible options. They can suck it up and drive on, following orders, or they can resign their command. Public disagreement is bad for everyone involved, especially the troops.

For the large part, I concur. There is a legitimate conflict here: the job of someone in that position is to execute policy, not make it.

At this point I (& most of America) can only speculate whether he’s arrogantly forgotten that (he is a naval aviator after all), or if he is so frustrated and concerned about the what he considers less-than-wise decisions that may impact the nation and the military that he feels ethically prompted to speak out & that his concern has reached the level to warrant such action. Until information to the counter is presented, I’m going to assume the latter.

One area that has not been mentioned, is reconciling or considering that conflict w/r/t ethics and obligations. (Unfortunately I don’t know have the USN document cognitively or electronically accessible …) On loyalty the Army says to put: “Put obligations in correct order: the Constitution, the Army, the unit, and finally, self.” [Reference: “The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills” FM 3-21.75 (issued Jan 08), which includes the “Warrior Ethos” (warning: 28MB file)]

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The military is not a democracy. If soldiers don't obey orders, the military breaks down and soldiers die unnecessarily.

Having said that, the people need to reign in politicians who think that wars can be run from Washington. They cannot. How many times must we learn the same lesson before we are able to commit it to our collective memory? Generals should be given missions, to be accomplished as they see fit, within the guidelines of international law. Generals, and not politicians, are the experts of war. Generals should be trusted most in time of war. If the situation does not warrant that trust, then most likely, the situation does not warrant war.

From a realist (political theory rather than the colloquial meaning) perspective, my first-order response is will or have humans ever learned that? Is that in the nature of war & politics?

In another post you asked:

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Can you think of any examples in which politicians second-guessed multiple generals (that were in agreement with one another) and successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?

I can’t.

And since you previously cited Clausewitz, I’m going feel comfortable invoking “St Carl” too.
To that end, I am confident that one answer to the question you posed that I bolded above is *not* further increases in the civilian-military divide. To that end -- & perhaps the only specific point w/which I heartedly agree w/Rep Duncan Hunter (R-CA) -- Jr ROTC & ROTC needs to be in San Francisco, Berkeley, Ann Arbor, Austin, Madison, etc. I am hopeful that OIF & OEF will yield a new contingent of individuals with interest and experience in foreign affairs who will eventually progress into the House & Senate, as happened after WWII.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Para_Frog 1]

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In another post you asked:

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Can you think of any examples in which politicians second-guessed multiple generals (that were in agreement with one another) and successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?

I can’t.

I can.

Task Force Ranger.

Particular bullets from the AAR Decent Wiki Synopsis:

Service analyses of the action later identified three factors in the failure of the raid to achieve its objectives without serious casualties on both sides:

A failure of intelligence gathering, particularly in relying on local intelligence sources only and failing to recognize Aidid's capability in urban guerilla warfare;

A lack of political support for the Task Force Ranger mission, reflected in denial or removal of military support assets that would have aided the force, such as M-1 Abrams tanks and AC-130 Spectre gunships; and

A lack of decisive force by Task Force Ranger, including insufficient troops, equipment, and weaponry. Parts of all three failures led to the decision to use tactics successful in previous raids but inappropriate to downtown Mogadishu, and to launch the operation during daylight instead of at night.


Les Aspin took the fall for the bold bullet, but it has been widely reported that Bill Clinton was the driving force behind the denial. Regardless, it was politics over tactics that turned what could have been a very successful operation into an abortion.

Those assets, used as force multipiers, would have negated the other two.

[Harvey rant]IF you make the difficult decision to enter into an armed conflict, it is essential to cast aside collateral concerns and project overwhelming force until the objective is met.

THAT is what wins battles AND what rightfully makes such decisions difficult. Half-assing operations is the political equivalent of soothing your troubled conscience. "Well we tried not to cause undo harm...blah blah"

Once you have made the decision to act, have the balls to accept the horrible consequences. Do not make my men pay for your guilt.[/Harvey rant]

- Harvey, BASE 1232
TAN-I, IAD-I, S&TA

BLiNC Magazine Team Member

[kallend 2,150]

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In another post you asked:

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Can you think of any examples in which politicians second-guessed multiple generals (that were in agreement with one another) and successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?

I can’t.

I can.

Task Force Ranger.

Particular bullets from the AAR Decent Wiki Synopsis:

Service analyses of the action later identified three factors in the failure of the raid to achieve its objectives without serious casualties on both sides:

A failure of intelligence gathering, particularly in relying on local intelligence sources only and failing to recognize Aidid's capability in urban guerilla warfare;

A lack of political support for the Task Force Ranger mission, reflected in denial or removal of military support assets that would have aided the force, such as M-1 Abrams tanks and AC-130 Spectre gunships; and

A lack of decisive force by Task Force Ranger, including insufficient troops, equipment, and weaponry. Parts of all three failures led to the decision to use tactics successful in previous raids but inappropriate to downtown Mogadishu, and to launch the operation during daylight instead of at night.


