bumper crops of opium-

[smiles 0]

Thursday, December 11, 2003
OTTAWA -- U.S. President George W. Bush is grateful for help in the war on terrorism and is ''working'' to include Canada in hefty contracts to help rebuild Iraq.

I was reading the other day that "The Golden Crescent" (A mountainous area of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan where opium has been grown for hundreds of years) is having it's biggest opium crop since before the Taliban regime.

The US State Department gave a $43 million grant to the Taliban government months before the attacks of 9/11 as a reward for curbing opium production. Now that the Taliban have been overthrown and replaced by US-sanctioned government- Afghanistan is bringing in bumper crops of opium.

George Bush tells us that we have to cut off funding to terrorists----yet no attempts of destroying the opium fields has been made?? Whatz up with that?

SMiles

[JohnRich 4]

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Now that the Taliban have been overthrown and replaced by US-sanctioned government- Afghanistan is bringing in bumper crops of opium. George Bush tells us that we have to cut off funding to terrorists----yet no attempts of destroying the opium fields has been made?? Whatz up with that?

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
Afghanistan Opium Survey (Note: 3 Megabytes)

Background:

During the second half of the 1990s Afghanistan became the world’s largest source of illicit opium and its derivative, heroin. In recent years, the country has produced more than 3,000 metric tons of illicit opium annually (over 2/3 of the world’s production). About 10
million people (2/3 of opiate abusers in the world) now consume opiates of Afghan origin. Among the most affected societies are Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, Russia and Europe. Heroin injecting is also fuelling the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Central Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe. Along the trafficking chain from Afghanistan to Europe, it is estimated that more than half a million people are involved in the international trade of illicit Afghan opiates, which generates a total turn-over of about US$30 billion annually.

In 2001, following the ban imposed by the former Taliban regime, an abrupt decline of illicit opium poppy cultivation interrupted a two-decade increase. It also stimulated a subsequent 10-fold increase in opium prices. After the fall of that regime, cultivation resumed at a high level in 2002 and started to spread outside the traditional areas. Although a new ban was issued in January 2002, poor compliance with the law has so far hindered efforts by the new government to curb opium cultivation – an activity further stimulated by its high revenue.

Conclusion:

The results of the 2003 survey confirm that opium poppy cultivation and production continued to increase, though moderately, in Afghanistan. Their extension to previously unaffected, or marginally affected, areas is worrying. It can partly be explained by the persistence of high opium prices, which stimulate an activity now involving 264,000 rural families (representing 1.7 million people, or 7% of Afghanistan’s population). These families derive a potential income from opium that amounts to about US$ 1.02 billion in 2003. Although it is down 15% from last year, that income is still equivalent to almost one fifth of the country’s legitimate GDP. Taking into account the additional profits made by traffickers, the Afghan authorities must grapple, in their efforts to rebuild the country, with an illicit opium economy that generates revenues about half the size of the legitimate GDP. Even if forecasts of rapid growth of the legal economy materialize, the huge revenues generated by the illicit opium economy will continue to compromise governance of the country. The Afghan Government has developed a drug control strategy to tackle the formidable task of dismantling the drug economy. Achieving that objective requires the implementation, under adverse conditions, of a complex and well balanced set of measures. They must increase the risk of illegality, unknot the intricate web of warlords and traffickers’ relations and remove the pressure they exert on local communities, while creating a socioeconomic environment that offers a way of life to rural households that reconciles the need to secure bare necessities with a sense of civic responsibility. Reaching these goals demands an effort on the part of Afghan society that is unlikely to be sustained unless the international community demonstrates an equal determination to support it.

The Survey shows that in 2003 Afghanistan again produced three-quarters of the world’s illicit opium. While this is disheartening, the preconditions for change are slowly being put in place. The recently adopted National Drug Control Strategy, for example, foresees rural development and law enforcement initiatives. Similarly, the new drug control law aims to counter opium trafficking and money laundering, reduce abuse and enhance international cooperation.

The experience of several countries in Asia and Latin America demonstrates that the dismantling of a drug economy can be a long and complex process, lasting a generation, or even longer. A generation is a long time. This prompts the question -- can Afghanistan, with its democratisation threatened by old terrorists and new drug barons; neighbouring countries, affected by drug addiction, an HIV/AIDS pandemic, corruption and violence; and the international community, with its 10 million people addicted to Afghan opiates – afford to wait that long? This Survey shows that in 2003 the income of Afghan opium farmers and traffickers was about $2.3 billion, a sum equivalent to half the legitimate GDP of the country. Out of this drug chest, some provincial administrators and military commanders take a considerable share: the more they get used to this, the less likely it becomes that they will respect the law, be loyal to Kabul and support the legal economy. Terrorists take a cut as well: the longer this happens, the greater the threat to security within the country and on its borders.

There is a palpable risk that Afghanistan will again turn into a failed state, this time in the hands of drug cartels and narco-terrorists -- a risk referred to more than once by President Karzai, whom I salute for his courage and dedication. The country is at a crossroads: either (i) energetic interdiction measures are taken now, and supported by the international community; or (ii) the drug cancer in Afghanistan will keep spreading and metastasise into corruption, violence and terrorism – within and beyond the country’s borders.

Yet, law enforcement alone cannot suffice. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime calls on the international community for adequate resources to help rebuild the economy of Afghanistan where far too many people still have no food security, no electricity, no running water, no roads, no schools and no health services.

My comments:

The Taliban might have been able to reduce it because they were brutal and ruthless, and didn't worry about things like constitutional rights and fair justice. It is not fair to say that Pres. Bush is doing nothing, as this report indicates. It is a huge, complex, and messy problem. It looks like the current Afghan rule is trying to stop the drugs, with our help, but it isn't easy with that much remote territory, that many people involved in it, and that much money to be made. We can't even stop illegal drugs in our own country, with vastly more police working on the problem. And our primary goal in Afghanistan is to root out and stop terrorists, while the drugs would be secondary to that mission.

[Kennedy 0]

How many times must we make the point that there is a difference between $43 million in food aid and a $43 million grant?

witty subliminal message
Guard your honor, let your reputation fall where it will, and outlast the bastards.
1*

[freeflir29 0]

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And our primary goal in Afghanistan is to root out and stop terrorists, while the drugs would be secondary to that mission.

1 is the other......the sooner we become comfortable with that....the better off we will be.