SpeedRacer 1 #1 November 15, 2004 My Dad forwarded this to me. sorry about all the little arrows. ---------------- Foreign Policy Research Institute >> A Catalyst for Ideas >> www.fpri.org >> >> UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS >> by Marc Sageman >> >> November 1, 2004 >> >> Marc Sageman, a newly appointed FPRI Senior fellow, was a CIA case >> officer >> in Afghanistan between 1987-89 and is now a forensic psychiatrist. This >> essay is based on his FPRI BookTalk on October 6, 2004. His book, >> "Understanding Terror Networks," was published by the University of >> Pennsylvania Press earlier this year. >> >> >> UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS >> >> by Marc Sageman >> >> After leaving the CIA, I was happy in my naive belief that I had left all >> that behind me. But after 9-11, like everyone, I wanted to do something. >> What people were saying about the perpetrators shortly after the attacks >> was >> simply not consistent with my own experience. I began to apply the >> principles of evidence-based medicine to terrorism research, because >> there >> really was no data on the perpetrators. There were theories, opinions, >> and >> anecdotal evidence, but there was no systematic gathering of data. >> >> I started gathering terrorist biographies from various sources, mostly >> from >> the records of trials. The trial that took place in New York in 2001 in >> connection with the 1998 embassy bombing, for instance, was 72 days long >> and >> had a wealth of information, 9,000 pages of it. I wanted to collect >> this >> information to test the conventional wisdom about terrorism. With some >> 400 >> biographies, all in a matrix, I began social-network analysis of this >> group. >> >> BACKGROUND >> We all know that Al Qaeda is a violent, Islamist, revivalist social >> movement, held together by a common vision of a Salafi state. Al Qaeda >> proper is just a small organization within this larger social movement. >> We >> often mistake the social movement for Al Qaeda and vice versa because for >> about five years, Al Qaeda had more or less control of the social >> movement. >> >> The segment that poses a threat to the United States came out of Egypt. >> Most of the leadership and the whole ideology of Al Qaeda derives from >> Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and his progeny, who killed Anwar >> Sadat and were arrested in October 1981. President Mubarak generously >> allowed them to be released in 1984. >> >> Many of the released men, harassed by the Egyptian police, migrated to >> Afghanistan. With the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, they continued on to >> jihad. These Arab outsiders actually did not fight in the Soviet-Afghan >> War except for one small battle at Jaji/Ali Kheyl, which was really >> defensive: the Arabs had put their camp on the main logistic supply line, >> and in the spring of 1987 the Soviets tried to destroy it. So they were >> really more the recipient of a Soviet offensive, but they really did not >> fight in that war and thus the U.S. had absolutely no contact with them. >> I >> heard about the battle of Jaji at the time, and it never dawned on me to >> ask >> the Afghans I debriefed who the Arabs were. They turned out to be bin >> Laden >> and his men at the Al-Masada (Lion's Den) camp. >> >> After the war, a lot of these foreigners returned to their countries. >> Those >> who could not return because they were terrorists remained in >> Afghanistan. >> In 1991, Algeria and Egypt complained to Pakistan that it was harboring >> terrorists, so Pakistan expelled them. Thus the most militant of these >> terrorists made their way to Khartoum, where they were invited by Hassan >> al-Turabi of the National Islamic Front in Khartoum. >> >> The Khartoum period is critical, because what these violent Salafists >> basically want to do is to create a Salafi state in a core Arab country. >> Salafi (from Salaf, "ancient ones" or "predecessors" in Arabic) is an >> emulation, an imitation of the mythical Muslim community that existed at >> the >> time of Mohammed and his companion, which Salafists believe was the only >> fair and just society that ever existed. A very small subset of Salafis, >> the disciples of Qutb, believe they cannot create this state peacefully >> through the ballot-box but have to use violence. The utopia they strive >> for >> is similar to most utopias in European thought of the nineteenth to the >> twentieth centuries, such as the communist classless society. >> >> In Khartoum, the Salafists theorized that the reason they had been unable >> to >> overthrow their own government (the "near enemy") was because it was >> propped >> up by the "far enemy" -- the United States. So they decided to redirect >> their efforts and, instead of going after their own government, to attack >> the "far enemy." In 1996, for many reasons, Hassan al-Bashir, the >> President >> of Sudan, had to expel Al Qaeda after the imposition of international >> sanctions, because the Sudanese Government was implicated in the attempt >> to >> assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995. In >> August >> 