Les Aspin took the fall for the bold bullet, but it has been widely reported that Bill Clinton was the driving force behind the denial. Regardless, it was politics over tactics that turned what could have been a very successful operation into an abortion.

Those assets, used as force multipiers, would have negated the other two.

[Harvey rant]IF you make the difficult decision to enter into an armed conflict, it is essential to cast aside collateral concerns and project overwhelming force until the objective is met.

THAT is what wins battles AND what rightfully makes such decisions difficult. Half-assing operations is the political equivalent of soothing your troubled conscience. "Well we tried not to cause undo harm...blah blah"

Once you have made the decision to act, have the balls to accept the horrible consequences. Do not make my men pay for your guilt.[/Harvey rant]

Apparently you completely misread the question, which was:

"...successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?"

You described the exact opposite.

...

The only sure way to survive a canopy collision is not to have one.

[Para_Frog 1]

Wow. No shit.

Thanks Doc.

Everyone nevermind.

But that opposite wasn't bad dammit.

- Harvey, BASE 1232
TAN-I, IAD-I, S&TA

BLiNC Magazine Team Member

[jcd11235 0]

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In another post you asked:

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Can you think of any examples in which politicians second-guessed multiple generals (that were in agreement with one another) and successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?

I can’t.

I can.
…
Les Aspin took the fall for the bold bullet, but it has been widely reported that Bill Clinton was the driving force behind the denial. Regardless, it was politics over tactics that turned what could have been a very successful operation into an abortion.

Which is exactly why it wasn't an example of politicians second-guessing military commanders, with those second-guesses having a beneficial effect on the outcome of the conflict. Perhaps I was not clear in my original assertion. Let me restate it:

Military commanders are better qualified than politicians to make decisions regarding resources and effective strategies necessary to accomplish military missions.

The wiki article doesn't offer any insight into what resources military commanders advised were necessary versus what resources they were actually authorized. Furthermore, we have the luxury of hindsight, which was not afforded those who were tasked with evaluating the situation and planning the operation. Having said that, I find it highly unlikely that the military commanders did not request more resources than were ultimately authorized for the operation.

Edit: This post was written prior to reading Para_Frog's response to Kallend, above.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[nerdgirl 0]

Even tho’ it may not have been your initial intention, thanks for bringing in a hardcore, real-world example of failure when strategy is disconnected from the operational ‘ground truths’/requirements and that illustrates breakdown across the needed ends, ways, & means.

In the case of Somalia, *indirect action* was not appropriate to accomplish the mission’s goal. It’s hard to indirectly capture a warload.

In the context of ADM Fallon’s resignation and surrounding politics, one can speculate that he’s trying to avoid that kind of breakdown in a potential situation (i.e., US direct action toward Iran), which would necessitate substantially more troops, equipment, and weaponry than the Battle of Mogadishu.

Repeatedly – from last November’s piece in UK’s Financial Times:

“None of this is helped by the continuing stories that just keep going around and around and around that any day now there will be another war which is just not where we want to go … Getting Iranian behaviour to change and finding ways to get them to come to their senses and do that is the real objective. Attacking them as a means to get to that spot strikes me as being not the first choice in my book. There has got to be some combination of strength and willingness to engage. How to come up with the right combination of that is the real trick.”

to the more recent Esquire article, ADM Fallon has emphasized indirect action.

So here's the underlying question: How does today’s military balance requirements to do both direct and indirect actions? (And we have to figure out how to pay for it too …)

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

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To that end -- & perhaps the only specific point w/which I heartedly agree w/Rep Duncan Hunter (R-CA) -- Jr ROTC & ROTC needs to be in San Francisco, Berkeley, Ann Arbor, Austin, Madison, etc. I am hopeful that OIF & OEF will yield a new contingent of individuals with interest and experience in foreign affairs who will eventually progress into the House & Senate, as happened after WWII.

I agree. While I believe US foreign policy has, at times, relied on the premature use of military force, I also believe that an understanding of military philosophy, structure and discipline is important for our civilian leaders. While I do not believe that military experience is a necessary or sufficient condition of that understanding, it is certainly an avenue that offers the opportunity of a better understanding. JROTC and ROTC also offer strong potential for the discovery and promotion of such interests.

As Sun Tzu wrote many centuries ago, "The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected." (Giles translation)

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[nerdgirl 0]

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Can you think of any examples in which politicians second-guessed multiple generals (that were in agreement with one another) and successfully snatched victory from the jaws of defeat?

...