1996, within two months of returning to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a >> fatwa declaring war on the United States. >> >> The fatwa clearly articulated the new goals of this movement, which were >> to >> get the U.S. out of the Middle East so they would be free to overthrow >> the >> Saudi monarchy or the Egyptian regime and establish a Salafi state. This >> remains their goal and is why 9-11 happened. This is why the embassy >> bombing happened. It's really not so much to destroy the United States, >> something they know they cannot do right now. This is all why I put the >> start of the threat against us at 1996. >> >> THE DATA >> The 400 terrorists on whom I've collected data were the ones who actually >> targeted the "far enemy," the U.S., as opposed to their own governments. >> I >> wanted to limit myself for analytical purity to that group, to see if I >> could identify anything different from other terrorist movements, which >> were >> far more nationalistic. >> >> Most people think that terrorism comes from poverty, broken families, >> ignorance, immaturity, lack of family or occupational responsibilities, >> weak >> minds susceptible to brainwashing -- the sociopath, the criminals, the >> religious fanatic, or, in this country, some believe they're just plain >> evil. >> >> Taking these perceived root causes in turn, three-quarters of my sample >> came >> from the upper or middle class. The vast majority -- 90 percent -- came >> from caring, intact families. Sixty-three percent had gone to college, >> as >> compared with the 5-6 percent that's usual for the third world. These >> are >> the best and brightest of their societies in many ways. >> >> Al Qaeda's members are not the Palestinian fourteen-year-olds we see on >> the >> news, but join the jihad at the average age of 26. Three-quarters were >> professionals or semi-professionals. They are engineers, architects, and >> civil engineers, mostly scientists. Very few humanities are represented, >> and quite surprisingly very few had any background in religion. The >> natural sciences predominate. Bin Laden himself is a civil engineer, >> Zawahiri is a physician, Mohammed Atta was, of course, an architect; and >> a >> few members are military, such as Mohammed Ibrahim Makawi, who is >> supposedly >> the head of the military committee. >> >> Far from having no family or job responsibilities, 73 percent were >> married >> and the vast majority had children. Those who were not married were >> usually >> too young to be married. Only 13 percent were madrassa-trained and most >> of >> them come from what I call the Southeast Asian sample, the Jemaah >> Islamiyya >> (JI). They had gone to schools headed by Sungkar and Bashir. Sungkar >> was >> the head of JI; he died in 1999. His successor, Bashir, is the cleric >> who >> is being tried for the Jakarta Marriott bombing of August 2003; he is >> also >> suspected of planning the October 2002 Bali bombing. >> >> As a psychiatrist, originally I was looking for any characteristic common >> to >> these men. But only four of the 400 men had any hint of a disorder. >> This >> is below the worldwide base rate for thought disorders. So they are as >> healthy as the general population. I didn't find many personality >> disorders, which makes sense in that people who are antisocial usually >> don't >> cooperate well enough with others to join groups. This is a >> well-organized >> type of terrorism: these men are not like Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, loners >> off planning in the woods. Loners are weeded out early on. Of the >> nineteen >> 9-11 terrorists, none had a criminal record. You could almost say that >> those least likely to cause harm individually are most likely to do so >> collectively. >> >> At the time they joined jihad, the terrorists were not very religious. >> They >> only became religious once they joined the jihad. Seventy percent of my >> sample joined the jihad while they were living in another country from >> where >> they grew up. So someone from country A is living in country B and going >> after country C -- the United States. This is very different from the >> usual terrorist of the past, someone from country A, living in country A, >> going after country A's government. I want to remind that I'm addressing >> my >> sample of those who attacked the U.S., not Palestinians, Chechens, >> Kashmiris, etc. >> >> France happened to generate a lot of my sample, fourth behind Saudi >> Arabia, >> Egypt, and Morocco. Eighty percent were, in some way, totally excluded >> from >> the society they lived in. Sixty-eight percent either had preexisting >> friendships with people already in the jihad or were part of a group of >> friends who collectively joined the jihad together: this is typical of >> the >> Hamburg group that did 9-11, the Montreal group that included Ahmed >> Ressam, >> the millennial bomber. Another 20 percent had close family bonds to the >> jihad. The Khadr family from Toronto is typical: the father, Ahmed Saeed >> Khadr, who had a computer engineering degree from Ottawa and was killed >> in >> Pakistan in October 2003, got his five