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Which is exactly why it wasn't an example of politicians second-guessing military commanders, with those second-guesses having a beneficial effect on the outcome of the conflict. Perhaps I was not clear in my original assertion. Let me restate it:

Military commanders are better qualified than politicians to make decisions regarding resources and effective strategies necessary to accomplish military missions.

Isn’t that true of almost any field? E.g., medical doctors are more qualified to make decisions regarding healthcare, macro-economists are more qualified to make decisions regarding the economy; skydivers are more qualified …, etc.

What about substituting “elected representatives of the American citizenry” for “politicians”? Does that change it substantially?

Pragmatically, would you disagree that both the day-to-day and many of the larger/longterm resource and strategic decisions w/in the services are made by military commanders: from setting acquisition requirements (through J-8) to budgets and the POM?

Where’s the boundary between (across?) those decisions that should be up to ‘politicians’ per the US representative democracy and Constitution versus those that should be the military commanders? A single boundary point/metric is likely to be completely inappropriate application to all situation … but in the one central to the subject of this thread (at least im-ever-ho) of US military action toward Iran? I don’t know.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Amazon 7]

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While I do not believe that military experience is a necessary or sufficient condition of that understanding, it is certainly an avenue that offers the opportunity of a better understanding. JROTC and ROTC also offer strong potential for the discovery and promotion of such interests.

The current problem is you have someone who THINKS he knows the military.. he went to basic as an airman...and then was put directly into the officer corp without even any grounding in doctrine or history or tactics or strategy, etc.

Hell he could not even complete his whole term of service nor perform his primary duty as a pilot for more than a few months( you have to go thru little details like physicals.. chamber rides.. etc to maintain your flight status).. yet feels he is qualified to be a military expert

A certain corporal comes to mind in a historical context

[SpeedRacer 1]

Here's another line from the same work:

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns.


Actually, by reading through Sun Tszu's Art of War, it becomes pretty clear that no one in the Bush administration has ever read it.

Speed Racer
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[FreeflyChile 0]

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6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.

Other than the *minor* detail of thousands of dead soldiers, didn't the US generally benefit from World War 2?

[SpeedRacer 1]

1) That war was over in 4 years.

2) We were paying off the debts of that war for decades. (and no, WWII did NOT "get us out of the Depression" as some people seem to think)

Speed Racer
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[FreeflyChile 0]

So what counts as prolonged?

[SpeedRacer 1]

Ask Sun Tszu.

I guess "prolonged" would be: Perpetual foreign occupation & war with no end in sight & no exit strategy.

And whenever anyone asks for a coherent exit strategy, they are accused of wanting to "surrender."

Speed Racer
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[nerdgirl 0]

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he went to basic as an airman...and then was put directly into the officer corp without even any grounding in doctrine or history or tactics or strategy, etc.

Pulling back from the current CINC, was that the standard situation? Was that a problem of training & education?

More importantly (im-ever-ho), underlying what you wrote is a profound question on the nature of qualification to be CINC and also one of the questions that was asked in a recent survey, “The U.S. Military Index,” conducted by Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security [w/which former SecNav Richard Danzing, Joe Cirinicione, and soon-to-be-retired-counterinsurgency 'guru' LTC John Nagl (USA) -nerdgirl], who “surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of command about the state of the U.S. military.”

To be upfront there are some problems with the survey pool, which FP & CNAS has been completely forthright regarding, principally something like 70% of the respondents were retired, many for >10 years, and the survey pool was restricted to field grade officers and above (i.e., Army, Air Force & Marine Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels; Navy Commanders and Captains; and General Officers).

W/r/t elected leaders:

“When asked how much confidence they have in other U.S. government institutions and departments, the index’s officers report low levels of trust nearly across the board. For instance, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means the officers have a great deal of confidence in the department or institution and 1 means they have none, the officers put their level of confidence in the presidency at 5.5. Some 16 percent express no confidence at all in the president. The index’s officers gave the CIA an average confidence rating of 4.7 and the Department of State, 4.1. The Department of Veterans Affairs received a confidence rating of just 4.5 and the Department of Defense, 5.6. The officers say their level of confidence in the U.S. Congress is the lowest, at an average of just 2.7.

“These negative perceptions of U.S. agencies and officials may stem in part from the fact that a majority of the officers polled for the index do not believe that the United States’ elected leaders are very well informed about the military they oversee. Sixty-six percent of the officers say they believe America’s elected leaders are either somewhat or very uninformed about the U.S. military.

“How can the military’s perception of elected leaders be improved? In part, the officers say, by electing people who have served in uniform. Nearly 9 in 10 officers agree that, all other things being equal, the military will respect a president of the United States who has served in the military more than one who has not. The people we trust most are often the ones who remind us of ourselves.”

Some may extrapolate the last sentence to the wider population.