sons involved: all of them trained >> in >> al Qaeda camps and one has been held for killing a U.S. medic. Their >> mother >> is involved in financing the group. >> >> So between the two, you have 88 percent with friendship/family bonds to >> the >> jihad; the rest are usually disciples of Bashir and Sungkar. But that's >> not >> the whole story. They also seem to have clustered around ten mosques >> worldwide that generated about 50 percent of my sample. If you add the >> two >> institutions in Indonesia, twelve institutions generated 60 percent of my >> sample. So, you're talking about a very select, small group of people. >> This is not as widespread as people think. >> >> So what's in common? There's really no profile, just similar >> trajectories >> to joining the jihad and that most of these men were upwardly and >> geographically mobile. Because they were the best and brightest, they >> were >> sent abroad to study. They came from moderately religious, caring, >> middle-class families. They're skilled in computer technology. They >> spoke >> three, four, five, six languages. Most Americans don't know Arabic; >> these >> men know two or three Western languages: German, French, English. >> >> When they became homesick, they did what anyone would and tried to >> congregate with people like themselves, whom they would find at mosques. >> So >> they drifted towards the mosque, not because they were religious, but >> because they were seeking friends. They moved in together in apartments, >> in >> order to share the rent and also to eat together -- they were mostly >> halal, >> those who observed the Muslim dietary laws, similar in some respects to >> the >> kosher laws of Judaism. Some argue that such laws help to bind a group >> together since observing them is something very difficult and more easily >> done in a group. A micro-culture develops that strengthens and absorbs >> the >> participants as a unit. This is a halal theory of terrorism, if you >> like. >> >> These cliques, often in the vicinity of mosques that had a militant >> script >> advocating violence to overthrow the corrupt regimes, transformed >> alienated >> young Muslims into terrorists. It's all really group dynamics. You >> cannot >> understand the 9/11 type of terrorism from individual characteristics. >> The >> suicide bombers in Spain are another perfect example. Seven terrorists >> sharing an apartment and one saying "Tonight we're all going to go, >> guys." >> You can't betray your friends, and so you go along. Individually, they >> probably would not have done it. >> >> There are potentially a lot of groups of guys around the world, who want >> to >> do something but just don't know how to do it. After 9-11, the whole >> network changed completely. There is no recruitment, really. In my >> sample, >> I have found no case of a recruiter. They're all volunteers. Before >> 9-11, >> a group like the Lackawanna Six would go to Afghanistan to fight a jihad. >> When they got to Afghanistan, they heard all this propaganda against the >> United States. They realized they were in the wrong place, got scared, >> and >> wanted to get out -- they had no intention of becoming terrorists >> afterwards. Even the prosecution never suggested that they would have >> become terrorists. They had broken the law by going to a terrorist >> organization, so they pled guilty to aiding and abetting a terrorist >> organization, but there was no hint that they would have become >> terrorists. >> >> Indeed, there are not that many terrorists in America. There have never >> been any sleeper cells. All the terrorists are fairly obvious. The FBI >> cases we see in the press tend to unravel. The Detroit group has been >> exonerated, and the prosecutor is now being prosecuted for malfeasance >> on >> the planted evidence. He allegedly knew exculpatory facts that he did >> not >> present to the defense. The only sleeper America has ever had in a >> century >> was Soviet Col. Rudolf Abel, who was arrested in the late 1950s and >> exchanged for Gary Powers, the U2 pilot. Eastern European countries did >> send sleepers to this country, men fully trained who "go to sleep" -- >> lead >> normal lives -- and then are activated to become fully operational. But >> they all became Americans. >> >> In order to really sustain your motivation to do terrorism, you need the >> reinforcement of group dynamics. You need reinforcement from your >> family, >> your friends. This social movement was dependent on volunteers, and >> there >> are huge gaps worldwide on those volunteers. One of the gaps is the >> United >> States. This is one of two reasons we have not had a major terrorist >> operation in the United States since 9/11. The other is that we are far >> more vigilant. We have actually made coming to the U.S. far more >> difficult >> for potential terrorists since 2001. >> >> Until late 2001, the terror network was the project of al-Turabi, who in >> the >> early 1990s had invited all the Muslim terrorists to Khartoum. That's >> how >> Al Qaeda learned about truck bombing from Hezbollah. Then when they were >> expelled from Khartoum, bin Laden had a deal with Mullah