VR/Marg

p.s. Thanks for helping keep the thread focused! Much appreciated!

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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I also believe that an understanding of military philosophy, structure and discipline is important for our civilian leaders. While I do not believe that military experience is a necessary or sufficient condition of that understanding, it is certainly an avenue that offers the opportunity of a better understanding. JROTC and ROTC also offer strong potential for the discovery and promotion of such interests.

As Sun Tzu wrote many centuries ago, "The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected." (Giles translation)

I do believe we have reached that point of, as they say, 'violent agreement' here.
And just because I feel naked w/out at least one reference, words from a more recent military commentator.

Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Amazon 7]

Well there is this

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=George_W._Bush's_military_service

and this

http://www.hereinreality.com/commander.html

The Washington Post reports that Bush joined the National Guard 12 days before his student deferment would have expired, and that in spite of his low score on the pilot's aptitude test (25, the lowest score allowed), and in spite of the waiting list that some kids spent years on, Bush was sworn in as an airman the day he applied. Indeed, so giddy was Bush's commander, Col. Walter B. "Buck" Staudt, that he later staged a special ceremony so he could have his picture taken giving Bush the oath, instead of the captain who actually had sworn Bush in. Bush spent two years learning to fly airplanes in his home state of Texas.

And this

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/bush072899.htm

This one is pretty harsh

http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/opinion/lechliter.pdf

[jcd11235 0]

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Isn’t that true of almost any field? E.g., medical doctors are more qualified to make decisions regarding healthcare, macro-economists are more qualified to make decisions regarding the economy; skydivers are more qualified …, etc.

Excepting economists (I believe mathematicians are more qualified to make unbiased decisions regarding the economy.), my answer is yes. Unfortunately, expert advice is all too often disregarded for the sake of political expediency, among other possible reasons.

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What about substituting “elected representatives of the American citizenry” for “politicians”? Does that change it substantially?

In most cases, I wouldn't think it would. However, everyone, including elected representatives, have their area of expertise. If, for example, Colin Powell were CINC, I would be less concerned about the CINC second-guessing military leaders, since military leadership is an area of expertise for General Powell. Of course, due to that expertise, he would be more likely to follow his general staff's advice.

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Pragmatically, would you disagree that both the day-to-day and many of the larger/longterm resource and strategic decisions w/in the services are made by military commanders: from setting acquisition requirements (through J-8) to budgets and the POM?

Since my military experience is limited to an active duty combat arms MOS and a subsequent REMF Army Reserves assignment, I don't feel qualified to offer an opinion. I simply don't have sufficient knowledge.

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Where’s the boundary between (across?) those decisions that should be up to ‘politicians’ per the US representative democracy and Constitution versus those that should be the military commanders? A single boundary point/metric is likely to be completely inappropriate application to all situation … but in the one central to the subject of this thread (at least im-ever-ho) of US military action toward Iran? I don’t know.

That's a very good question, and one that I don't have an answer for. The only thing I'm confident about is that there is no easy answer. Some of my thoughts:

Once a political decision to go to war is made, a concrete mission, as well as total control of the troops could be given to the commanding general. From there, the only control the politicians have over the army is the ability to change the mission; they would not be able to dictate how a given mission is carried out. This approach has its own problems, not the least of which being violation of Article II Section 2 of the US Constitution. Such a policy would also significantly increase the potential of an attempted military coup. The latter danger could be mitigated with a policy, similar to a law in ancient Rome, IIRC, that the action of stepping onto US soil automatically relieves the general of his command. That's also consistent with Sun Tzu's observation that the same characteristics that make one a good offensive general make him/her a poor defensive general, and vice versa.

Another possible approach, also not terribly practical, would be to require troops to furnish their own personal equipment, with the intent of creating an army made up of troops from a much higher social class. Presumably, Congress and the President would be much more reluctant to put these troops in harms way without due consideration and sufficient resources to accomplish the mission.

I think both approaches have significant problems, and I'm not trying to promote the adoption of either. But your question is one that I've given much consideration over the years. I still don't have an answer.

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[jcd11235 0]

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Actually, by reading through Sun Tszu's Art of War, it becomes pretty clear that no one in the Bush administration has ever read it.

I think General Powell did. At the very least his Powell Doctrine shows a more thorough understanding of On War than many other generals have displayed.

Of course, Gen. Powell advised the President against invading Iraq.

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[jcd11235 0]

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6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.

Other than the *minor* detail of thousands of dead soldiers, didn't the US generally benefit from World War 2?

Could we have endured a shorter war at lower costs (in lives and financial terms) had we arrived at the party a little bit earlier? Certainly things could have ended up worse after WWII, but I don't think it's unrealistic to consider that if some decisions had been made differently, things could have ended better, also.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!