Omar where he >> actually had a monopoly of sanctuaries in Afghanistan -- the training >> camp, >> housing, funding. Instead of raising theirown money, it was much easier >> to >> go to bin Laden for it. And so, by his control of training camps, >> sanctuaries, and funding for five years, bin Laden was able to dominate >> this >> movement >> >> But after 2001, when the U.S. destroyed the camps and housing and turned >> off >> the funding, bin Laden was left with little control. The movement has >> now >> degenerated into something like the internet. Spontaneous groups of >> friends, as in Madrid and Casablanca, who have few links to any central >> leadership, are generating sometimes very dangerous terrorist operations, >> notwithstanding their frequent errors and poor training. What tipped the >> Madrid group to operation was probably the arrest of someof their friends >> after the Casablanca bombing. Most of them were Moroccans and the >> Moroccan >> government asked the Spaniards to arrest several militants. So the >> group >> was activated, wanting to do something. Their inspiration -- the >> document >> "Jihad al-Iraq" -- probably was found on the Web. Six of its 42 pages >> argued that if there were bombings right before Spanish election, it >> could >> effect a change of government and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from >> Iraq, the expulsion of the "far enemy" from a core Arab state. From >> conception to execution, the operation took about five weeks. >> >> We hear that Al Qaeda plans its attacks for years and years. It may have >> before 9-11, but not anymore. Operatives in caves simply cannot >> communicate >> with people in the field. The network has been fairly well broken by our >> intelligence services. The network is now self-organized from the bottom >> up, and is very decentralized. With local initiative and flexibility, >> it's very robust. True, two-thirds to three-quarters of the old leaders >> have been taken out, but that doesn't mean that we're home free. The >> network grows organically, like the Internet. We couldn't have >> identified >> the Madrid culprits, because we wouldn't have known of them until the >> first >> bomb exploded. >> >> So in 2004, Al Qaeda has new leadership. In a way today's operatives are >> far more aggressive and senseless than the earlier leaders. The whole >> network is held together by the vision of creating the Salafi state. A >> fuzzy, idea-based network really requires an idea-based solution. The >> war >> of ideas is very important and this is one we haven't really started to >> engage yet. >> Speed Racer -------------------------------------------------- Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
SpeedRacer 1 #2 November 16, 2004 well I posted this originally in the Bonfire because of its non-partisan nature. It was ignored there, probably due to the complete absence of boobies. Then it got moved here to Speakers Corner. And it was ignored here due to its non-partisan nature. Speed Racer -------------------------------------------------- Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
lawrocket 3 #3 November 16, 2004 QuoteIn August 1996, within two months of returning to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on the United States. Right there, I know it's bullshit. We all know that they declared war on us with Dubya in office. To day that it happened on Clinton's watch is ridiculous. My wife is hotter than your wife. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
nacmacfeegle 0 #4 November 16, 2004 "Then it got moved here to Speakers Corner. And it was ignored here due to its non-partisan nature." Obviously there is no place in this forum for factual, non controversial postings. To me, the piece is incomplete, it merely describes one flavour of terrorist, there are many including ETA, IRA, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. It kind of annoys me that people talking about terrorists tend to focus only on AQ, even though it is understandable, it does niggle me. I grew up with the Baader Meinhoff, Red Brigades, IRA, and Black September/PLO/PLFP etc filling the headlines, those were really confusing times.-------------------- He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. Thomas Jefferson Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
storm1977 0 #5 November 16, 2004 QuoteQuoteIn August 1996, within two months of returning to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on the United States. Right there, I know it's bullshit. We all know that they declared war on us with Dubya in office. To day that it happened on Clinton's watch is ridiculous. WHAT?????? It is common knowledge it happend in '96' http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html ----------------------------------------------------- Sometimes it is more important to protect LIFE than Liberty Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
SpeedRacer 1 #6 November 17, 2004 lawrocket: you should have used this icon to indicate a "tongue in cheek" statement. Speed Racer -------------------------------------------------- Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
